04608oam 22010214 450 991078834410332120230721045646.01-4623-3359-11-4519-9938-01-282-84187-497866128418731-4518-7094-9(CKB)3170000000055133(EBL)1608045(SSID)ssj0000943962(PQKBManifestationID)11501260(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943962(PQKBWorkID)10982840(PQKB)11227731(OCoLC)460195921(MiAaPQ)EBC1608045(IMF)WPIEE2008236(EXLCZ)99317000000005513320020129d2008 uf 0engurcnu||||||||txtccrA Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality /Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan Ostry, Olivier JeanneWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2008.1 online resource (35 p.)IMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/08/236Description based upon print version of record.1-4519-1547-0 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. History; III. Literature; IV. A Theory of the IMF; A. Setup; B. Equilibrium Under Laissez-Faire; C. Equilibrium with IMF Crisis Lending; D. Moral Hazard in the Presence of IMF Crisis Lending; E. The Case for ex ante Conditionality; V. Discussion and Extensions; A. Incomplete Information and Imperfect Commitment by the IMF; B. Large versus Small Countries; C. Distortions Related to Domestic Political Economy; VI. Conclusion; ReferencesWe present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the return of private capital, and ensuring repayment to the IMF. Nonetheless, moral hazard can arise if there are crisis externalities across countries (contagion) or if country authorities discount crisis costs too much relative to the national social optimum, or both. Moral hazard can be avoided by making IMF lending conditional on crisis prevention efforts-"ex ante" conditionality.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2008/236Financial crisesPreventionEconometric modelsMoral hazardEconometric modelsLoans, ForeignEconometric modelsFinance: GeneralimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfPolitical EconomyimfFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationimfGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationimfFinancial CrisesimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfFinanceimfPolitical economyimfCrisis preventionimfMoral hazardimfFinancial crisesimfCrisis resolutionimfCrisis managementimfFinancial risk managementimfEconomicsimfPeruimfFinancial crisesPreventionEconometric models.Moral hazardEconometric models.Loans, ForeignEconometric models.Finance: GeneralFinancial Risk ManagementPolitical EconomyFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationFinancial CrisesEconomic & financial crises & disastersFinancePolitical economyCrisis preventionMoral hazardFinancial crisesCrisis resolutionCrisis managementFinancial risk managementEconomics332.152Zettelmeyer Jeromin1462149Ostry Jonathan1436213Jeanne Olivier125747DcWaIMFBOOK9910788344103321A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality3716492UNINA