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Free will [[electronic resource] ] : an extensive bibliography / / Nicholas Rescher ; with the collaboration of Estelle Burris
| Free will [[electronic resource] ] : an extensive bibliography / / Nicholas Rescher ; with the collaboration of Estelle Burris |
| Autore | Rescher Nicholas |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Frankfurt ; ; New Brunswick, : Ontos Verlag, 2010 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (326 p.) |
| Altri autori (Persone) | BurrisEstelle |
| Soggetto topico | Free will and determinism |
| ISBN | 3-11-031953-5 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Frontmatter -- Contents -- INTRODUCTION -- Bibliography -- A-G -- H-M -- N-Z -- Backmatter |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910779869203321 |
Rescher Nicholas
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| Frankfurt ; ; New Brunswick, : Ontos Verlag, 2010 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Free will [[electronic resource] ] : an extensive bibliography / / Nicholas Rescher ; with the collaboration of Estelle Burris
| Free will [[electronic resource] ] : an extensive bibliography / / Nicholas Rescher ; with the collaboration of Estelle Burris |
| Autore | Rescher Nicholas |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Frankfurt ; ; New Brunswick, : Ontos Verlag, 2010 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (326 p.) |
| Altri autori (Persone) | BurrisEstelle |
| Soggetto topico | Free will and determinism |
| ISBN | 3-11-031953-5 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Frontmatter -- Contents -- INTRODUCTION -- Bibliography -- A-G -- H-M -- N-Z -- Backmatter |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910825159903321 |
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Rescher Nicholas
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| Frankfurt ; ; New Brunswick, : Ontos Verlag, 2010 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Free will : a defence against neurophysiological determinism / John Thorp
| Free will : a defence against neurophysiological determinism / John Thorp |
| Autore | Thorp, John |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | London ; Boston : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980 |
| Descrizione fisica | xi, 162 p. : ill. ; 22 cm. |
| Soggetto topico |
Free will and determinism
Neurophysiology - Moral and ethical aspects |
| ISBN | 0710005652 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | und |
| Record Nr. | UNISALENTO-991003997189707536 |
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Thorp, John
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| London ; Boston : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. del Salento | ||
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Free will [[electronic resource] ] : sourcehood and its alternatives / / Kevin Timpe
| Free will [[electronic resource] ] : sourcehood and its alternatives / / Kevin Timpe |
| Autore | Timpe Kevin |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | London ; ; New York, : Continuum, c2008 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (166 p.) |
| Disciplina | 123/.5 |
| Collana | Continuum studies in philosophy |
| Soggetto topico | Free will and determinism |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN |
1-282-87151-X
9786612871511 1-4411-1504-8 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Introducing the issues -- Alternative possibilities -- The importance of sourcehood. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910458774603321 |
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Timpe Kevin
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| London ; ; New York, : Continuum, c2008 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Free will [[electronic resource] ] : sourcehood and its alternatives / / Kevin Timpe
| Free will [[electronic resource] ] : sourcehood and its alternatives / / Kevin Timpe |
| Autore | Timpe Kevin |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | London ; ; New York, : Continuum, c2008 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (166 p.) |
| Disciplina | 123/.5 |
| Collana | Continuum studies in philosophy |
| Soggetto topico | Free will and determinism |
| ISBN |
1-282-87151-X
9786612871511 1-4411-1504-8 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Introducing the issues -- Alternative possibilities -- The importance of sourcehood. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910785203303321 |
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Timpe Kevin
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| London ; ; New York, : Continuum, c2008 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Free will [[electronic resource] ] : sourcehood and its alternatives / / Kevin Timpe
| Free will [[electronic resource] ] : sourcehood and its alternatives / / Kevin Timpe |
| Autore | Timpe Kevin |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | London ; ; New York, : Continuum, c2008 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (166 p.) |
