The lessons and non-lessons of the air and missile campaign in Kosovo / / Anthony H. Cordesman

• Autore: Cordesman Anthony H
• Pubblicazione: Westport, Conn., : Praeger, 2001
• Edizione: 1st ed.
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (xii, 399 pages) : illustrations, maps
• Disciplina: 949.7103
• Soggetto topico: Bombing, Aerial - Yugoslavia; Kosovo War, 1998-1999 - Aerial operations
• Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. [378]-399).
• Nota di contenuto: Cover -- The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo -- Contents -- 1 The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo -- 2 The Historical Background: The Course and Character of the NATO Campaign -- BOSNIA AND THE DAYTON ACCORDS BECOME THE PRELUDE TO WAR IN KOSOVO -- THE DIPLOMATIC PRELUDE -- PEACE TALKS END IN WAR -- Serbia's Grand Strategic and Tactical Mistakes -- NATO's Blundering into Large-Scale War -- OPERATION ALLIED FORCE: THE AIR AND MISSILE CAMPAIGN -- The Phases and Non-Phases of the Air and Missile Campaign -- The Road to Escalation -- Expanding the Target Base and Scale of Military Action -- NATO's Changing Objectives -- NATO Moves Towards Decisive Force -- Ending the Air and Missile Campaign -- Why Serbia Conceded -- Estimates of the Overall Impact of the Air and Missile Campaign -- INCREASES IN NATO FORCES AND LEVELS OF EFFORT -- NATO Naval Forces -- NATO Aircraft Numbers -- Sortie Rates and Intensity -- RELIANCE AND NON-RELIANCE ON PRECISION-GUIDED WEAPONS -- Analysis by Farce: The Imprecise Nature of Precision Engagement -- British and French Use of Precision and Non-Precision Weapons -- The Limits of Precision Weapons and Precision Engagement -- WEATHER -- NATO'S LIMITED LOSSES -- CONFLICT TERMINATION -- 3 The Grand Strategic Aspects of Kosovo: The "Whys" and "Hows" of the War and the Implications for Strategy and Force Planning -- THE "WHYS" OF GOING TO WAR -- A Lack of Criteria for Deciding on Military Action -- The Dilemmas in Deciding on Peacemaking -- THE "HOWS" OF GOING TO WAR -- COALITION WARFARE AND LEVELS OF COMMITMENT -- The Contributions of the US and Europe -- Problems in Coalition Warfare: National Decision Making and the Air War -- Problems in Coalition Warfare: National Decision Making and the Incident at Pristina -- Unity of Command versus Unity of Coalition. ; Lessons for the NATO Alliance -- US STRATEGY, FORCE PLANNING, AND DEFENSE SPENDING -- Major Theater War (MTW) Operation Plans -- Problems in US Defense Spending and Readiness -- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton -- Chief of Staff, US Army, General Dennis J. Reimer -- Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay L. Johnson -- Commandant of the Marine Corps, Charles C. Krulak -- Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Michael E. Ryan -- The Force Drawdown Imposed by Kosovo -- Being the World's Only Superpower Without Paying for the Power -- 4 The Strategic Impact and Military Effectiveness of the Air and Missile Campaign -- THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF THE WAR IN KOSOVO -- MORE THAN AIR POWER LED TO NATO'S VICTORY -- THE RELEVANCE OF KOSOVO TO OTHER WARS -- ROB PETER TO PRAISE PAUL? -- STRATEGIC LIMITS ON IMPACT OF AIR POWER IN KOSOVO: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE? -- "SHOCK AND AWE" OR "LIMITS AND RESTRAINT" -- 5 The Problem of "Perfect" and "Bloodless" War -- THE ABSURDITY OF PERFECTION -- "BLOODLESS WAR": THE PROBLEM OF SUFFERING NO OR MINIMAL CASUALTIES -- Casualties and Staying at Medium to High Altitudes -- Overall Sensitivity to Casualties -- THE PROBLEM OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE -- The Chinese Embassy Bombing -- The Real-World Problems in Targeting in Wartime -- The Results of the US Investigation into the Bombing -- The CIA Accepts the Blame -- The Imperfect Nature of Perfect War -- NATO and Serbian Collateral Damage Claims: Hiding the Truth with a Liar's Contest -- The Tragedy of Moral and Analytic