06001oam 22014654 450 991078869000332120230617031737.01-4623-4561-11-4527-9946-61-283-56128-X97866138737361-4519-2028-8(CKB)3360000000445091(EBL)3012511(SSID)ssj0001478958(PQKBManifestationID)11781068(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001478958(PQKBWorkID)11471926(PQKB)11741419(OCoLC)535146898(MiAaPQ)EBC3012511(IMF)WPIEE2352004(EXLCZ)99336000000044509120020129d2004 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrManaging Confidence in Emerging Market Bank Runs /Ashoka Mody, Se-Jik KimWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2004.1 online resource (29 p.)IMF Working Papers"December 2004."1-4518-7568-1 Includes bibliographical references (p. 27-28).""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE BASIC MODEL""; ""III. SIMULTANEOUS VERSUS SEQUENTIAL LIQUIDITY SHORTAGES""; ""IV. EARLY VERSUS LATE BAILOUTS""; ""V. POLITICAL ECONOMY""; ""VI. EXTENSIONS""; ""VII. CONCLUSIONS""; ""References""In a rational-expectations framework, we model depositors' confidence as a function of the probability of future bank bailouts. We analyze the effect of alternative bank bailout policies on depositors' confidence in an emerging market setting, where liquidity shortages of banks are revealed sequentially and governments cannot credibly commit to bailing out all potentially distressed banks. Our findings suggest that allowing early bank failures and using available liquidity for credible commitments to later bailouts can better boost confidence than early bailouts. This conclusion arises because with a high chance of liquidity shortage in the future, depositors may lose confidence and hence withdraw deposits even from potentially sound banks. Such a policy of late bailouts is likely to receive political support when a full bailout needs to be financed by taxation. The logic of late bailout remains valid even when banks may hide their distress or when closures of early distressed banks create contagion.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2004/235Bank failuresDeveloping countriesEconometric modelsLiquidity (Economics)Developing countriesEconometric modelsBanks and BankingimfFinance: GeneralimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfMacroeconomicsimfBanksimfDepository InstitutionsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfPortfolio ChoiceimfInvestment DecisionsimfFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationimfMacroeconomics: ConsumptionimfSavingimfWealthimfFinancing PolicyimfFinancial Risk and Risk ManagementimfCapital and Ownership StructureimfValue of FirmsimfGoodwillimfBankingimfFinanceimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfFinancial services law & regulationimfLiquidityimfBank bailoutsimfBlanket guaranteeimfConsumptionimfAsset and liability managementimfFinancial crisesimfNational accountsimfLiquidity riskimfFinancial regulation and supervisionimfBanks and bankingimfEconomicsimfCrisis managementimfFinancial risk managementimfKorea, Republic ofimfBank failuresEconometric models.Liquidity (Economics)Econometric models.Banks and BankingFinance: GeneralFinancial Risk ManagementMacroeconomicsBanksDepository InstitutionsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesPortfolio ChoiceInvestment DecisionsFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationMacroeconomics: ConsumptionSavingWealthFinancing PolicyFinancial Risk and Risk ManagementCapital and Ownership StructureValue of FirmsGoodwillBankingFinanceEconomic & financial crises & disastersFinancial services law & regulationLiquidityBank bailoutsBlanket guaranteeConsumptionAsset and liability managementFinancial crisesNational accountsLiquidity riskFinancial regulation and supervisionBanks and bankingEconomicsCrisis managementFinancial risk managementMody Ashoka888386Kim Se-Jik1558659International Monetary Fund.European Dept.International Monetary Fund.Research Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910788690003321Managing Confidence in Emerging Market Bank Runs3823233UNINA