1.

Record Nr.

UNINA9910825688103321

Autore

Bolt Wilko

Titolo

On myopic equilibria in dynamic games with endogenous discounting / / prepared by Wilko Bolt and Alexander F. Tieman

Pubbl/distr/stampa

Washington, D.C., : International Monetary Fund, 2006

ISBN

1-4623-3364-8

1-4527-9150-3

1-283-51256-4

1-4519-1015-0

9786613825018

Edizione

[1st ed.]

Descrizione fisica

1 online resource (18 p.)

Collana

IMF working paper ; ; WP/06/302

Altri autori (Persone)

TiemanAlexander F

Soggetti

Game theory

Competition - Mathematical models

Equilibrium (Economics)

Lingua di pubblicazione

Inglese

Formato

Materiale a stampa

Livello bibliografico

Monografia

Note generali

"December 2006."

Nota di bibliografia

Includes bibliographical references (p. 16).

Nota di contenuto

""Contents""; ""I Introduction""; ""II Defining the multi-stage game with endogenous discounting""; ""III Equilibrium analysis""; ""IV Finite horizon and equilibrium selection""; ""V An illustrative example""; ""VI Discussion and concluding remarks""; ""Appendix""; ""References""

Sommario/riassunto

This paper derives an equilibrium for a competitive multi-stage game in which an agents' current action influences his probability of survival into the next round of play. This is directly relevant in banking, where a banks' current lending and pricing decisions determines its future probability of default. In technical terms, our innovation is to consider a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting. An equilibrium for such a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting has not been derived before in the literature.