Corruption -- The Worthless Character of Serbian Claims -- Outside Studies and Analyses: The Human Rights Watch and OSCE Reports -- Lessons for the Future -- Economic Aftermaths and Environmental Effects -- THE PROBLEM OF TARGETING -- Improvising a New Approach to Targeting -- National versus NATO Targeting. ; Changes in the Targeting Effort over Time -- Precision Targeting, Precision Engagement, and Precision Intelligence -- Targeting and C4: "Dynamic Battle Control" -- THE NEW CONDITIONS OF WAR -- 6 NATO Reporting on the Effectiveness of the Air and Missile Campaign -- EFFECTIVENESS REPORTING AS OF APRIL 13: THE FIRST THREE WEEKS -- THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO AIRPOWER FROM DAY 20 TO DAY 24 -- THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR AND MISSILE CAMPAIGN: DAY 25 TO DAY 50 -- THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR AND MISSILE CAMPAIGN: DAY 50 TO THE END -- BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, THE "FOG OF WAR," AND THE "FOG OF SELF-DECEPTION" -- The Pentagon Lies to Congress and the American People -- The Barry and Thomas Critique of the Pentagon Report -- The Fog of War, Surgical Bombing, and the Revolution in Military Affairs -- 7 Strategic Bombing -- THE US POST-ACTION ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN -- KOSOVO, NATO, AND STRATEGIC BOMBING -- EVOLVING A COMMAND STRUCTURE IN MID-CRISIS -- THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL BASE THAT NATO ATTACKED -- The Vulnerabilities of Serbia's Economy and Infrastructure -- Unrealistic NATO Claims versus Unrealistic Serbian Claims -- FUEL, PETROLEUM, OIL, AND LUBRICANTS (POL) TARGET GROUPS -- Wartime Gamesmanship with Damage Assessment -- Guessing at the Impact from a Postwar Perspective -- Strikes Against Industry Support and Infrastructure Target Groups -- Strikes Against Electric Power Facilities -- LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCs) AND SUPPLY ROUTE TARGET GROUPS -- COMMAND AND CONTROL TARGET GROUPS -- 8 The Air and Missile War and Serbian Air and Land Force Targets -- INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (IADS) TARGET GROUPS -- The Yugoslavian Air Force -- NATO Attacks on the Serbian Air Force During the Campaign -- NATO Claims at the End of the Campaign and Possible Lessons -- The Yugoslavian Land-Based Air Defense System. ; The Size and Nature of Serbian Forces -- NATO's Wartime Claims -- Damage Assessments from May to the End of the Conflict -- Damage Assessment after the War and the Impact of Serbian Air Defenses in Forcing NATO to Fly at Higher Altitudes -- Suppression versus Destruction -- The Problem of Survivability -- SERBIAN ARMY AND SPECIAL POLICE TARGET GROUPS -- The Size and Capability of Serbian Land Forces -- NATO Attacks on Serbian Forces and Major Weapons -- The Problems of Operational Effectiveness -- The Impact of Problems in Reporting on the Strikes on Serbian Land Forces and Battle Damage Assessment -- NATO's Damage Claims in Mid-May -- NATO's Damage Claims on June 10 -- Serbia's False Damage Claims and Deception Efforts -- NATO's Post-Conflict Damage Assessment Efforts -- British Post-Conflict Damage Assessment Claims -- US Post-Conflict Damage Assessment Efforts -- The Lessons of Attacks on Serbian Ground Forces -- THE SERBIAN BUILD-UP, SERBIAN OPERATIONS, AND THE CHALLENGE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE -- Serbian and NATO Actions in 1998 -- The FRY/Serbian Build-Up in 1999 -- The Serbian Build-Up During the War -- Serbian Use of Human Shields and Manipulation of the Media -- A Serbian View of the Build-Up -- Lessons from the Serbian Build-Up -- 9 The "Ground Option": The Possible Impact of NATO Planning for an Invasion -- THE QUIET SHIFT TOWARDS A GROUND OPTION -- PUTTING ALL THE OPTIONS ON THE TABLE -- LATE MAY: ON THE EDGE OF GOING TO A GROUND OPTION -- 10 The "Ground Option": The Role of the KLA -- THE REAL-WORLD GROUND OPTION THAT NATO DID NOT DISCUSS -- SYNERGY? GUESSING