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Autore: | Danninger Stephan |
Titolo: | The Political Economy of Revenue-Forecasting Experience From Low-Income Countries / / Stephan Danninger, Annette Kyobe, M. Cangiano |
Pubblicazione: | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2005 |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (34 p.) |
Soggetto topico: | Capital movements |
Electronic books. -- local | |
Financial crises | |
Lenders of last resort | |
Liquidity (Economics) | |
Political Science | |
Law, Politics & Government | |
Public Finance | |
Budgeting | |
Taxation | |
Criminology | |
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General | |
National Budget | |
Budget Systems | |
Bureaucracy | |
Administrative Processes in Public Organizations | |
Corruption | |
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General | |
Public finance & taxation | |
Budgeting & financial management | |
Corporate crime | |
white-collar crime | |
Revenue forecasting | |
Budget planning and preparation | |
Revenue administration | |
Expenditure | |
Tax policy | |
Public financial management (PFM) | |
Crime | |
Tax administration and procedure | |
Budget | |
Revenue | |
Expenditures, Public | |
Soggetto geografico: | United States |
Altri autori: | KyobeAnnette CangianoM |
Note generali: | Description based upon print version of record. |
Nota di contenuto: | ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. VARIETIES OF COUNTRY INSURANCE""; ""A. Capital Controls""; ""B. Self-Insurance""; ""C. Private Insurance""; ""D. IMF-Led Packages""; ""E. Regional Swap Agreements""; ""III. A NEW COUNTRY INSURANCE FACILITY""; ""A. Eligibility Criteria""; ""B. Interest Rate""; ""C. Duration""; ""D. Size""; ""E. Procedures""; ""F. The Exit Problem""; ""IV. FINAL REMARKS"" |
Sommario/riassunto: | This paper analyzes interference and timeliness in the revenue-forecasting process, using new data on revenue-forecasting practices in low-income countries. Interference is defined as the occurrence of a significant deviation from purely technical forecasts. A theoretical model explains forecasting interference through government corruption. The data broadly supports the model, and the results are robust to alternative explanations. The paper also constructs three indices-transparency, formality, and organizational simplicity-that characterize revenue-forecasting practices, and assesses their effectiveness in producing an upfront-that is, timely-budget envelope. More transparent and simple forecasting processes lead to early budget constraints, while formality has no measurable effect. |
Titolo autorizzato: | The Political Economy of Revenue-Forecasting Experience From Low-Income Countries |
ISBN: | 1-4623-1251-9 |
1-4527-8549-X | |
1-282-04589-X | |
1-4519-0557-2 | |
9786613797674 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910788518103321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
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