LEADER 03929nam 2200625 450 001 9910576894703321 005 20220214012917.0 010 $a0-472-90275-X 024 7 $a10.3998/mpub.11978139 035 $a(CKB)5860000000051461 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC7017498 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL7017498 035 $a(OCoLC)1296611071 035 $a(NjHacI)995860000000051461 035 $a(MiU)10.3998/mpub.11978139 035 $a(ScCtBLL)1daf0aba-575d-442c-8856-2926508707b4 035 $a(EXLCZ)995860000000051461 100 $a20220214h20222022 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe dictator's dilemma at the ballot box$eelectoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies /$f[by] Masaaki Higashijima 210 1$aAnn Arbor, Michigan :$cUniversity of Michigan Press,$d[2022] 210 4$dİ2022 215 $a1 online resource (367 pages) 225 1 $aWeiser Center for Emerging Democracies 311 $a0-472-05531-3 311 $a0-472-07531-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 301-324) and index. 327 $gPart I.$tPuzzles and arguments --$gChapter 1.$tIntroduction --$gChapter 2.$tA theory of autocratic elections --$gPart II.$tCross-national explorations --$gChapter 3.$tBlatant electoral fraud --$gChapter 4.$tInstitutional manipulation --$gChapter 5.$tEconomic maneuvering --$gChapter 6.$tBackfiring at the Ballot Box --$gPart III.$tComparative case studies --$gChapter 7.$tFrom electoral manipulation to economic maneuvering: Nazarbaev's Kazakhstan --$gChapter 8.$tFrom electoral manipulation to autocratic breakdown: Akaev's Kyrgyzstan --$gChapter 9.$tConclusion. 330 3 $aModern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box explores how dictators design elections and what consequences those elections have on political order. It argues that strong autocrats who can effectively garner popular support through extensive economic distribution become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics--Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The book's findings suggest that indicators of free and fair elections in dictatorships may not be enough to achieve full-fledged democratization. 410 0$aWeiser Center for Emerging Democracies series. 517 3 $aElectoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies 606 $aElections$xCorrupt practices$vCase studies 606 $aElections$xCorrupt practices$zKazakhstan 606 $aElections$xCorrupt practices$zKyrgyzstan 606 $aDictatorship$vCase studies 606 $aDictatorship$zKazakhstan 606 $aDictatorship$zKyrgyzstan 615 0$aElections$xCorrupt practices 615 0$aElections$xCorrupt practices 615 0$aElections$xCorrupt practices 615 0$aDictatorship 615 0$aDictatorship 615 0$aDictatorship 676 $a321.9 700 $aHigashijima$b Masaaki$01254236 801 0$bEYM 801 1$bEYM 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910576894703321 996 $aThe Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box$92908242 997 $aUNINA