Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System / / Sven Jari Stehn, Annalisa Fedelino

• Autore: Stehn Sven Jari
• Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (31 p.)
• Soggetto topico: Intergovernmental fiscal relations - Germany; Fiscal policy - Germany; Macroeconomics; Public Finance; Production and Operations Management; Fiscal Policy; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General; Macroeconomics: Production; Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General; Public finance & taxation; Expenditure; Fiscal policy; Output gap; Fiscal sustainability; Revenue administration; Expenditures, Public; Production; Economic theory; Revenue
• Soggetto geografico: Germany
• Altri autori: FedelinoAnnalisa
• Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: Contents; I. Introduction; II. Fiscal Discipline and Fiscal Transfers: A Difficult Nexus; Figures; 1. Subnational Shares in Total Spending and Revenue, 2006; 2. Comparative Composition of Subnational Revenue; A. Germany's Transfer System; 3. Net Contributing and Net Receiving Länder; 4. Evolution of the Transfer System; B. Potential Implications of Transfers; 5. Debt by Government Level; 6: Länder Debt; III. Framework, Methodology, and Data; A. The Inter-Temporal Budget Constraint; B. Cyclicality; C. Data; IV. Empirical Analysis; Tables; 1. Germany: Descriptive Statistics, 1985-2007 ; A. Univariate Analysis: Fiscal Reaction Functions2. Fiscal Behavior of the Old Länder, 1985-2007; 3. Behavior of Primary Expenditure for Länder, 1985-2007; 4. Robustness Check I: Behavior of Primary Expenditure for Länder, 1985-2007; B. Multivariate Analysis: VARs; 5. Robustness Check II: Behavior of Primary Expenditure; 7. Länder Behavior and Average Received Transfers, 1985-2007; 8. Output Gap Shock; V. Policy Implications and Conclusions; 9. Primary Spending Shock; Appendix I; Appendix Table 6: Unit root tests; References
• Sommario/riassunto: Does reliance on transfers weaken fiscal discipline and encourage pro-cyclical fiscal policies in recipient subnational governments? Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of the German Länder, this paper finds a positive answer to both questions. Net-recipient states (Länder, benefiting from the transfer system) have not reduced primary expenditure significantly in response to rising deficits, but have instead relied on vertical transfers from the federal government to ensure debt sustainability. Moreover, they have pursued pro-cyclical policies, particularly by raising expenditures in good times. Net-contributing Länder (paying into the transfer system), in contrast, have ensured fiscal sustainability through spending adjustments; they have also been less pro-cyclical. Panel vector auto-regressions confirm these findings.
• Titolo autorizzato: Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System
• ISBN: 1-4623-6989-8; 1-4527-6116-7; 1-282-84338-9; 1-4518-7271-2; 9786612843389
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910788333503321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2009/124