Incentives and political economy / / Jean-Jacques Laffont

• Autore: Laffont Jean-Jacques <1947->
• Pubblicazione: Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2000
• Edizione: 1st ed.
• Descrizione fisica: xii, 257 p. : ill
• Disciplina: 338.9
• Soggetto topico: Economics; Policy sciences
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references (p. [231]-242) and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Political Economy with a Benevolent Monarch -- 1.2 The Design of Democratic Institutions -- 1.3 Political Economy in Democratic Countries -- 1.4 The Chicago View of Interest Group Politics -- 1.5 The Complete Contracting Approach -- 1.6 The Incomplete Contracting Approach -- 1.7 Adding Asymmetric Information -- 1.8 Endogenous Coalition formation -- I: Politicians as Informed Supervisors -- 2. The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 A Simple Supervision Model -- 2.3 Optimal Incentives for the Politician -- 2.4 Conclusion -- Appendix 2 -- 3. An Incentive Theory of the Separation of Powers -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Separation of Powers and Yardstick Competition -- 3.3 A Model with Three Types -- 3.4 Single Non-benevolent Politician -- 3.5 Separation of Politicians -- 3.6 Generalization of the Results -- 3.7 Conclusion -- Appendix 3 -- 4. Checks and Balances -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Model -- 4.3 Optimal Symmetric Constitution -- 4.4 Supervision and Division of Tasks -- 4.5 Multidimensional Collusion Activities -- 4.6 A Model with Three Politicians -- 4.7 Optimal Supervisory Structures -- 4.8 Conclusion -- Appendix 4 -- II: Flexibility Versus Discretion in Constitutional Design -- 5. Political Economy and Industrial Policy -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Political Interference in the Rent-Efficiency Trade-off -- 5.3 Ownership Matters -- 5.4 Incentives against Capture as a Constitutional Rule -- 5.5 Political Price Discrimination Versus Uniform Pricing -- 5.6 Information Asymmetries, Costly Redistribution and the Cost of Democracy -- 5.7 Conclusion -- Appendix 5 -- 6. Political Economy and the Marginal Cost Pricing Controversy -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Marginal Cost Pricing Rule -- 6.3 Frisch's Comment. ; 6.4 Smith, Edgeworth, Hotelling -- 6.5 Project Selection and Pricing Rules -- 6.6 Conclusion -- Appendix 6 -- 7. Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Basic Model -- 7.3 Controlling the Discriminatory Power of Politicians through Constraints on the Choice of Instruments -- 7.4 Delegating Discriminatory Power to the Politicians -- 7.5 Multiple Privately Informed Interest Groups -- 7.6 Conclusion -- Appendix 7 -- III: Coalition Formation and Constitutional Design -- 8. Optimal Constitutional Response to Coalition Formation -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 The Model -- 8.3 Modeling Collusion -- 8.4 Collusion under Complete Information -- 8.5 Collusion under Complete Information with Extended Mechanisms -- 8.6 Collusion under Incomplete Information -- 8.7 Conclusion -- Appendix 8 -- 9. Collusion and Decentralization -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 The Independent Case -- 9.3 The Independent Case with Limits on Communication -- 9.4 Risk Aversion -- 9.5 Conclusion -- 10. Concluding Remarks -- Appendix. Translations of Passages Quoted in French -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.
• Sommario/riassunto: Incentives and Political Economy constructs a normative approach to constitutional design using recent developments in contract theory. It treats political economy as the study of the incentive problems created by the delegation of economic policy to self-interested politicians. Politicians are treated successively as informed supervisors or residual decision-makers. The optimal constitutional responses to the activities of interest groups are characterizedin various circumstances, as well as the optimal trade-off between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas when the incompleteness of the constitutional contract is recognized.
• Titolo autorizzato: Incentives and political economy
• ISBN: 0191522228; 9780191522222
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910813626603321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: Clarendon lectures in economics.