| Disciplina | 123/.5 |
| Collana | Continuum studies in philosophy |
| Soggetto topico | Free will and determinism |
| ISBN |
1-282-87151-X
9786612871511 1-4411-1504-8 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Introducing the issues -- Alternative possibilities -- The importance of sourcehood. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910808947903321 |
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Timpe Kevin
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| London ; ; New York, : Continuum, c2008 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Free will : historical and analytic perspectives / / edited by Marco Hausmann, Jörg Noller
| Free will : historical and analytic perspectives / / edited by Marco Hausmann, Jörg Noller |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2021] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (341 pages) : illustrations |
| Disciplina | 123.5 |
| Soggetto topico | Free will and determinism |
| ISBN | 3-030-61136-1 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- 1: Introduction -- 1 Aims and Scope -- 2 The Problem(s) of Free Will -- 3 Proposed Solutions to the Problem(s) of Free Will -- 4 Overview of the Contributions -- References -- Part I: Free Will and Determinism -- 2: What Is Determinism? Why We Should Ditch the Entailment Definition -- 1 What Is the Thesis We Are Worried About When We Worry About Free Will? -- 2 The Relationship Between (MD) and (ED) -- 3 Deciding on the Definition of Determinism -- 4 Why (MD) Is to Be Preferred to (ED) as a Definition of Determinism -- References -- 3: Aristotle and the Discovery of Determinism -- 1 Preface: Three Types of Determinism in Aristotle -- 2 Logical Determinism: Future Truth -- 3 Physical Determinism -- 4 Ethical Determinism -- 5 Limitations on What Is 'Up to Us' -- 6 Determinate But 'Up to Us'? -- References -- 4: Defending Free Will -- 1 Basic Issues -- 2 Digression: The Crucial Contrast Between Events and Eventuations -- References -- 5: Some Free Thinking About 'Thinking About Free Will' -- 1 Introduction: The Problem of Free Will -- 2 Peter van Inwagen's Consequence Argument -- 3 The Fixity of Descriptions of the Past -- 3.1 How van Inwagen Justifies His Assumption -- 3.2 Why van Inwagen's Attempt to Justify His Assumption Fails -- Identity of Necessarily Equivalent Propositions -- Descriptivism About Proper Names -- Deflationism About the Past -- 4 Conclusion -- References -- 6: Local-Miracle Compatibilism: A Critique -- 1 The Consequence Argument: The Conditional Version -- 2 Local-Miracle Compatibilism -- 3 Reply to Multiple-Pasts Compatibilism -- 4 Reply to Local-Miracle Compatibilism -- 5 Freedom and Counterfactuals -- 6 The Fixed Future and the Open Past -- References -- 7: Backtracking Counterfactuals and Agents' Abilities -- 1 Introduction.
2 Fixed-Laws Compatibilism: A Primer -- 3 Different Modalities? -- 4 Fischer's Argument for (FPFL) -- 5 Counterfactuals and Rationality -- References -- 8: Moral Necessity, Agent Causation, and the Determination of Free Actions in Clarke and Leibniz -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Brief Overview of Leibniz's Theory of Freedom -- 3 Activity, Self-Motion, and Agent-Causation in Clarke -- 4 Determination, Moral Necessity, and Final Causation in Clarke -- 4.1 God's Inability to Choose Sub-optimal Options -- 4.2 Divine Freedom and Moral Necessity -- 4.3 Human Freedom -- 4.4 Clarkean Determination and Freedom -- 4.5 The Determination by Final and Occasional Causes -- 5 Equipoise in Clarke -- 6 Comparison and Conclusion -- References -- Part II: Free Will and Indeterminism -- 9: Indeterministic Compatibilism -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Compatibility of Compatibilism with Indeterminism -- 3 Indeterministic Causation and Probability-Raising -- 4 Indeterminism, Causal Underdetermination, and Causal Indeterminacy -- 5 Conclusions -- References -- 10: The Culpability Problem and the Indeterminacy of Choice -- 1 Peter van Inwagen's Description of the Problem -- 2 Are Forms of Determinism and Indeterminism Conceivable That Might Not Be Contradictory? -- 3 Personally Localized Indeterminism and Its Aporetic Consequences for the Possibility of Controlled Decision -- 4 Decisions in a Situation of Personally Localized Indeterminism -- 5 The Most Possible Course of Action According to Rational Principles: Aquinas's Idea of a Rational Consilium of Free Decisions -- 6 Sameness of Laws of Nature with a Potential Difference of Principles of Choice -- 7 General Determinism and the Ability to Decide Otherwise -- References -- 11: Ambivalent Freedom: Kant and the Problem of Willkür -- 1 The Problem of Willkür -- 2 The Conceptual History of Willkür. 