Ensuring corporate misconduct : how liability insurance undermines shareholder litigation / / Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith
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| Autore: |
Baker Tom <1959->
|
| Titolo: |
Ensuring corporate misconduct : how liability insurance undermines shareholder litigation / / Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith
|
| Pubblicazione: | Chicago ; ; London, : University of Chicago Press, 2010 |
| Edizione: | 1st ed. |
| Descrizione fisica: | 1 online resource (295 p.) |
| Disciplina: | 368.5/6 |
| Soggetto topico: | Executives' liability insurance - United States |
| Executives' liability insurance - Law and legislation - United States | |
| Stockholders' derivative actions - United States | |
| Liability insurance - United States | |
| Soggetto non controllato: | liability, insurance, company, institutional, institution, shareholder, litigation, legal, laws, law school, higher education, college, university, lawyer, textbook, finance, economics, economy, corporation, illegal, responsibility, blame, securities, corporate, governance, change, united states, executive, progress, reform, stockholder, coverage, pricing, health, wellness |
| Altri autori: |
GriffithSean J
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| Note generali: | Description based upon print version of record. |
| Nota di bibliografia: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Nota di contenuto: | Introduction -- Shareholder litigation -- An introduction to directors' and officers' liability insurance -- The puzzle of entity-level D&O coverage -- Pricing and deterrence -- Insurance monitoring and loss-prevention programs -- The D&O insurer at defense and settlement -- What matters in settlement? -- Coverage defenses and disputes -- Policy recommendations: improving deterrence. |
| Sommario/riassunto: | Shareholder litigation and class action suits play a key role in protecting investors and regulating big businesses. But Directors and Officers liability insurance shields corporations and their managers from the financial consequences of many illegal acts, as evidenced by the recent Enron scandal and many of last year's corporate financial meltdowns. Ensuring Corporate Misconduct demonstrates for the first time how corporations use insurance to avoid responsibility for corporate misconduct, dangerously undermining the impact of securities laws. As Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith demonstrate, this need not be the case. Opening up the formerly closed world of corporate insurance, the authors interviewed people from every part of the industry in order to show the different instances where insurance companies could step in and play a constructive role in strengthening corporate governance-yet currently do not. Ensuring Corporate Misconduct concludes with a set of readily implementable reforms that could significantly rehabilitate the system. |
| Titolo autorizzato: | Ensuring corporate misconduct |
| ISBN: | 1-283-05808-1 |
| 9786613058089 | |
| 0-226-03507-7 | |
| Formato: | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione: | Inglese |
| Record Nr.: | 9910815439403321 |
| Lo trovi qui: | Univ. Federico II |
| Opac: | Controlla la disponibilità qui |