AT THE IMPACT OF AIRPOWER ON THE KLA GROUND OPTION AND VICE VERSA -- LESSONS FROM THE KLA GROUND OPTION -- 11 Detailed Lessons and Issues of the Air and Missile Campaign -- AIR SUPERIORITY -- THE A-10 -- THE AH-64 -- Tactical and Technical Problems. ; Readiness and Training Problems and Detailed Technical Issues -- Command Problems and Failure to Prepare for Independent Operations -- Mobility and Deployability -- Politics versus Technical and Tactical Problems -- Lessons and Non-Lessons -- ASYMMETRIC WEAPONS AND WARFARE -- AV-8B HARRIER -- BOMBERS: THE B-2, B-1, AND B-52 AND GLOBAL FORCE INTEGRATION -- Global Force Integration -- Global Attack -- Levels of Bomber Action -- Uncertain Bomber Effectiveness, Certain Bomber Politics -- Claims but No Evidence Regarding the Details of Effectiveness -- Lessons or Air Force Propaganda -- CLUSTER BOMBS AND MINES -- COALITION/NATO TECHNOLOGY AND INTEROPERABILITY -- European Problems and Weaknesses -- European Views on the Lessons for Force Upgrades and Interoperability -- Secretary Cohen's Summary Comments on Interoperability -- NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative -- NATO and European Action or Inaction? -- COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTERS (C4) -- Key Lessons from the War -- Reiterating the Need for Capability and Interoperability -- Lessons for High Level and Political Decision Makers -- Combined Air Operations Center -- Secure Communications and Operational Security -- Joint Operational Architecture, Network, and Information Management -- CONSCRIPTS VERSUS PROFESSIONALS -- WELL-TRAINED RESERVES VERSUS A LARGE MOBILIZATION BASE -- CRUISE MISSILES -- Speaking in Glittering Generalities -- Growing Effectiveness? -- DECOYS -- ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND THE EA-6B -- Over-Reliance on the EA-6B and Insufficient Electronic Warfare Assets -- Lessons Regarding the EA-6B -- Lessons Regarding the Overall Need to Improve US Electronic Warfare Capabilities -- Lessons Regarding NATO and Alliance Electronic Warfare Capabilities -- EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY AND POWER PROJECTION OF US AND NATO FORCES -- Deployment Planning and Management. ; The Role of US Strategic Lift.
• Sommario/riassunto: The conclusion of a war typically signals the beginning of a flood of memoirs and instant campaign histories, many presenting the purported, but often dubious lessons of the recent conflict. Cordesman is careful to avoid such pitfalls in this detailed and closely reasoned analysis, and helps us to begin to understand the implications of this dramatic conflict on its own terms. Based on a combination of official and unofficial (but always authoritative) sources, he builds a thorough case for the true lessons of NATO's first battle fought within Europe. After consideration of the historical, major political, and strategic factors that set the stage for the Kosovo campaign, Cordesman critically examines the actual effectiveness of the NATO air campaigns, both in Kosovo and Serbia proper. Operations in this rugged part of Europe were difficult, and compounding the challenges of terrain and weather were the conflicting national agendas within the Allied coalition that seriously hampered focused and decisive action by NATO. Although Milosevic ultimately conceded defeat, all of these factors played an important role in limiting the intensity and shaping the military outcome of the campaign, and the likely political and strategic results were far from certain. Cordesman unflinchingly concludes, that the air campaign over Kosovo exposed deep fault lines within and among the NATO countries and fundamental flaws in the way the West wages war.
• Titolo autorizzato: The lessons and non-lessons of the air and missile campaign in Kosovo
• ISBN: 9780313073922; 0313073929; 9780313048746; 0313048746
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910968228803321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II