Dispute Resolution under Tax Treaties and Beyond

• Autore: Maisto Guglielmo
• Pubblicazione: Amsterdam : , : IBFD Publications USA, Incorporated, , 2023; ©2023
• Edizione: 1st ed.
• Descrizione fisica: 1 online resource (1261 pages)
• Disciplina: 343.040269
• Soggetto topico: Double taxation; Dispute resolution (Law)
• Nota di contenuto: Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Acknowledgements -- Foreword -- Part One: Paragraph 1 of Article 25 of the OECD Model -- Chapter 1: Paragraph 1 of Article 25 of the OECD Model - Persons Entitled to MAP -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. Persons entitled to make the MAP request in transfer pricing situations where two separate taxpayers are involved -- 1.3. To which competent authority should the request be made, considering the difference between the wording of article 25(1) under the OECD Model (2017) and the UN Model (2017)? -- Chapter 2: Actions of One or Both Contracting States -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. Historical evolution of the term "action" -- 2.2.1. The 1920s works of the League of Nations and the Rome Double Tax Convention -- 2.2.2. The Mexico and London Draft Conventions -- 2.2.3. The work of the OECD -- 2.3. The guidance included in the Commentary -- 2.3.1. Change to a contracting state's tax law -- 2.3.2. Return in a self-assessment system -- 2.3.3. Audit -- 2.3.4. Transfer pricing and amended tax return -- 2.3.5. Judicial decisions -- 2.3.6. Other examples: APAs and audit settlements -- Chapter 3: The Meaning of "Result or Will Result inTaxation Not in Accordance with the Provisions of This Convention" -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. From an objective to a subjective condition -- 3.3. The phrase "result or will result" -- 3.4. The phrase "in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of this Convention" -- 3.5. Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Time Limits for Submitting the Case -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. Historical evolution of the provision -- 4.2.1. The Draft OECD Model (1963) -- 4.2.2. The OECD Model (1977) -- 4.2.3. The 2008 Update to the OECD Model -- 4.3. Overview of current treaty practice -- 4.4. The computation of the 3-year time limit -- Chapter 5: Acceptance and Denial of MAP Requests and Related Remedies -- 5.1. Introduction. ; 5.2. Why is access/denial of MAPs an issue? The special nature of MAPs and arbitration in tax treaties -- 5.3. Judicial control of the decision of denial of access to the MAP -- 5.4. Access/denial of access to MAP in the MEMAP, BEPS Action 14 Minimum Standard and article 25 of the OECD Model -- 5.4.1. Preliminary remarks -- 5.4.2. The MEMAP (2007) -- 5.4.3. BEPS Action 14 (2015): An overview -- 5.4.4. MLI (2016) -- 5.4.5. Article 25 of the OECD Model: Access and exceptions to access to the MAP -- 5.4.5.1. Facilitating access to MAP (new drafting of article 25(1) of the OECD Model) and communications of "denials of access" to the other competent authorities -- 5.4.5.2. Good faith creates a presumption in favour of MAP access -- 5.4.5.3. Exceptions to MAP and the presumption of MAP access -- 5.4.6. A final reflection on the Commentary on Article 25 of the OECD Model and access to MAP -- 5.5. The 2021 public consultation on BEPS Action 14 and some countries' position: Remaining obstacles to MAP access -- 5.5.1. The OECD public consultation in 2021: Defining MAP access, common documentation and suspension of collection of tax debts during the MAP -- 5.5.2. The input received by the OECD in the public consultation -- 5.5.3. The position on access to MAP in some countries and its connection with arbitration -- 5.5.4. Conclusion -- 5.6. The remedies against denial of access (including the interaction of MAP access and bilateral investment treaties) -- 5.6.1. Introduction -- 5.6.2. Consultation with the other competent authorities on admission of MAP requests -- 5.6.3. Corresponding adjustments -- 5.6.4. Domestic courts and the solution in the Dispute Resolution Directive -- 5.6.5. Mediation/ombudsman intervention for access to MAP -- 5.6.6. Bilateral investment treaties. ; 5.7. Access/denial of access to MAP: An assessment of the current situation and the need for a fresh approach -- 5.8. Annex 1: BEPS Action 14: Minimum standard and access to MAP -- 5.8.1. Minimum standard -- 5.8.2. Best practices -- Part Two: Paragraph 2 of Article 25 of the OECD Model -- Chapter 6: Judicial Control of the MAP Process -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. MAP issues within tax litigation -- 6.2.1. Would the alleged mismanagement of a MAP procedure affect the legality of taxation? -- 6.2.2. Is a MAP agreement binding for tax courts? -- 6.2.2.1. If the taxpayer refuses the MAP agreement -- 6.2.2.2. If the taxpayer accepts the MAP agreement -- 6.3. MAP issues outside tax litigation -- 6.3.1. Direct litigation against MAP procedures -- 6.3.1.1. Is court action possible against decisions denying access to a MAP? -- 6.3.1.1.1. Admissibility of applications -- 6.3.1.1.2. Reasons for the denial of a MAP request -- 