The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box : electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies / / [by] Masaaki Higashijima
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| Autore: |
Higashijima Masaaki
|
| Titolo: |
The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box : electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies / / [by] Masaaki Higashijima
|
| Pubblicazione: | Ann Arbor, Michigan : , : University of Michigan Press, , [2022] |
| ©2022 | |
| Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (367 pages) |
| Disciplina: | 321.9 |
| Soggetto topico: | Elections - Corrupt practices |
| Elections - Corrupt practices - Kazakhstan | |
| Elections - Corrupt practices - Kyrgyzstan | |
| Dictatorship | |
| Dictatorship - Kazakhstan | |
| Dictatorship - Kyrgyzstan | |
| Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 301-324) and index. |
| Nota di contenuto: | ; Part I. Puzzles and arguments -- ; Chapter 1. Introduction -- ; Chapter 2. A theory of autocratic elections -- ; Part II. Cross-national explorations -- ; Chapter 3. Blatant electoral fraud -- ; Chapter 4. Institutional manipulation -- ; Chapter 5. Economic maneuvering -- ; Chapter 6. Backfiring at the Ballot Box -- ; Part III. Comparative case studies -- ; Chapter 7. From electoral manipulation to economic maneuvering: Nazarbaev's Kazakhstan -- ; Chapter 8. From electoral manipulation to autocratic breakdown: Akaev's Kyrgyzstan -- ; Chapter 9. Conclusion. |
| Sommario/riassunto: | Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box explores how dictators design elections and what consequences those elections have on political order. It argues that strong autocrats who can effectively garner popular support through extensive economic distribution become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics--Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The book's findings suggest that indicators of free and fair elections in dictatorships may not be enough to achieve full-fledged democratization. |
| Altri titoli varianti: | Electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies |
| Titolo autorizzato: | The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box |
| ISBN: | 0-472-90275-X |
| Formato: | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
| Record Nr.: | 9910576894703321 |
| Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
| Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |
Serie:
Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies series.