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Corruption and technology-induced private sector development / / prepared by Jean-Francois Ruhashyankiko and Etienne B. Yehoue



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Autore: Ruhashyankiko Jean-Francois Visualizza persona
Titolo: Corruption and technology-induced private sector development / / prepared by Jean-Francois Ruhashyankiko and Etienne B. Yehoue Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: [Washington, D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, Research Dept., c2006
Edizione: 1st ed.
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (32 p.)
Soggetto topico: Corruption
Political corruption
Altri autori: YehoueEtienne B  
Note generali: "August 2006."
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A SIMPLE MODEL""; ""III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE""; ""IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""REFERENCES""
Sommario/riassunto: This paper asks whether corruption might be the outcome of a lack of outside options for public officials or civil servants. We propose an occupational choice model embedded in an agency framework to address the issue. We show that technology-induced private sector expansion leads to a decline in publicly supplied corruption as it provides outside options to public officials who might otherwise engage in corruption. We provide empirical evidence that strongly shows that technology-induced private sector development is associated with a decline in aggregate corruption. This suggests that the decline in publicly supplied corruption outweighs the potential increase in privately supplied corruption that could result from private sector expansion.
Titolo autorizzato: Corruption and Technology-Induced Private Sector Development  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-6998-7
1-4527-1381-2
1-283-51828-7
1-4519-9209-2
9786613830739
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910809417503321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: IMF working paper ; ; WP/06/198.