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| Titolo | Digital transmission theory / Sergio Benedetto, Ezio Biglieri, Valentino Castellani |
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| | Collana | IMF Working Papers |
| | Soggetti | Economic stabilization |
| | | Banks and banking, Central |
| | | Banks and Banking |
| | | Finance: General |
| | | Financial Risk Management |
| | | General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation |
| | | Banks |
| | | Depository Institutions |
| | | Micro Finance Institutions |
| | | Mortgages |
| | | Central Banks and Their Policies |
| | | Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation |
| | | Financial Crises |
| | | Banking |
| | | Finance |
| | | Economic & financial crises & disasters |
| | | Systemic risk |
| | | Financial sector stability |
| | | Central bank mandate |
| | | Special resolution regime |
| | | Financial sector policy and analysis |
| | | Central banks |
| | | Financial crises |
| | | Banks and banking |
| | | Financial risk management |
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| Nota di contenuto | Contents; Executive Summary; I. The Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability-Lessons from the Crisis; A. Monetary Policy; B. Provision of Systemic Liquidity; C. Lender of Last Resort and Resolution of Failing Institutions; D. Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems; II. Costs and Benefits of a Role of Central Banks in Financial Regulation; III. Recent Debates on Financial Stability Frameworks; IV. Financial Regulation-Objectives, Tools, Scope; A. Why Regulate Financial Institutions?; B. How to Regulate Financial Institutions?; C. Who Should be Regulated?; Boxes<br>1. Originate and  Distribute and Systemic RiskV. Financial Regulation-Agency Structure; A. Principles; B. Comparison of Existing Structures; 2. Financial Stability Frameworks Across Countries; 3. Special Considerations for Government Sponsored Entities; 4. International Considerations; VI. Conclusions; References; Appendixes; I. Some Preliminary Empirical Analysis; Figures; 1. Developed Europe: Bank Losses; 2. Developed Europe: Overall Loss to Credit Ratio |
| Sommario/riassunto | This paper sets out general principles for the design of financial stability frameworks, starting from an analysis of the objectives and tools of financial regulation. The paper then offers a comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of the two main models that have emerged for modern financial systems: the integrated model, with a single supervisor outside of the central bank, and the twin-peaks model, with a systemic risk regulator (central bank) on the one hand and a conduct of business regulator on the other. The paper concludes that the twin-peaks model may become more attractive when regulatory structures are geared more explicitly towards the mitigation of systemic risk-including through the introduction of new macroprudential tools that could be used alongside monetary policy to contain macro-systemic risks; through enhanced regulation and special resolution regimes for systemically important institutions; and a more holistic approach to the oversight of clearing and settlement systems. Since the optimal solution may well be path-dependent and specific to the development of financial markets in any given country, a number of hybrid models are also discussed. |