Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships / / André De Palma, Guillaume Prunier, Luc Leruth

• Autore: De Palma André
• Pubblicazione: Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2009
• Edizione: 1st ed.
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (25 p.)
• Disciplina: 332.1;332.152
• Soggetto topico: Public-private sector cooperation; Privatization; Risk management; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Asymmetric and Private Information; Bureaucracy; Civil service & public sector; Corruption; Economic sectors; Expenditure; Finance, Public; Fiscal policy; Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities: General; Infrastructure; Macroeconomics; Marketing and Advertising: Government Policy and Regulation; National accounts; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Organizational Behavior; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock; Property Rights; Public Administration; Public Enterprises; Public finance & taxation; Public Finance; Public financial management (PFM); Public investment and public-private partnerships (PPP); Public Sector Accounting and Audits; Public sector; Public-Private Enterprises; Risks of public-private partnership; Saving and investment; Transaction Costs; Transportation Systems: Government and Private Investment Analysis; Transportation
• Soggetto geografico: United States
• Altri autori: LeruthLuc PrunierGuillaume
• Note generali: At head of title: Offices in Europe.; "August 2009."
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references.
• Nota di contenuto: Contents; I. Introduction; II. The development of PPPs; III. Risk sharing, asymmetry of information, and perception biases; A. Asymmetry of information; Tables; 1. A Basic Matrix for Risk-Sharing in PPPs; B. Perception Biases; IV. A principal-agent approach to PPPs; Figures; 1. Perception Biases; 2. The Principal-Agent Framework; V. PPP risks and a typology; 2. Typology of Risks in PPPs; VI. Conclusions; References
• Sommario/riassunto: There is a strong economic rationale for close cooperation between the public and private sectors. This has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for the provision of public services through instruments combining public and private money such as public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s). We describe these arrangements and explore how they can be analyzed using standard tools in economics (incentives and principal-agent theory). We discuss the implications of our approach in terms of identifying risks that are often overlooked before turining to the optimal risk-sharing between the public and private partners, in particular with respect to information asymmetries in risk perceptions. This allows us to propose a typology of the risks associated with PPPs, where both internal risks (the risks associated with the contract) and external risks (those associated with the project) are considered.
• Titolo autorizzato: Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships
• ISBN: 9786612843884; 9781462341641; 1462341640; 9781452760155; 1452760152; 9781451873245; 1451873247; 9781282843882; 1282843885
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910960077403321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; ; No. 2009/177