3 Kant and the Problem of Willkür -- 3.1 Willkür and Transcendental Freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason -- 3.2 Willkür and Autonomy in the Critique of Practical Reason -- 3.3 Willkür and Maxim in Kant's Religion -- 3.4 Willkür and Will in the Metaphysics of Morals -- 4 Willkür and Free Will in the Analytic Debate on Freedom -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- 12: Determination, Chance and David Hume: On Freedom as a Power -- 1 Freedom and the Distinctiveness of Blame -- 2 Freedom as Agent-Causation -- 3 Determination and Contingency -- 4 Hume's Argument Again -- References -- Part III: Free Will and Moral Responsibility -- 13: Kant's Justification of Freedom as a Condition for Moral Imputation -- 1 Moral Responsibility, Imputation and the Required Sense of Freedom -- 2 Making Room for Freedom: The Compatibility of Transcendental Freedom and Determinism -- 3 The Practical Justification of Freedom -- 4 Pereboom on Kant's Practical Justification of Freedom -- 4.1 Does Kant's Justification of Transcendental Freedom Suffice to Legitimate Practices of Holding Each Other Responsible? -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- 14: Does "Ought" Imply "Can"? -- References -- Name Index -- Subject Index. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910484607403321 |
| Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2021] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Free will and consciousness [[electronic resource] ] : a determinist account of the illusion of free will / / Gregg D. Caruso
| Free will and consciousness [[electronic resource] ] : a determinist account of the illusion of free will / / Gregg D. Caruso |
| Autore | Caruso Gregg D |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, 2012 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (313 p.) |
| Disciplina | 123/.5 |
| Soggetto topico |
Free will and determinism
Consciousness Phenomenology |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN |
1-280-66878-4
9786613645715 0-7391-7137-2 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Contents; Acknowledgments; Chapter One: The Problem of Free Will: A Brief Introduction and Outline of Position; 1.1 Hard-Enough Determinism and the Illusion of Free Will; 1.2 Freedom and Determinism: Defining the Problem; 1.3 A Word About Moral Responsibility; Notes; Chapter Two: Against Libertarianism; 2.1 Agent-Causal Accounts of Free Will; 2.2 The Problem of Mental Causation; 2.3 Naturalized Libertarianism: Is Anyone Up For a Role of the Dice?; Notes; Chapter Three: Against Compatibilism; 3.1 Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument; 3.2 The Folk Psychology of Free Will
3.3 The Phenomenology of FreedomNotes; Chapter Four: Consciousness and Free Will (I): Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious; 4.1 Is Consciousness Necessary for Free Will?; 4.2 Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious; 4.3 The Unbearable Automaticity of Being; 4.4 Implications for Free Will; Notes; Chapter Five: Consciousness and Free Will (II): Transparency, Infallibility, and the Higher-Order Thought Theory; 5.1 Consciousness and Freedom: The Introspective Argument for Free Will; 5.2 Two Concepts of Consciousness; 5.3 The Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory of Consciousness 5.4 Misrepresentation and Confabulation5.5 What the HOT Theory Tells Us About Free Will; 5.6 On the Function of Consciousness; Notes; Chapter Six: Consciousness and Free Will (III): Intentional States, Spontaneity, and Action Initiation; 6.1 The Apparent Spontaneity of Intentional States; 6.2 The Asymmetry Between Intentional States and Sensory States; 6.3 Do Our Conscious Intentions Cause Our Actions?; 6.4 Libet's Findings and the HOT Theory; 6.5 Explaining the Phenomenological Illusion; 6.6 Wegner's Theory of Apparent Mental Causation; Notes Chapter Seven: Consciousness and Free Will (IV): Self-Consciousness and Our Sense of Agency7.1 When Self-Consciousness Breaks Down; 7.2 Self-Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts; 7.3 Errors of Identification, Thought Insertion, and the HOT Theory; 7.4 Accounting for Our Sense of Agency; 7.5 Conclusion; Notes; Works Cited; Index; About the Author |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910451857903321 |
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Caruso Gregg D
|
||
| Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, 2012 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Free will and consciousness [[electronic resource] ] : a determinist account of the illusion of free will / / Gregg D. Caruso
| Free will and consciousness [[electronic resource] ] : a determinist account of the illusion of free will / / Gregg D. Caruso |
| Autore | Caruso Gregg D |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, 2012 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (313 p.) |
| Disciplina | 123/.5 |
| Soggetto topico |
Free will and determinism
Consciousness Phenomenology |
| ISBN |
1-280-66878-4
9786613645715 0-7391-7137-2 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Contents; Acknowledgments; Chapter One: The Problem of Free Will: A Brief Introduction and Outline of Position; 1.1 Hard-Enough Determinism and the Illusion of Free Will; 1.2 Freedom and Determinism: Defining the Problem; 1.3 A Word About Moral Responsibility; Notes; Chapter Two: Against Libertarianism; 2.1 Agent-Causal Accounts of Free Will; 2.2 The Problem of Mental Causation; 2.3 Naturalized Libertarianism: Is Anyone Up For a Role of the Dice?; Notes; Chapter Three: Against Compatibilism; 3.1 Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument; 3.2 The Folk Psychology of Free Will
