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010   $a1-283-51558-X
010   $a1-4519-0860-1
010   $a9786613828033
035   $a(CKB)3360000000443731
035   $a(EBL)3014528
035   $a(SSID)ssj0000943068
035   $a(PQKBManifestationID)11558966
035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943068
035   $a(PQKBWorkID)10975060
035   $a(PQKB)11574660
035   $a(OCoLC)694141232
035   $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014528
035   $a(IMF)WPIEE2006064
035   $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443731
100   $a20020129d2006      uf             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aSovereign Insurance and Program Design : $eWhat is Optimal for the Sovereign? /$fMiguel Messmacher
210  1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006.
215   $a1 online resource (30 p.)
225 1 $aIMF Working Papers
300   $a"March 2006."
311   $a1-4518-6324-1 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE""; ""III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE""; ""IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER""; ""V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS""; ""REFERENCES""
330 3 $aThe design of the optimal sovereign insurance contract is analyzed when: the sovereign chooses the contract; effort is not contractible; shocks are of uncertain magnitude; the sovereign can save; and the sovereign can default. Under these conditions: i) an ex ante premium leads to higher coverage; ii) the premium increases with the sovereign's incentive to take risks; iii) a deductible is chosen to limit moral hazard; iv) the deductible-to-support ratio is decreasing with the size of the realized shock; and v) the change in the choice of savings when insurance is available is ambiguous, as there is a trade-off between inducing higher effort and increasing the likelihood of default.
410  0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/064
606   $aInsurance$xEconometric models
606   $aMoral hazard$xEconometric models
606   $aInternational finance$xEconometric models
606   $aFinance: General$2imf
606   $aInsurance$2imf
606   $aMacroeconomics$2imf
606   $aTaxation$2imf
606   $aIndustries: Financial Services$2imf
606   $aInternational Economic Order and Integration$2imf
606   $aInternational Monetary Arrangements and Institutions$2imf
606   $aInternational Lending and Debt Problems$2imf
606   $aInternational Policy Coordination and Transmission$2imf
606   $aInsurance Companies$2imf
606   $aActuarial Studies$2imf
606   $aGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf
606   $aPension Funds$2imf
606   $aNon-bank Financial Institutions$2imf
606   $aFinancial Instruments$2imf
606   $aInstitutional Investors$2imf
606   $aMacroeconomics: Consumption$2imf
606   $aSaving$2imf
606   $aWealth$2imf
606   $aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General$2imf
606   $aFinance$2imf
606   $aInsurance & actuarial studies$2imf
606   $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf
606   $aMoral hazard$2imf
606   $aInsurance companies$2imf
606   $aConsumption$2imf
606   $aTax incentives$2imf
606   $aFinancial risk management$2imf
606   $aEconomics$2imf
615  0$aInsurance$xEconometric models.
615  0$aMoral hazard$xEconometric models.
615  0$aInternational finance$xEconometric models.
615  7$aFinance: General
615  7$aInsurance
615  7$aMacroeconomics
615  7$aTaxation
615  7$aIndustries: Financial Services
615  7$aInternational Economic Order and Integration
615  7$aInternational Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
615  7$aInternational Lending and Debt Problems
615  7$aInternational Policy Coordination and Transmission
615  7$aInsurance Companies
615  7$aActuarial Studies
615  7$aGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
615  7$aPension Funds
615  7$aNon-bank Financial Institutions
615  7$aFinancial Instruments
615  7$aInstitutional Investors
615  7$aMacroeconomics: Consumption
615  7$aSaving
615  7$aWealth
615  7$aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
615  7$aFinance
615  7$aInsurance & actuarial studies
615  7$aPublic finance & taxation
615  7$aMoral hazard
615  7$aInsurance companies
615  7$aConsumption
615  7$aTax incentives
615  7$aFinancial risk management
615  7$aEconomics
700   $aMessmacher$b Miguel$01574026
712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.
712 02$aIMF Institute.
801  0$bDcWaIMF
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910788406203321
996   $aSovereign Insurance and Program Design$93850033
997   $aUNINA