05163oam 22009974 450 991078833350332120230721045719.01-4623-6989-81-4527-6116-71-282-84338-91-4518-7271-29786612843389(CKB)3170000000055280(EBL)1608322(SSID)ssj0000940826(PQKBManifestationID)11519300(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940826(PQKBWorkID)10955497(PQKB)10572487(OCoLC)550640858(MiAaPQ)EBC1608322(IMF)WPIEE2009124(EXLCZ)99317000000005528020020129d2009 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrFiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System /Sven Jari Stehn, Annalisa FedelinoWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.1 online resource (31 p.)IMF Working PapersDescription based upon print version of record.1-4519-1700-7 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. Fiscal Discipline and Fiscal Transfers: A Difficult Nexus; Figures; 1. Subnational Shares in Total Spending and Revenue, 2006; 2. Comparative Composition of Subnational Revenue; A. Germany's Transfer System; 3. Net Contributing and Net Receiving Länder; 4. Evolution of the Transfer System; B. Potential Implications of Transfers; 5. Debt by Government Level; 6: Länder Debt; III. Framework, Methodology, and Data; A. The Inter-Temporal Budget Constraint; B. Cyclicality; C. Data; IV. Empirical Analysis; Tables; 1. Germany: Descriptive Statistics, 1985-2007A. Univariate Analysis: Fiscal Reaction Functions2. Fiscal Behavior of the Old Länder, 1985-2007; 3. Behavior of Primary Expenditure for Länder, 1985-2007; 4. Robustness Check I: Behavior of Primary Expenditure for Länder, 1985-2007; B. Multivariate Analysis: VARs; 5. Robustness Check II: Behavior of Primary Expenditure; 7. Länder Behavior and Average Received Transfers, 1985-2007; 8. Output Gap Shock; V. Policy Implications and Conclusions; 9. Primary Spending Shock; Appendix I; Appendix Table 6: Unit root tests; ReferencesDoes reliance on transfers weaken fiscal discipline and encourage pro-cyclical fiscal policies in recipient subnational governments? Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of the German Länder, this paper finds a positive answer to both questions. Net-recipient states (Länder, benefiting from the transfer system) have not reduced primary expenditure significantly in response to rising deficits, but have instead relied on vertical transfers from the federal government to ensure debt sustainability. Moreover, they have pursued pro-cyclical policies, particularly by raising expenditures in good times. Net-contributing Länder (paying into the transfer system), in contrast, have ensured fiscal sustainability through spending adjustments; they have also been less pro-cyclical. Panel vector auto-regressions confirm these findings.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/124Intergovernmental fiscal relationsGermanyFiscal policyGermanyMacroeconomicsimfPublic FinanceimfProduction and Operations ManagementimfFiscal PolicyimfNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: GeneralimfMacroeconomics: ProductionimfTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralimfPublic finance & taxationimfExpenditureimfFiscal policyimfOutput gapimfFiscal sustainabilityimfRevenue administrationimfExpenditures, PublicimfProductionimfEconomic theoryimfRevenueimfGermanyimfIntergovernmental fiscal relationsFiscal policyMacroeconomicsPublic FinanceProduction and Operations ManagementFiscal PolicyNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: GeneralMacroeconomics: ProductionTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralPublic finance & taxationExpenditureFiscal policyOutput gapFiscal sustainabilityRevenue administrationExpenditures, PublicProductionEconomic theoryRevenueStehn Sven Jari1472662Fedelino Annalisa1472674DcWaIMFBOOK9910788333503321Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System3685540UNINA