A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality / / Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan Ostry, Olivier Jeanne
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| Autore: |
Zettelmeyer Jeromin
|
| Titolo: |
A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality / / Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan Ostry, Olivier Jeanne
|
| Pubblicazione: | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008 |
| Edizione: | 1st ed. |
| Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (35 p.) |
| Disciplina: | 332.152 |
| Soggetto topico: | Financial crises - Prevention - Econometric models |
| Moral hazard - Econometric models | |
| Loans, Foreign - Econometric models | |
| Finance: General | |
| Financial Risk Management | |
| Political Economy | |
| Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation | |
| General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation | |
| Financial Crises | |
| Economic & financial crises & disasters | |
| Finance | |
| Political economy | |
| Crisis prevention | |
| Moral hazard | |
| Financial crises | |
| Crisis resolution | |
| Crisis management | |
| Financial risk management | |
| Economics | |
| Soggetto geografico: | Peru |
| Altri autori: |
OstryJonathan
JeanneOlivier
|
| Note generali: | Description based upon print version of record. |
| Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| Nota di contenuto: | Contents; I. Introduction; II. History; III. Literature; IV. A Theory of the IMF; A. Setup; B. Equilibrium Under Laissez-Faire; C. Equilibrium with IMF Crisis Lending; D. Moral Hazard in the Presence of IMF Crisis Lending; E. The Case for ex ante Conditionality; V. Discussion and Extensions; A. Incomplete Information and Imperfect Commitment by the IMF; B. Large versus Small Countries; C. Distortions Related to Domestic Political Economy; VI. Conclusion; References |
| Sommario/riassunto: | We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the return of private capital, and ensuring repayment to the IMF. Nonetheless, moral hazard can arise if there are crisis externalities across countries (contagion) or if country authorities discount crisis costs too much relative to the national social optimum, or both. Moral hazard can be avoided by making IMF lending conditional on crisis prevention efforts-"ex ante" conditionality. |
| Titolo autorizzato: | A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality |
| ISBN: | 1-4623-3359-1 |
| 1-4519-9938-0 | |
| 1-282-84187-4 | |
| 9786612841873 | |
| 1-4518-7094-9 | |
| Formato: | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
| Record Nr.: | 9910827363403321 |
| Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
| Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |
Serie:
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2008/236