05699oam 22012854 450 991081262700332120240402050110.01-4623-4268-X1-4527-9751-X97866128406231-282-84062-21-4518-6968-1(CKB)3170000000055000(EBL)1607837(SSID)ssj0000943051(PQKBManifestationID)11593661(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943051(PQKBWorkID)10974773(PQKB)10657397(OCoLC)815735892(MiAaPQ)EBC1607837(IMF)WPIEE2008108(EXLCZ)99317000000005500020020129d2008 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrReserve Requirements, the Maturity Structure of Debt, and Bank Runs /Eza Ghassan Al-Zein1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2008.1 online resource (28 p.)IMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/08/108Description based upon print version of record.1-4519-1422-9 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. Motivation and Literature; III. The Model; A. The Domestic Economy; B. Date-Specific and Maturity-Specific Reserve Requirements; C. The Lenders' Problem; D. Defining the Equilibrium; Figures; 1. Structure of the Model; IV. The Emergence of Bank Runs; A. The Emergence of Bank Runs in the Setup Without Reserve Requirements; Defining the Illiquidity Condition; 2. Decision Tree at t=1 Summarizes How a Bank Run Would Occur.; B. Can Reserve Requirements Prevent the Occurrence of a Bank Run?; Illiquidity Conditions with Reserve RequirementsReserve Requirements and Market FailureC. International Lending After the Bank Runs: Are International Lenders "Throwing Good Money After Bad Money"?; International Re-Optimization Problem; V. Discussion; Sunspot and Bank Run Probability; Incentive to Form a Bank; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; ReferencesThe paper looks at the relationship between reserve requirements and the choice of the maturity structure of external debt in a general equilibrium setup, by incorporating the role of international lenders. A date- and maturity-specific reserve requirement is a fraction of the debt to be deposited in a non-interest bearing account at the central bank. At maturity, the central bank returns the reserves. There exist some specific combinations of date- and maturity-specific reserve requirements that reduce the vulnerability to bank runs. In such setup, lenders may still want to provide new short-term lending to the bank after a bank run.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2008/108Bank reservesEconometric modelsBanks and banking, CentralEconometric modelsBank failuresEconometric modelsDebts, PublicEconometric modelsBanks and BankingimfExports and ImportsimfInvestments: BondsimfMoney and Monetary PolicyimfMonetary PolicyimfBanksimfDepository InstitutionsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfInternational InvestmentimfLong-term Capital MovementsimfGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)imfInterest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and EffectsimfMonetary economicsimfBankingimfInternational economicsimfInvestment & securitiesimfFinanceimfReserve requirementsimfCapital controlsimfBondsimfReal interest ratesimfMonetary policyimfBanks and bankingimfCapital movementsimfInterest ratesimfChileimfBank reservesEconometric models.Banks and banking, CentralEconometric models.Bank failuresEconometric models.Debts, PublicEconometric models.Banks and BankingExports and ImportsInvestments: BondsMoney and Monetary PolicyMonetary PolicyBanksDepository InstitutionsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesInternational InvestmentLong-term Capital MovementsGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and EffectsMonetary economicsBankingInternational economicsInvestment & securitiesFinanceReserve requirementsCapital controlsBondsReal interest ratesMonetary policyBanks and bankingCapital movementsInterest rates332.15Al-Zein Eza Ghassan1722288DcWaIMFBOOK9910812627003321Reserve Requirements, the Maturity Structure of Debt, and Bank Runs4122531UNINA