3.3 The Phenomenology of FreedomNotes; Chapter Four: Consciousness and Free Will (I): Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious; 4.1 Is Consciousness Necessary for Free Will?; 4.2 Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious; 4.3 The Unbearable Automaticity of Being; 4.4 Implications for Free Will; Notes; Chapter Five: Consciousness and Free Will (II): Transparency, Infallibility, and the Higher-Order Thought Theory; 5.1 Consciousness and Freedom: The Introspective Argument for Free Will; 5.2 Two Concepts of Consciousness; 5.3 The Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory of Consciousness 5.4 Misrepresentation and Confabulation5.5 What the HOT Theory Tells Us About Free Will; 5.6 On the Function of Consciousness; Notes; Chapter Six: Consciousness and Free Will (III): Intentional States, Spontaneity, and Action Initiation; 6.1 The Apparent Spontaneity of Intentional States; 6.2 The Asymmetry Between Intentional States and Sensory States; 6.3 Do Our Conscious Intentions Cause Our Actions?; 6.4 Libet's Findings and the HOT Theory; 6.5 Explaining the Phenomenological Illusion; 6.6 Wegner's Theory of Apparent Mental Causation; Notes Chapter Seven: Consciousness and Free Will (IV): Self-Consciousness and Our Sense of Agency7.1 When Self-Consciousness Breaks Down; 7.2 Self-Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts; 7.3 Errors of Identification, Thought Insertion, and the HOT Theory; 7.4 Accounting for Our Sense of Agency; 7.5 Conclusion; Notes; Works Cited; Index; About the Author |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910779269903321 |
|
Caruso Gregg D
|
||
| Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, 2012 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Free will and consciousness [[electronic resource] ] : a determinist account of the illusion of free will / / Gregg D. Caruso
| Free will and consciousness [[electronic resource] ] : a determinist account of the illusion of free will / / Gregg D. Caruso |
| Autore | Caruso Gregg D |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, 2012 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (313 p.) |
| Disciplina | 123/.5 |
| Soggetto topico |
Free will and determinism
Consciousness Phenomenology |
| ISBN |
1-280-66878-4
9786613645715 0-7391-7137-2 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Contents; Acknowledgments; Chapter One: The Problem of Free Will: A Brief Introduction and Outline of Position; 1.1 Hard-Enough Determinism and the Illusion of Free Will; 1.2 Freedom and Determinism: Defining the Problem; 1.3 A Word About Moral Responsibility; Notes; Chapter Two: Against Libertarianism; 2.1 Agent-Causal Accounts of Free Will; 2.2 The Problem of Mental Causation; 2.3 Naturalized Libertarianism: Is Anyone Up For a Role of the Dice?; Notes; Chapter Three: Against Compatibilism; 3.1 Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument; 3.2 The Folk Psychology of Free Will
3.3 The Phenomenology of FreedomNotes; Chapter Four: Consciousness and Free Will (I): Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious; 4.1 Is Consciousness Necessary for Free Will?; 4.2 Automaticity and the Adaptive Unconscious; 4.3 The Unbearable Automaticity of Being; 4.4 Implications for Free Will; Notes; Chapter Five: Consciousness and Free Will (II): Transparency, Infallibility, and the Higher-Order Thought Theory; 5.1 Consciousness and Freedom: The Introspective Argument for Free Will; 5.2 Two Concepts of Consciousness; 5.3 The Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory of Consciousness 5.4 Misrepresentation and Confabulation5.5 What the HOT Theory Tells Us About Free Will; 5.6 On the Function of Consciousness; Notes; Chapter Six: Consciousness and Free Will (III): Intentional States, Spontaneity, and Action Initiation; 6.1 The Apparent Spontaneity of Intentional States; 6.2 The Asymmetry Between Intentional States and Sensory States; 6.3 Do Our Conscious Intentions Cause Our Actions?; 6.4 Libet's Findings and the HOT Theory; 6.5 Explaining the Phenomenological Illusion; 6.6 Wegner's Theory of Apparent Mental Causation; Notes Chapter Seven: Consciousness and Free Will (IV): Self-Consciousness and Our Sense of Agency7.1 When Self-Consciousness Breaks Down; 7.2 Self-Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts; 7.3 Errors of Identification, Thought Insertion, and the HOT Theory; 7.4 Accounting for Our Sense of Agency; 7.5 Conclusion; Notes; Works Cited; Index; About the Author |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910809284503321 |
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Caruso Gregg D
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||
| Lanham, Md., : Lexington Books, 2012 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Soggetto topico
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Free will and determinism
(303)
- Ethics (28)
- Consciousness (18)
- Liberty (18)
- Predestination (17)