LEADER 05486oam 22012974 450 001 9910810170103321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4623-7396-8 010 $a1-4527-8944-4 010 $a1-282-84073-8 010 $a9786612840739 010 $a1-4518-6979-7 035 $a(CKB)3390000000010376 035 $a(EBL)1607854 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1607854 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10368700 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL284073 035 $a(OCoLC)870245283 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2008119 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1607854 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2008119 035 $a(EXLCZ)993390000000010376 100 $a20020129d2008 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $2rdacontent 182 $2rdamedia 183 $2rdacarrier 200 10$aCentral Bank Independence and Transparency : $eEvolution and Effectiveness /$fChristopher Crowe, Ellen Meade 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2008. 215 $a1 online resource (30 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 225 0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/08/119 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aContents; I. Introduction; II. Measures of Central Bank Independence; Text Tables; 1. Mean Level (Later Period) and Change in CBI; III. Measures of Central Bank Transparency; 2. Correlates with Change in CBI Index, D.CBI; 3. Mean Level (Later Period) and Change in Transparency; IV. Effects of Central Bank Independence; 4. Correlates with Transparency Score, TRANS1; 5. CBI and Inflation (INF): OLS Regression Results; 6. D.CBI and Inlfation (D.INF) IV Regression Results; V. Effects of Transparency; 7. Transparency and Use of Private Information; VI. Conclusions 327 $aAppendix: Data Sources and Variables UsedAppendix Tables; A1. Country Samples; A2. Construction and Coding of Transparency Measure; References 330 3 $aThis paper examines the current level of central bank independence (CBI) and transparency in a broad sample of countries using newly constructed measures, and looks at the evolution in both measures from an earlier time period. Increases in CBI have tended to occur in more democratic countries and in countries with high levels of past inflation. More independent central banks in turn tend to be more transparent, while transparency is also positively correlated with measures of national institutional quality. Exploiting the time dimension of our data to eliminate country fixed effects and using instrumental variable estimation to overcome endogeneity concerns, we present evidence that greater CBI is associated with lower inflation. We also find that enhanced transparency practices are associated with the private sector making greater use of information provided by the central bank. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2008/119 606 $aBanks and banking, Central 606 $aAutonomy 606 $aMonetary policy 606 $aBanking$2imf 606 $aBanks and Banking$2imf 606 $aBanks and banking$2imf 606 $aBanks$2imf 606 $aCentral bank autonomy$2imf 606 $aCentral bank transparency$2imf 606 $aCentral Banks and Their Policies$2imf 606 $aCentral banks$2imf 606 $aCurrency$2imf 606 $aDeflation$2imf 606 $aDepository Institutions$2imf 606 $aExchange rate arrangements$2imf 606 $aExchange rate flexibility$2imf 606 $aFinancial Markets and the Macroeconomy$2imf 606 $aForeign Exchange$2imf 606 $aForeign exchange$2imf 606 $aGovernment and the Monetary System$2imf 606 $aInflation$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf 606 $aMonetary Policy$2imf 606 $aMonetary Systems$2imf 606 $aMortgages$2imf 606 $aPayment Systems$2imf 606 $aPrice Level$2imf 606 $aPrices$2imf 606 $aRegimes$2imf 606 $aStandards$2imf 607 $aUnited Kingdom$2imf 615 0$aBanks and banking, Central. 615 0$aAutonomy. 615 0$aMonetary policy. 615 7$aBanking 615 7$aBanks and Banking 615 7$aBanks and banking 615 7$aBanks 615 7$aCentral bank autonomy 615 7$aCentral bank transparency 615 7$aCentral Banks and Their Policies 615 7$aCentral banks 615 7$aCurrency 615 7$aDeflation 615 7$aDepository Institutions 615 7$aExchange rate arrangements 615 7$aExchange rate flexibility 615 7$aFinancial Markets and the Macroeconomy 615 7$aForeign Exchange 615 7$aForeign exchange 615 7$aGovernment and the Monetary System 615 7$aInflation 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aMicro Finance Institutions 615 7$aMonetary Policy 615 7$aMonetary Systems 615 7$aMortgages 615 7$aPayment Systems 615 7$aPrice Level 615 7$aPrices 615 7$aRegimes 615 7$aStandards 676 $a332.11 700 $aCrowe$b Christopher$0868737 701 $aMeade$b Ellen$01594414 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910810170103321 996 $aCentral Bank Independence and Transparency$93914948 997 $aUNINA