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Autore: | Bolt Wilko |
Titolo: | On myopic equilibria in dynamic games with endogenous discounting / / prepared by Wilko Bolt and Alexander F. Tieman |
Pubblicazione: | Washington, D.C., : International Monetary Fund, 2006 |
Edizione: | 1st ed. |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (18 p.) |
Soggetto topico: | Game theory |
Competition - Mathematical models | |
Equilibrium (Economics) | |
Altri autori: | TiemanAlexander F |
Note generali: | "December 2006." |
Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references (p. 16). |
Nota di contenuto: | ""Contents""; ""I Introduction""; ""II Defining the multi-stage game with endogenous discounting""; ""III Equilibrium analysis""; ""IV Finite horizon and equilibrium selection""; ""V An illustrative example""; ""VI Discussion and concluding remarks""; ""Appendix""; ""References"" |
Sommario/riassunto: | This paper derives an equilibrium for a competitive multi-stage game in which an agents' current action influences his probability of survival into the next round of play. This is directly relevant in banking, where a banks' current lending and pricing decisions determines its future probability of default. In technical terms, our innovation is to consider a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting. An equilibrium for such a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting has not been derived before in the literature. |
Titolo autorizzato: | On myopic equilibria in dynamic games with endogenous discounting |
ISBN: | 1-4623-3364-8 |
1-4527-9150-3 | |
1-283-51256-4 | |
1-4519-1015-0 | |
9786613825018 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910825688103321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
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