6.3.1.1.3. Margin of appreciation by tax administration -- 6.3.1.1.4. Efficiency of litigation -- 6.3.1.2. Is court action possible against a lengthy MAP or a failure to reach an agreement? -- 6.3.1.3. Is court action possible for the taxpayer against a MAP agreement on the grounds that it violates the tax treaty? -- 6.3.2. Court action claiming compensation for the mismanagement of the MAP process by the tax administration -- 6.4. Conclusion -- Chapter 7: A Judicial Experience on MAPs in the Context of the Domestic Legal System -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. The MAP and domestic proceedings in the Netherlands - Some general aspects -- 7.3. Interaction between MAPs and domestic legal proceedings in the Netherlands -- 7.4. Judicial control of the MAP process in the Netherlands -- 7.5. Personal judicial experience with MAPs -- 7.6. Final remarks -- Part Three: Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 25 of the OECD Model. ; Chapter 8: The Resolution of "Difficulties" or "Doubts" Related to the Interpretation and Application of a Tax Treaty and Consultation in Cases Not Provided for in the Treaty -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. Historical background on article 25 of the OECD Model and in particular on article 25(3) -- 8.2.1. The 1928 League of Nations Draft Conventions -- 8.2.2. The Mexico (1943) and London (1946) Draft Conventions -- 8.2.3. The 1963 OECD Model and beyond -- 8.3. The first sentence of article 25(3) of the OECD Model: Resolving difficulties or doubts in the interpretation or application of the tax treaty through the MAP -- 8.3.1. General -- 8.3.2. The competent authorities are not allowed to change the treaty -- 8.3.3. Cases in which the competent authorities can conclude an interpretative mutual agreement -- 8.3.3.1. General -- 8.3.3.2. Doubts and difficulties regarding the application or interpretation of the treaty -- 8.3.4. The Commentary on Article 25 of the OECD Model -- 8.3.4.1. General -- 8.3.4.2. The phrase "difficulties arising from the application" -- 8.3.4.3. Difficulties of interpretation -- 8.3.4.4. Commentaries on other articles of the OECD Model -- 8.3.4.5. Difficulties and doubts according to the 2016 US Model -- 8.3.4.6. Double taxation and double exemption: Difficulty regarding the application or interpretation of a treaty -- 8.3.5. The relationship between the first sentence of article 25(3) of the OECD Model and article 3(2) of the OECD Model -- 8.3.5.1. General -- 8.3.5.2. Qualification conflicts -- 8.3.5.3. Interpretative mutual agreement is part of the treaty context -- 8.3.6. Testing by the judge -- 8.3.6.1. Marginal test -- 8.3.6.2. Relationship with former supreme judge decisions. ; 8.3.6.3. Further illustrations of a judge independently interpreting the tax treaty and declaring a MAP reaching another result as not binding (no difficulty) -- 8.3.6.4. Supreme judges' diverging views in contracting states -- 8.3.7. Qualification of an interpretative MAP under international law -- 8.3.7.1. Treaty under international law? -- 8.3.7.2. German Federal Tax Court case law and internal effect -- 8.3.7.3. Some other jurisdictions -- 8.4. The second sentence of article 25(3) of the OECD Model: Joint consultation by the competent authorities for the elimination of double taxation in cases not provided for -- 8.4.1. General -- 8.4.2. Cases not provided for in a tax treaty -- 8.4.2.1. Commentary on the OECD Model -- 8.4.2.2. The role of articles 21 and 22 of the OECD Model -- 8.4.3. No duty -- Chapter 9: Dangerous Transplantation: Importing Big Government into Article 3(2) of the 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. Article 3(2) of the 2017 OECD Model -- 9.2.1. A poorly conceived and drafted addition -- 9.2.2. The Commentary on the changes to the Model clause -- 9.3. Where did the idea originate? -- 9.3.1. Relevant US tax treaty history -- 9.3.2. US administrative law and big government -- 9.4. The positions of others on deference to the administrative interpretation of law -- 9.4.1. Reticence among European courts about interpretive mutual agreements -- 9.4.2. Deference to the administrative interpretation of law further afield: South Africa -- 9.5. The apparent clarification of article 3(2) in 2017 -- 9.6. Post-2017 adoption in tax treaty practices beyond the United States -- 9.7. Publicity and interpretive mutual agreements -- 9.8. Conclusion -- Chapter 10: Scope of Arbitration under the OECD and UN Model Provisions -- 10.1. Introduction -- 10.2. Preconditions for arbitration. ; 10.2.1. Presentation of a case under article 25(1).
• Sommario/riassunto: Dispute Resolution under Tax Treaties and Beyond is a detailed and comprehensive study on tax dispute resolution mechanisms, with a specific focus on tax treaty disputes.
• Titolo autorizzato: Dispute Resolution under Tax Treaties and Beyond
• ISBN: 90-8722-855-4
• Formato: Materiale a stampa
• Livello bibliografico: Monografia
• Lingua di pubblicazione: Inglese
• Record Nr.: 9910915786103321
• Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
• Serie: EC and International Tax Law Series