Preference, value, choice, and welfare / / Daniel M. Hausman [[electronic resource]]

• Autore: Hausman Daniel M. <1947->
• Pubblicazione: Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2012
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (xiv, 153 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
• Disciplina: 658.8/343
• Soggetto topico: Consumers' preferences; Preferences (Philosophy); Value; Rational choice theory
• Note generali: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Cover; Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Preface; 1: Preferences, Comparative Evaluations, and Reasons; 1.1. WHAT ARE PREFERENCES?; 1.2. OVERALL AND TOTAL COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS; 1.3. PREFERENCES, REASONS, AND FOLK PSYCHOLOGY; 1.4. MISCONCEPTIONS CONCERNING PREFERENCES; 1.5. CONCLUSIONS; Part I: PREFERENCES IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS; 2: Preference Axioms and Their Implications; 2.1. THE AXIOMS OF ORDINAL UTILITY THEORY; 2.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE AXIOMS FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF PREFERENCES; 2.3. RATIONALITY AND PREFERENCES ; 2.4. PREFERENCES AND SELF-INTEREST3: Revealed-Preference Theory; 3.1. ACTUAL REVEALED PREFERENCES AND THE REVELATION THEOREM; 3.2. CRITIQUE OF ACTUAL REVEALED-PREFERENCE THEORY; 3.3. WHY NOT REDEFINE PREFERENCES IN TERMS OF CHOICE?; 3.4. HYPOTHETICAL REVEALED PREFERENCES; 3.5. BELIEF-DEPENDENT REVEALED PREFERENCES; 3.6. CONCLUSIONS; 4: Preferences, Decision Theory, and Consequentialism; 4.1. TOTAL SUBJECTIVE COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS; 4.2. USING PREFERENCES TO PREDICT AND EXPLAIN CHOICES: THE STANDARD MODEL; 4.3. EXPECTED-UTILITY THEORY; 4.4. WHAT DOES EXPECTED-UTILITY THEORY ACCOMPLISH? ; 4.5. CONSEQUENTIALISM AND STANDARD CHOICE THEORY4.6. ATTRIBUTES AND PREFERENCES; 4.7. CONCLUSIONS; 5: Game Theory and Consequentialism; 5.1. GAMES AND OUTCOMES; 5.2. CONSEQUENTIALISM IN GAME THEORY; 5.3. THE DEFAULT PRINCIPLE; 5.4. CONCLUSIONS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONSEQUENTIALISM; 6: Constraints and Counterpreferential Choice; 6.1. SYMPATHY AND COMMITMENT; 6.2. COMMITMENT AND COUNTERPREFERENTIAL CHOICE; 6.3. CONSTRAINTS AND COUNTERPREFERENTIAL CHOICE; 6.4. MANY CONCEPTS OF PREFERENCE OR JUST ONE?; 6.5. GAME THEORY AND COUNTERPREFERENTIAL CHOICE; 6.6. COMMITMENTS AND INTENTIONS ; 6.7. CONCLUSIONSPart II: PREFERENCES, WELFARE, AND NORMATIVE ECONOMICS; 7: Preference Satisfaction and Welfare; 7.1. WELFARE AND PREFERENCES; 7.2. WHY WELFARE IS NOT PREFERENCE SATISFACTION; 7.3 WELFARE AND LAUNDERED PREFERENCES: THE APPROXIMATION RATIONALE; 7.4. WHY THE APPROXIMATION VIEW FAILS; 7.5. CONCLUSIONS; 8: Preferences in Welfare Economics; 8.1. PREFERENCES AND WELFARE: AN EVIDENTIAL VIEW; 8.2. THE EVIDENTIAL VIEW AND THE SCOPE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; 8.3. PREFERENCE DISTORTIONS AND PATERNALISM; 8.4. CONCLUSIONS; PART III: PSYCHOLOGY, RATIONAL EVALUATION, AND PREFERENCE FORMATION ; 9: The Psychology of Choice9.1. LOSS AVERSION, FRAMING, AND THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT; 9.2. REVERSALS, VARIANCE, AND ADAPTATION; 9.3. BELIEF-DESIRE PSYCHOLOGY; 9.4. EXPLAINING AND PREDICTING PREFERENCES AND CHOICES; 10: Constructing Preferences; 10.1. HOW PEOPLE EVALUATE ALTERNATIVES; 10.2. HOW PEOPLE OUGHT TO EVALUATE ALTERNATIVES; 10.3. AN EXAMPLE: HEALTH-STATE VALUES; 10.4. EMOTIONS AND RATIONAL EVALUATION; 10.5. HUME'S CHALLENGE; 10.6. COHERENCE; 10.7. CONCLUSION: THEORIES OF PREFERENCE FORMATION; 11: Conclusions; References; Index
• Sommario/riassunto: This book is about preferences, principally as they figure in economics. It also explores their uses in everyday language and action, how they are understood in psychology and how they figure in philosophical reflection on action and morality. The book clarifies and for the most part defends the way in which economists invoke preferences to explain, predict and assess behavior and outcomes. Hausman argues, however, that the predictions and explanations economists offer rely on theories of preference formation that are in need of further development, and he criticizes attempts to define welfare in terms of preferences and to define preferences in terms of choices or self-interest. The analysis clarifies the relations between rational choice theory and philosophical accounts of human action. The book also assembles the materials out of which models of preference formation and modification can be constructed, and it comments on how reason and emotion shape preferences.
• Altri titoli varianti: Preference, Value, Choice, & Welfare
• Titolo autorizzato: Preference, value, choice, and welfare
• ISBN: 1-107-23023-3; 1-139-21006-8; 1-280-56887-9; 1-139-22303-8; 9786613598479; 1-139-05853-3; 1-139-22475-1; 1-139-21823-9; 1-139-21514-0; 1-139-22132-9
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910457438103321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II