Vai al contenuto principale della pagina

Central Bank Independence and Transparency : : Evolution and Effectiveness / / Christopher Crowe, Ellen Meade



(Visualizza in formato marc)    (Visualizza in BIBFRAME)

Autore: Crowe Christopher Visualizza persona
Titolo: Central Bank Independence and Transparency : : Evolution and Effectiveness / / Christopher Crowe, Ellen Meade Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
Edizione: 1st ed.
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (30 p.)
Disciplina: 332.11
Soggetto topico: Banks and banking, Central
Autonomy
Monetary policy
Banking
Banks and Banking
Banks and banking
Banks
Central bank autonomy
Central bank transparency
Central Banks and Their Policies
Central banks
Currency
Deflation
Depository Institutions
Exchange rate arrangements
Exchange rate flexibility
Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
Foreign Exchange
Foreign exchange
Government and the Monetary System
Inflation
Macroeconomics
Micro Finance Institutions
Monetary Policy
Monetary Systems
Mortgages
Payment Systems
Price Level
Prices
Regimes
Standards
Soggetto geografico: United Kingdom
Altri autori: MeadeEllen  
Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: Contents; I. Introduction; II. Measures of Central Bank Independence; Text Tables; 1. Mean Level (Later Period) and Change in CBI; III. Measures of Central Bank Transparency; 2. Correlates with Change in CBI Index, D.CBI; 3. Mean Level (Later Period) and Change in Transparency; IV. Effects of Central Bank Independence; 4. Correlates with Transparency Score, TRANS1; 5. CBI and Inflation (INF): OLS Regression Results; 6. D.CBI and Inlfation (D.INF) IV Regression Results; V. Effects of Transparency; 7. Transparency and Use of Private Information; VI. Conclusions
Appendix: Data Sources and Variables UsedAppendix Tables; A1. Country Samples; A2. Construction and Coding of Transparency Measure; References
Sommario/riassunto: This paper examines the current level of central bank independence (CBI) and transparency in a broad sample of countries using newly constructed measures, and looks at the evolution in both measures from an earlier time period. Increases in CBI have tended to occur in more democratic countries and in countries with high levels of past inflation. More independent central banks in turn tend to be more transparent, while transparency is also positively correlated with measures of national institutional quality. Exploiting the time dimension of our data to eliminate country fixed effects and using instrumental variable estimation to overcome endogeneity concerns, we present evidence that greater CBI is associated with lower inflation. We also find that enhanced transparency practices are associated with the private sector making greater use of information provided by the central bank.
Titolo autorizzato: Central Bank Independence and Transparency  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-7396-8
1-4527-8944-4
1-282-84073-8
9786612840739
1-4518-6979-7
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910810170103321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2008/119