LEADER 05446oam 22012374 450 001 9910788234503321 005 20230721045659.0 010 $a1-4623-3158-0 010 $a9786612841156 010 $a1-282-84115-7 010 $a1-4519-8526-6 010 $a1-4518-7022-1 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055062 035 $a(EBL)1605826 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000943259 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11502960 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943259 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10977184 035 $a(PQKB)11511886 035 $a(OCoLC)451167897 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1605826 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2008164 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055062 100 $a20020129d2008 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aStrategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt /$fSven Jari Stehn, David Vines 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 215 $a1 online resource (40 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/164 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1475-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; A. Consumers; B. Price Setting; C. Aggregate Demand and Fiscal Policy; D. The System; E. Social Welfare; F. Policy Objectives; G. Calibration; III.Solving for Optimal Policy; A. Cooperative Policy; B. Non-Cooperative Policy under Discretion; Tables; 1. Optimal policy simulations for a transitory cost-push shock; IV.Optimal Policy when Lump-Sum Taxes are Available; A. Cooperative Policy; 1. Commitment; Figures; 1. Dynamic responses to a transitory cost-push shock under optimal policy. .; 2. Discretion 330 3 $aWe analyse optimal discretionary games between a benevolent central bank and a myopic government in a New Keynesian model. First, when lump-sum taxes are available and public debt is absent, we show that a Nash game results in too much government spending and excessively high interest rates, while fiscal leadership reinstates the cooperative outcome under discretion. Second, we show that this familiar result breaks down when lump-sum taxes are unavailable. With government debt, the Nash equilibrium still entails too much public spending but leads to lower interest rates than the cooperative policy, because debt has to be adjusted back to its pre-shock level to ensure time consistency. A setup of fiscal leadership does not avoid this socially costly outcome. Imposing a debt penalty onto the myopic government under either Nash or fiscal leadership raises welfare substantially, while appointing a conservative central bank is less effective. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2008/164 606 $aExpenditures, Public$xEconometric models 606 $aFiscal policy$xEconometric models 606 $aBanks and banking, Central$xEconometric models 606 $aDebts, Public$xEconometric models 606 $aMonetary policy$xEconometric models 606 $aBanks and Banking$2imf 606 $aInflation$2imf 606 $aPublic Finance$2imf 606 $aPrice Level$2imf 606 $aDeflation$2imf 606 $aNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General$2imf 606 $aFiscal Policy$2imf 606 $aDebt$2imf 606 $aDebt Management$2imf 606 $aSovereign Debt$2imf 606 $aBanks$2imf 606 $aDepository Institutions$2imf 606 $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf 606 $aMortgages$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf 606 $aBanking$2imf 606 $aExpenditure$2imf 606 $aFiscal policy$2imf 606 $aPublic debt$2imf 606 $aPrices$2imf 606 $aExpenditures, Public$2imf 606 $aDebts, Public$2imf 606 $aBanks and banking$2imf 615 0$aExpenditures, Public$xEconometric models. 615 0$aFiscal policy$xEconometric models. 615 0$aBanks and banking, Central$xEconometric models. 615 0$aDebts, Public$xEconometric models. 615 0$aMonetary policy$xEconometric models. 615 7$aBanks and Banking 615 7$aInflation 615 7$aPublic Finance 615 7$aPrice Level 615 7$aDeflation 615 7$aNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General 615 7$aFiscal Policy 615 7$aDebt 615 7$aDebt Management 615 7$aSovereign Debt 615 7$aBanks 615 7$aDepository Institutions 615 7$aMicro Finance Institutions 615 7$aMortgages 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aPublic finance & taxation 615 7$aBanking 615 7$aExpenditure 615 7$aFiscal policy 615 7$aPublic debt 615 7$aPrices 615 7$aExpenditures, Public 615 7$aDebts, Public 615 7$aBanks and banking 676 $a336.39 700 $aStehn$b Sven Jari$01472662 701 $aVines$b David$0120880 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910788234503321 996 $aStrategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt$93704174 997 $aUNINA