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Autore: | Ueda Kenichi |
Titolo: | Banks As Coordinators of Economic Growth / / Kenichi Ueda |
Pubblicazione: | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006 |
Edizione: | 1st ed. |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (77 p.) |
Soggetto topico: | Economic development - Econometric models |
Banks and banking - Econometric models | |
Bank deposits | |
Banking | |
Banks and Banking | |
Banks and banking | |
Banks | |
Competition | |
Corporate Finance and Governance | |
Deposit rates | |
Depository Institutions | |
Economic Development: Financial Markets | |
Exchange and Production Economies | |
Finance | |
Finance: General | |
Financial institutions | |
Financial markets | |
Financial services | |
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) | |
Industries: Financial Services | |
Interbank markets | |
Interest rates | |
Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects | |
International finance | |
Loans | |
Micro Finance Institutions | |
Mortgages | |
Noncooperative Games | |
One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models | |
Saving and Capital Investment | |
Soggetto geografico: | United States |
Note generali: | "November 2006." |
Nota di contenuto: | ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. MODEL SETTING AND CHARACTERISTICS""; ""III. UNIQUE EQUILIBRIUM CANDIDATE WITH STRATEGIC INTERMEDIATION""; ""IV. EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM WITH FREE RECONTRACTING OPPORTUNITY""; ""V. DISCUSSION""; ""VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""REFERENCES""; ""APPENDIX I. PROOFS""; ""APPENDIX II. EXISTENCE OF AN OPTIMAL PLAN""; ""APPENDIX III. PARETO- OPTIMAL ALLOCATION AND WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM""; ""APPENDIX IV. ALLOCATIONS UNDER OTHER PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS""; ""APPENDIX V. ECONOMY WITH PRIVATE DIRECT FINANCE"" |
""APPENDIX VI. RELATION TO DISCONTINUOUS GAME LITERATURE"" | |
Sommario/riassunto: | This paper formally identifies an important role of banks: Banks competitively internalize production externalities and facilitate economic growth. I formulate a canonical growth model with externalities as a game among consumers, firms, and banks. Banks compete for deposits to seek monopoly profits, including externalities. Using loan contracts that specify price and quantity, banks control firms' investments. Each bank forms a firm group endogenously and internalizes externalities directly within a firm group and indirectly across firm groups. This unique equilibrium requires a condition that separates competition for sources and uses of funds. I present a realistic institution that satisfies this condition. |
Titolo autorizzato: | Banks As Coordinators of Economic Growth |
ISBN: | 1-4623-9620-8 |
1-4527-2591-8 | |
1-283-51804-X | |
1-4519-0977-2 | |
9786613830494 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910808878003321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
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