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Autore: | Al-Zein Eza Ghassan |
Titolo: | Reserve Requirements, the Maturity Structure of Debt, and Bank Runs / / Eza Ghassan Al-Zein |
Pubblicazione: | Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008 |
Edizione: | 1st ed. |
Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (28 p.) |
Disciplina: | 332.15 |
Soggetto topico: | Bank reserves - Econometric models |
Banks and banking, Central - Econometric models | |
Bank failures - Econometric models | |
Debts, Public - Econometric models | |
Banks and Banking | |
Exports and Imports | |
Investments: Bonds | |
Money and Monetary Policy | |
Monetary Policy | |
Banks | |
Depository Institutions | |
Micro Finance Institutions | |
Mortgages | |
International Investment | |
Long-term Capital Movements | |
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) | |
Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects | |
Monetary economics | |
Banking | |
International economics | |
Investment & securities | |
Finance | |
Reserve requirements | |
Capital controls | |
Bonds | |
Real interest rates | |
Monetary policy | |
Banks and banking | |
Capital movements | |
Interest rates | |
Soggetto geografico: | Chile |
Note generali: | Description based upon print version of record. |
Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references. |
Nota di contenuto: | Contents; I. Introduction; II. Motivation and Literature; III. The Model; A. The Domestic Economy; B. Date-Specific and Maturity-Specific Reserve Requirements; C. The Lenders' Problem; D. Defining the Equilibrium; Figures; 1. Structure of the Model; IV. The Emergence of Bank Runs; A. The Emergence of Bank Runs in the Setup Without Reserve Requirements; Defining the Illiquidity Condition; 2. Decision Tree at t=1 Summarizes How a Bank Run Would Occur.; B. Can Reserve Requirements Prevent the Occurrence of a Bank Run?; Illiquidity Conditions with Reserve Requirements |
Reserve Requirements and Market FailureC. International Lending After the Bank Runs: Are International Lenders "Throwing Good Money After Bad Money"?; International Re-Optimization Problem; V. Discussion; Sunspot and Bank Run Probability; Incentive to Form a Bank; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; References | |
Sommario/riassunto: | The paper looks at the relationship between reserve requirements and the choice of the maturity structure of external debt in a general equilibrium setup, by incorporating the role of international lenders. A date- and maturity-specific reserve requirement is a fraction of the debt to be deposited in a non-interest bearing account at the central bank. At maturity, the central bank returns the reserves. There exist some specific combinations of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements that reduce the vulnerability to bank runs. In such setup, lenders may still want to provide new short-term lending to the bank after a bank run. |
Titolo autorizzato: | Reserve Requirements, the Maturity Structure of Debt, and Bank Runs |
ISBN: | 1-4623-4268-X |
1-4527-9751-X | |
9786612840623 | |
1-282-84062-2 | |
1-4518-6968-1 | |
Formato: | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
Record Nr.: | 9910812627003321 |
Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |