Principled agents? : the political economy of good government / / Timothy Besley

• Autore: Besley Timothy
• Pubblicazione: Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2006
• Descrizione fisica: xi, 266 p. : ill
• Disciplina: 352.3
• Soggetto topico: Public administration; Government productivity; Agent (Philosophy) - Political aspects; Motivation (Psychology) - Political aspects; Policy sciences
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. 234-247) and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Competing views of government -- 1.1 The issues -- 1.2 This book -- 1.3 Background -- 1.3.1 The size of government -- 1.3.2 Corruption -- 1.3.3 Property rights -- 1.3.4 Trust and turnout -- 1.4 Economic policy making -- 1.4.1 Foundations -- 1.4.2 Good policies -- 1.4.3 The public choice critique of welfare economics -- 1.5 Political economy -- 1.6 Incentives and selection in politics -- 1.7 Concluding comments -- 2 The anatomy of government failure -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Three notions of government failure -- 2.2.1 Pareto inefficiency -- 2.2.2 Distributional failures -- 2.2.3 Wicksellian failures -- 2.2.4 Comparisons -- 2.3 An example: financing a public project -- 2.3.1 Private provision -- 2.3.2 Government provision -- 2.4 Sources of government failure -- 2.4.1 Ignorance -- 2.4.2 Influence -- 2.4.3 The quality of leadership -- 2.5 Sources of political failure -- 2.5.1 Voting -- 2.5.2 Log-rolling and legislative behavior -- 2.6 Dynamics -- 2.6.1 Investment linkages -- 2.6.2 Political and policy linkages -- 2.6.3 Investment and politics -- 2.7 Implications -- 2.8 Concluding comments -- 3 Political agency and accountability -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Elements of political agency models -- 3.2.1 The nature of the uncertainty -- 3.2.2 The motives for holding office -- 3.2.3 The nature of accountability -- 3.2.4 Retrospective voting -- 3.2.5 Model types -- 3.3 The baseline model -- 3.3.1 The environment -- 3.3.2 Equilibrium -- 3.3.3 Implications -- 3.4 Extensions -- 3.4.1 Polarization and competition -- 3.4.2 Information and accountability -- 3.4.3 The nature of the distortion -- 3.4.4 Within-term cycles -- 3.4.5 Multiple issues -- 3.4.6 Multiple two-period terms -- 3.4.7 Indefinite terms -- 3.4.8 Multiple agents -- 3.5 Discussion -- 3.5.1 Civic virtue and the quality of government. ; 3.5.2 Decentralization versus centralization -- 3.5.3 Autocracy versus democracy -- 3.5.4 Accountability to whom? -- 3.5.5 Wage policies for politicians -- 3.5.6 Behavioral versus rational choice models -- 3.6 Concluding comments -- 4 Political agency and public finance (with Michael Smart) -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The model -- 4.3 Three scenarios -- 4.3.1 Pure adverse selection -- 4.3.2 Pure moral hazard -- 4.3.3 Combining moral hazard and adverse selection -- 4.4 Implications -- 4.4.1 Equilibrium voter welfare -- 4.4.2 Are good politicians necessarily good for voters? -- 4.4.3 Turnover of politicians -- 4.4.4 The spending cycle -- 4.5 Restraining government -- 4.5.1 A direct restraint on the size of government -- 4.5.2 Indirect restraints -- 4.5.3 Summary -- 4.6 Debt and deficits -- 4.7 Governments versus NGOs -- 4.7.1 Framework -- 4.7.2 Aid to the government -- 4.7.3 Comparisons -- 4.7.4 Further issues -- 4.8 Competence -- 4.9 Conclusions -- Appendix -- 5 Final Comments -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.
• Sommario/riassunto: Mainstream policy economics now pays more attention to the delivery of policy outcomes and how incentives and institutional change shape the effectiveness of government. But should these issues be studied against a background of purely self-interested public servants? There is plenty of evidence that many citizens are publicly spirited. Can their motivation be harnessed in the public interest? These lectures review how economic thought on these issues hasevolved.
• Titolo autorizzato: Principled Agents
• ISBN: 0191533920; 9780191533921
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910821871003321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: Lindahl lectures.