Higher-order theories of consciousness : an anthology / / edited by Rocco J. Gennaro

• Pubblicazione: Philadelphia, PA, : J. Benjamins, 2004
• Edizione: 1st ed.
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (383 p.)
• Disciplina: 126
• Soggetto topico: Consciousness; Self-consciousness (Sensitivity); Thought and thinking; Phenomenological psychology
• Altri autori: GennaroRocco J
• Note generali: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
• Nota di bibliografia: Includes bibliographical references and index.
• Nota di contenuto: Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness -- Editorial page -- Title page -- LCC page -- Table of contents -- Contributors -- Acknowledgments and dedication -- Higher-order theories of consciousness -- 1. General introduction and terminology -- 2. Different kinds of HO theory -- 3. Some important issues -- 3.1. Circularity and regress -- 3.2. Animal and infant consciousness -- 3.3. The problem of the rock -- 3.4. The hard problem of phenomenal consciousness -- 3.5. Misrepresentation -- 3.6. The causal and/or inferential relation between the lower and higher-order states -- 4. The essays -- Notes -- References -- I. Defenders of higher-order theories -- Varieties of higher-order theory -- 1. Introductory -- 2. Higher-order sensing -- 3. Higher-order perceiving -- 4. Dispositional higher-order thoughts -- 5. Intrinsic higher-order thoughts -- 6. Higher-order thoughts and the intentional stance -- 7. Distinct higher-order thoughts -- Notes -- References -- Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation -- 1. Animal consciousness and the dispositionalist HOT theory (Carruthers) -- 1.1. Preliminaries -- 1.2. Animal concepts: A reply -- 1.3. Brain structure and evolution -- 1.4. The moral issue -- 1.5. Against the dispositional HOT theory -- 2. Misrepresentation and the division of phenomenal labor (Levine/Neander) -- 3. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Higher-order global states (HOGS) -- 1. Historical and contemporary background -- 2. Standard HOT and HOP models -- 3. The HOGS model: Higher-order global states -- 4. The higher-order aspect of HOGS -- 5. Implicit meta-intentionality and phenomenal structure - a second time -- 6. HOGS and general objections to the HO view -- 7. Conclusion -- References -- The superiority of HOP to HOT -- 1. The explanandum -- 2. HOR theories -- 3. Objections to HOR theories -- 4. My HOP theory. ; 5. Rosenthal's objection to HOP -- 6. HOP vs. HOT -- 6.0. Intuitive priority -- 6.1. Phenomenology -- 6.2. Voluntary control -- 6.3. Nonvoluntary results -- 6.4. Degrees of awareness -- 6.5. Epistemology -- 6.6. Grain -- 6.7. The ineffability of ``what it's like'' -- 6.8. Purely recognitional concepts -- 6.9. HOT's problem of sufficiency -- Notes -- References -- HOP over FOR, HOT theory -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Two kinds of HOP theory -- 3. Explaining higher-order recognitional judgments -- 4. Why some states are phenomenal and some aren't -- 5. Does HOP theory face the same objection? -- 6. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- A higher order syntactic thought (HOST) theory of consciousness -- 1. Background -- 1.1. A theory of emotion -- 1.2. The functions of emotion -- 1.3. To what extent is consciousness involved in the different types of processing initiated by emotional states? -- 1.4. Dual routes to action, and consciousness -- 2. A theory of consciousness -- Sensory qualia -- A causal role for consciousness -- Free will -- Self-identity and the unity of consciousness -- 3. Dual routes to action, and decisions -- 4. Discussion -- 5. Conclusion -- Acknowledgements -- Note -- References -- Assumptions of a subjective measure of consciousness -- Previous use of the zero correlation criterion -- Preliminary considerations: Attitudes and higher order thoughts -- Applying the zero correlation criterion to implicit learning -- Applying the zero correlation criterion to subliminal perception -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Appendix 1 -- Factors influencing mapping (2) -- II. Critics of the higher-order approach -- What phenomenal consciousness is like* -- 1. Phenomenal consciousness -- 2. Three distinctions: Intentionalism vs. phenomenism -- FO vs. HO -- experiences vs. conscious experiences. ; 3. Experiences vs. conscious experiences: Three accounts of this distinction -- 3.1. Carruthers: Worldly vs. experiential subjectivity -- 3.2. Lycan: What it's like - lower-order vs. higher-order -- 3.3. Rosenthal: Thin and thick phenomenality -- 4. Against FOR theories -- 4.1. Thick phenomenality and higher-order representations: Rosenthal -- 4.2. Higher-order qualitative character and higher-order representations: Lycan -- 4.3. Experiential subjectivity and higher-order representations: Carruthers -- 5. Against HOR theories -- Notes -- References -- Either FOR or HOR -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The explanandum and the explanans of representational theories -- 3. FOR and HOR -- 4. An alternative kind of transitive-conscious state -- 5. The case for SOR -- 6. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- A cold look at HOT theory -- 1. HOT theory, introspection and concepts -- 2. Do animals attribute mental states? -- 3. Consequences for HOT theory -- 4. Tests for consciousness -- 5. The function of consciousness -- Notes -- References -- HOT theories of consciousness -- 1. HOT theories -- 2. Examining the reasoning -- 3. Evidence for HOT theories -- Notes -- References -- A few thoughts too many? -- 1. Background -- 2. The issue -- 3. The complex account -- 4. The simpler account -- 5. The very simple view -- 6. Burdens of proof -- 7. The resolutely simple view -- 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Higher order representation in a mentalistic metatheory -- General nature of the philosophical literature -- Nature of the higher order representation -- Relation of first order to higher order representation -- Mentalistic metatheory -- Central principles -- Overall Nature -- Nature of the higher order representation -- Relation of first order to higher order representation -- Influential higher order representation theories -- ``Actualist'' theory. ; ``Dispositional'' theory -- ``Intrinsic'' theory -- Mentalism, the intrinsic, and sources of first order conscious representation -- Misguided rationales for higher order thought theories -- ``What it's like''? -- Naturalizing? -- Nonconscious mental states? -- Upshot -- References -- Ouch! An essay on pain* -- 1. -- 2. -- 3. -- 4. -- Notes -- References -- Index of names -- Index of topics -- The series ADVANCES IN CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH.
• Sommario/riassunto: Higher-Order (HO) theories of consciousness have in common the idea that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order representation. This volume presents fourteen previously unpublished essays both defending and criticizing this approach to the problem of consciousness. It is the first anthology devoted entirely to HO theories of consciousness. There are several kinds of HO theory, such as the HOT (higher-order thought) and HOP (higher-order perception) models, and each is discussed and debated. Part One contains essays by authors who defend some form of HO theory. Part Two includes papers by those who are critics of the HO approach. Some of the topics covered include animal consciousness, misrepresentation, the nature of pain, subvocal speech, subliminal perception, blindsight, the nature of emotion, the difference between perception and thought, first-order versus higher-order theories of consciousness, and the relationship between nonconscious and conscious mentality. (Series A).
• Titolo autorizzato: Higher-order theories of consciousness
• ISBN: 9786612255007; 9781423772323; 1423772326; 9789027251916; 9027251916; 9781282255005; 1282255002; 9789027295699; 9027295697
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910967549403321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: Advances in consciousness research ; ; v. 56.