LEADER 06132nam 22007812 450 001 9910457438103321 005 20151005020622.0 010 $a1-107-23023-3 010 $a1-139-21006-8 010 $a1-280-56887-9 010 $a1-139-22303-8 010 $a9786613598479 010 $a1-139-05853-3 010 $a1-139-22475-1 010 $a1-139-21823-9 010 $a1-139-21514-0 010 $a1-139-22132-9 035 $a(CKB)2550000000082936 035 $a(EBL)833492 035 $a(OCoLC)775870003 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000612608 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11381505 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000612608 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10571438 035 $a(PQKB)10290187 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9781139058537 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC833492 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL833492 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10533213 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL359847 035 $a(OCoLC)801814775 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000082936 100 $a20110316d2012|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aPreference, value, choice, and welfare /$fDaniel M. Hausman$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2012. 215 $a1 online resource (xiv, 153 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a1-107-69512-0 311 $a1-107-01543-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aCover; Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Preface; 1: Preferences, Comparative Evaluations, and Reasons; 1.1. WHAT ARE PREFERENCES?; 1.2. OVERALL AND TOTAL COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS; 1.3. PREFERENCES, REASONS, AND FOLK PSYCHOLOGY; 1.4. MISCONCEPTIONS CONCERNING PREFERENCES; 1.5. CONCLUSIONS; Part I: PREFERENCES IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS; 2: Preference Axioms and Their Implications; 2.1. THE AXIOMS OF ORDINAL UTILITY THEORY; 2.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE AXIOMS FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF PREFERENCES; 2.3. RATIONALITY AND PREFERENCES 327 $a2.4. PREFERENCES AND SELF-INTEREST3: Revealed-Preference Theory; 3.1. ACTUAL REVEALED PREFERENCES AND THE REVELATION THEOREM; 3.2. CRITIQUE OF ACTUAL REVEALED-PREFERENCE THEORY; 3.3. WHY NOT REDEFINE PREFERENCES IN TERMS OF CHOICE?; 3.4. HYPOTHETICAL REVEALED PREFERENCES; 3.5. BELIEF-DEPENDENT REVEALED PREFERENCES; 3.6. CONCLUSIONS; 4: Preferences, Decision Theory, and Consequentialism; 4.1. TOTAL SUBJECTIVE COMPARATIVE EVALUATIONS; 4.2. USING PREFERENCES TO PREDICT AND EXPLAIN CHOICES: THE STANDARD MODEL; 4.3. EXPECTED-UTILITY THEORY; 4.4. WHAT DOES EXPECTED-UTILITY THEORY ACCOMPLISH? 327 $a4.5. CONSEQUENTIALISM AND STANDARD CHOICE THEORY4.6. ATTRIBUTES AND PREFERENCES; 4.7. CONCLUSIONS; 5: Game Theory and Consequentialism; 5.1. GAMES AND OUTCOMES; 5.2. CONSEQUENTIALISM IN GAME THEORY; 5.3. THE DEFAULT PRINCIPLE; 5.4. CONCLUSIONS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONSEQUENTIALISM; 6: Constraints and Counterpreferential Choice; 6.1. SYMPATHY AND COMMITMENT; 6.2. COMMITMENT AND COUNTERPREFERENTIAL CHOICE; 6.3. CONSTRAINTS AND COUNTERPREFERENTIAL CHOICE; 6.4. MANY CONCEPTS OF PREFERENCE OR JUST ONE?; 6.5. GAME THEORY AND COUNTERPREFERENTIAL CHOICE; 6.6. COMMITMENTS AND INTENTIONS 327 $a6.7. CONCLUSIONSPart II: PREFERENCES, WELFARE, AND NORMATIVE ECONOMICS; 7: Preference Satisfaction and Welfare; 7.1. WELFARE AND PREFERENCES; 7.2. WHY WELFARE IS NOT PREFERENCE SATISFACTION; 7.3 WELFARE AND LAUNDERED PREFERENCES: THE APPROXIMATION RATIONALE; 7.4. WHY THE APPROXIMATION VIEW FAILS; 7.5. CONCLUSIONS; 8: Preferences in Welfare Economics; 8.1. PREFERENCES AND WELFARE: AN EVIDENTIAL VIEW; 8.2. THE EVIDENTIAL VIEW AND THE SCOPE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; 8.3. PREFERENCE DISTORTIONS AND PATERNALISM; 8.4. CONCLUSIONS; PART III: PSYCHOLOGY, RATIONAL EVALUATION, AND PREFERENCE FORMATION 327 $a9: The Psychology of Choice9.1. LOSS AVERSION, FRAMING, AND THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT; 9.2. REVERSALS, VARIANCE, AND ADAPTATION; 9.3. BELIEF-DESIRE PSYCHOLOGY; 9.4. EXPLAINING AND PREDICTING PREFERENCES AND CHOICES; 10: Constructing Preferences; 10.1. HOW PEOPLE EVALUATE ALTERNATIVES; 10.2. HOW PEOPLE OUGHT TO EVALUATE ALTERNATIVES; 10.3. AN EXAMPLE: HEALTH-STATE VALUES; 10.4. EMOTIONS AND RATIONAL EVALUATION; 10.5. HUME'S CHALLENGE; 10.6. COHERENCE; 10.7. CONCLUSION: THEORIES OF PREFERENCE FORMATION; 11: Conclusions; References; Index 330 $aThis book is about preferences, principally as they figure in economics. It also explores their uses in everyday language and action, how they are understood in psychology and how they figure in philosophical reflection on action and morality. The book clarifies and for the most part defends the way in which economists invoke preferences to explain, predict and assess behavior and outcomes. Hausman argues, however, that the predictions and explanations economists offer rely on theories of preference formation that are in need of further development, and he criticizes attempts to define welfare in terms of preferences and to define preferences in terms of choices or self-interest. The analysis clarifies the relations between rational choice theory and philosophical accounts of human action. The book also assembles the materials out of which models of preference formation and modification can be constructed, and it comments on how reason and emotion shape preferences. 517 3 $aPreference, Value, Choice, & Welfare 606 $aConsumers' preferences 606 $aPreferences (Philosophy) 606 $aValue 606 $aRational choice theory 615 0$aConsumers' preferences. 615 0$aPreferences (Philosophy) 615 0$aValue. 615 0$aRational choice theory. 676 $a658.8/343 700 $aHausman$b Daniel M.$f1947-$0121751 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910457438103321 996 $aPreference, value, choice, and welfare$92483359 997 $aUNINA