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Autore: | Nier Erlend |
Titolo: | Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks : : Lessons From the Crisis / / Erlend Nier |
Pubblicazione: | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009 |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (66 p.) |
Soggetto topico: | Economic stabilization |
Banks and banking, Central | |
Banks and Banking | |
Finance: General | |
Financial Risk Management | |
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation | |
Banks | |
Depository Institutions | |
Micro Finance Institutions | |
Mortgages | |
Central Banks and Their Policies | |
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation | |
Financial Crises | |
Banking | |
Finance | |
Economic & financial crises & disasters | |
Systemic risk | |
Financial sector stability | |
Central bank mandate | |
Special resolution regime | |
Financial sector policy and analysis | |
Central banks | |
Financial crises | |
Banks and banking | |
Financial risk management | |
Financial services industry | |
Crisis management | |
Soggetto geografico: | United States |
Note generali: | Description based upon print version of record. |
Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references. |
Nota di contenuto: | Contents; Executive Summary; I. The Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability-Lessons from the Crisis; A. Monetary Policy; B. Provision of Systemic Liquidity; C. Lender of Last Resort and Resolution of Failing Institutions; D. Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems; II. Costs and Benefits of a Role of Central Banks in Financial Regulation; III. Recent Debates on Financial Stability Frameworks; IV. Financial Regulation-Objectives, Tools, Scope; A. Why Regulate Financial Institutions?; B. How to Regulate Financial Institutions?; C. Who Should be Regulated?; Boxes |
1. Originate and Distribute and Systemic RiskV. Financial Regulation-Agency Structure; A. Principles; B. Comparison of Existing Structures; 2. Financial Stability Frameworks Across Countries; 3. Special Considerations for Government Sponsored Entities; 4. International Considerations; VI. Conclusions; References; Appendixes; I. Some Preliminary Empirical Analysis; Figures; 1. Developed Europe: Bank Losses; 2. Developed Europe: Overall Loss to Credit Ratio | |
Sommario/riassunto: | This paper sets out general principles for the design of financial stability frameworks, starting from an analysis of the objectives and tools of financial regulation. The paper then offers a comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of the two main models that have emerged for modern financial systems: the integrated model, with a single supervisor outside of the central bank, and the twin-peaks model, with a systemic risk regulator (central bank) on the one hand and a conduct of business regulator on the other. The paper concludes that the twin-peaks model may become more attractive when regulatory structures are geared more explicitly towards the mitigation of systemic risk-including through the introduction of new macroprudential tools that could be used alongside monetary policy to contain macro-systemic risks; through enhanced regulation and special resolution regimes for systemically important institutions; and a more holistic approach to the oversight of clearing and settlement systems. Since the optimal solution may well be path-dependent and specific to the development of financial markets in any given country, a number of hybrid models are also discussed. |
Titolo autorizzato: | Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks |
ISBN: | 1-4623-5577-3 |
1-4527-3998-6 | |
1-4518-7217-8 | |
9786612842917 | |
1-282-84291-9 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910788338003321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
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