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Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt / / Sven Jari Stehn, David Vines



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Autore: Stehn Sven Jari Visualizza persona
Titolo: Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt / / Sven Jari Stehn, David Vines Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (40 p.)
Disciplina: 336.39
Soggetto topico: Expenditures, Public - Econometric models
Fiscal policy - Econometric models
Banks and banking, Central - Econometric models
Debts, Public - Econometric models
Monetary policy - Econometric models
Banks and Banking
Inflation
Public Finance
Price Level
Deflation
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
Fiscal Policy
Debt
Debt Management
Sovereign Debt
Banks
Depository Institutions
Micro Finance Institutions
Mortgages
Macroeconomics
Public finance & taxation
Banking
Expenditure
Fiscal policy
Public debt
Prices
Expenditures, Public
Debts, Public
Banks and banking
Altri autori: VinesDavid  
Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; A. Consumers; B. Price Setting; C. Aggregate Demand and Fiscal Policy; D. The System; E. Social Welfare; F. Policy Objectives; G. Calibration; III.Solving for Optimal Policy; A. Cooperative Policy; B. Non-Cooperative Policy under Discretion; Tables; 1. Optimal policy simulations for a transitory cost-push shock; IV.Optimal Policy when Lump-Sum Taxes are Available; A. Cooperative Policy; 1. Commitment; Figures; 1. Dynamic responses to a transitory cost-push shock under optimal policy. .; 2. Discretion
Sommario/riassunto: We analyse optimal discretionary games between a benevolent central bank and a myopic government in a New Keynesian model. First, when lump-sum taxes are available and public debt is absent, we show that a Nash game results in too much government spending and excessively high interest rates, while fiscal leadership reinstates the cooperative outcome under discretion. Second, we show that this familiar result breaks down when lump-sum taxes are unavailable. With government debt, the Nash equilibrium still entails too much public spending but leads to lower interest rates than the cooperative policy, because debt has to be adjusted back to its pre-shock level to ensure time consistency. A setup of fiscal leadership does not avoid this socially costly outcome. Imposing a debt penalty onto the myopic government under either Nash or fiscal leadership raises welfare substantially, while appointing a conservative central bank is less effective.
Titolo autorizzato: Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-3158-0
9786612841156
1-282-84115-7
1-4519-8526-6
1-4518-7022-1
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910788234503321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2008/164