LEADER 04662oam 22010454 450 001 9910827363403321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4623-3359-1 010 $a1-4519-9938-0 010 $a1-282-84187-4 010 $a9786612841873 010 $a1-4518-7094-9 035 $a(CKB)3170000000055133 035 $a(EBL)1608045 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000943962 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11501260 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943962 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10982840 035 $a(PQKB)11227731 035 $a(OCoLC)460195921 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2008236 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1608045 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2008236 035 $a(EXLCZ)993170000000055133 100 $a20020129d2008 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 12$aA Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality /$fJeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan Ostry, Olivier Jeanne 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 215 $a1 online resource (35 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/236 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4519-1547-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. History; III. Literature; IV. A Theory of the IMF; A. Setup; B. Equilibrium Under Laissez-Faire; C. Equilibrium with IMF Crisis Lending; D. Moral Hazard in the Presence of IMF Crisis Lending; E. The Case for ex ante Conditionality; V. Discussion and Extensions; A. Incomplete Information and Imperfect Commitment by the IMF; B. Large versus Small Countries; C. Distortions Related to Domestic Political Economy; VI. Conclusion; References 330 3 $aWe present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the return of private capital, and ensuring repayment to the IMF. Nonetheless, moral hazard can arise if there are crisis externalities across countries (contagion) or if country authorities discount crisis costs too much relative to the national social optimum, or both. Moral hazard can be avoided by making IMF lending conditional on crisis prevention efforts-"ex ante" conditionality. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2008/236 606 $aFinancial crises$xPrevention$xEconometric models 606 $aMoral hazard$xEconometric models 606 $aLoans, Foreign$xEconometric models 606 $aCrisis management$2imf 606 $aCrisis prevention$2imf 606 $aCrisis resolution$2imf 606 $aEconomic & financial crises & disasters$2imf 606 $aEconomics$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aFinance: General$2imf 606 $aFinancial Crises$2imf 606 $aFinancial crises$2imf 606 $aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf 606 $aFinancial Risk Management$2imf 606 $aFinancial risk management$2imf 606 $aGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation$2imf 606 $aMoral hazard$2imf 606 $aPolitical Economy$2imf 606 $aPolitical economy$2imf 607 $aPeru$2imf 615 0$aFinancial crises$xPrevention$xEconometric models. 615 0$aMoral hazard$xEconometric models. 615 0$aLoans, Foreign$xEconometric models. 615 7$aCrisis management 615 7$aCrisis prevention 615 7$aCrisis resolution 615 7$aEconomic & financial crises & disasters 615 7$aEconomics 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aFinance: General 615 7$aFinancial Crises 615 7$aFinancial crises 615 7$aFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation 615 7$aFinancial Risk Management 615 7$aFinancial risk management 615 7$aGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation 615 7$aMoral hazard 615 7$aPolitical Economy 615 7$aPolitical economy 676 $a332.152 700 $aZettelmeyer$b Jeromin$01598456 701 $aJeanne$b Olivier$0125747 701 $aOstry$b Jonathan$01436213 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910827363403321 996 $aA Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality$94234739 997 $aUNINA