Managing Confidence in Emerging Market Bank Runs / / Ashoka Mody, Se-Jik Kim

• Autore: Mody Ashoka
• Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2004
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (29 p.)
• Soggetto topico: Bank failures - Developing countries - Econometric models; Liquidity (Economics) - Developing countries - Econometric models; Banks and Banking; Finance: General; Financial Risk Management; Macroeconomics; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages; Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions; Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation; Macroeconomics: Consumption; Saving; Wealth; Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill; Banking; Finance; Economic & financial crises & disasters; Financial services law & regulation; Liquidity; Bank bailouts; Blanket guarantee; Consumption; Asset and liability management; Financial crises; National accounts; Liquidity risk; Financial regulation and supervision; Banks and banking; Economics; Crisis management; Financial risk management
• Soggetto geografico: Korea, Republic of
• Altri autori: KimSe-Jik
• Note generali: "December 2004."
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. 27-28).
• Nota di contenuto: ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE BASIC MODEL""; ""III. SIMULTANEOUS VERSUS SEQUENTIAL LIQUIDITY SHORTAGES""; ""IV. EARLY VERSUS LATE BAILOUTS""; ""V. POLITICAL ECONOMY""; ""VI. EXTENSIONS""; ""VII. CONCLUSIONS""; ""References""
• Sommario/riassunto: In a rational-expectations framework, we model depositors' confidence as a function of the probability of future bank bailouts. We analyze the effect of alternative bank bailout policies on depositors' confidence in an emerging market setting, where liquidity shortages of banks are revealed sequentially and governments cannot credibly commit to bailing out all potentially distressed banks. Our findings suggest that allowing early bank failures and using available liquidity for credible commitments to later bailouts can better boost confidence than early bailouts. This conclusion arises because with a high chance of liquidity shortage in the future, depositors may lose confidence and hence withdraw deposits even from potentially sound banks. Such a policy of late bailouts is likely to receive political support when a full bailout needs to be financed by taxation. The logic of late bailout remains valid even when banks may hide their distress or when closures of early distressed banks create contagion.
• Titolo autorizzato: Managing Confidence in Emerging Market Bank Runs
• ISBN: 1-4623-4561-1; 1-4527-9946-6; 1-283-56128-X; 9786613873736; 1-4519-2028-8
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910788690003321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2004/235