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A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality / / Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan Ostry, Olivier Jeanne



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Autore: Zettelmeyer Jeromin Visualizza persona
Titolo: A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality / / Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan Ostry, Olivier Jeanne Visualizza cluster
Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (35 p.)
Disciplina: 332.152
Soggetto topico: Financial crises - Prevention - Econometric models
Moral hazard - Econometric models
Loans, Foreign - Econometric models
Finance: General
Financial Risk Management
Political Economy
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
Financial Crises
Economic & financial crises & disasters
Finance
Political economy
Crisis prevention
Moral hazard
Financial crises
Crisis resolution
Crisis management
Financial risk management
Economics
Soggetto geografico: Peru
Altri autori: OstryJonathan  
JeanneOlivier  
Note generali: Description based upon print version of record.
Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
Nota di contenuto: Contents; I. Introduction; II. History; III. Literature; IV. A Theory of the IMF; A. Setup; B. Equilibrium Under Laissez-Faire; C. Equilibrium with IMF Crisis Lending; D. Moral Hazard in the Presence of IMF Crisis Lending; E. The Case for ex ante Conditionality; V. Discussion and Extensions; A. Incomplete Information and Imperfect Commitment by the IMF; B. Large versus Small Countries; C. Distortions Related to Domestic Political Economy; VI. Conclusion; References
Sommario/riassunto: We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the return of private capital, and ensuring repayment to the IMF. Nonetheless, moral hazard can arise if there are crisis externalities across countries (contagion) or if country authorities discount crisis costs too much relative to the national social optimum, or both. Moral hazard can be avoided by making IMF lending conditional on crisis prevention efforts-"ex ante" conditionality.
Titolo autorizzato: A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality  Visualizza cluster
ISBN: 1-4623-3359-1
1-4519-9938-0
1-282-84187-4
9786612841873
1-4518-7094-9
Formato: Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
Record Nr.: 9910788344103321
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
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Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2008/236