Between deflationism & correspondence theory / / Matthew McGrath |
Autore | McGrath Matthew |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | London : , : Routledge, , 2013 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (282 p.) |
Disciplina | 121 |
Collana | Studies in Philosophy |
Soggetto topico |
Truth - Deflationary theory
Truth - Correspondence theory |
Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
ISBN |
1-138-86555-9
1-315-05456-6 1-135-71953-5 1-135-71946-2 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; Preface; 1. Realism about Propositions and Properties; I. Introduction; II. Ontological Commitment; III. Are Properties and Contents on a Par with Sakes and Average Persons?; IV. Ackerman's Triviality Charge; V. Properties and Concepts? Propositions and States of Affairs?; 2. Deflationism Rejected, Weak Deflationism Presented; 3. Questions for Weak Deflationism; I. Is Weak Deflationism Circular?; II. Why Shouldn't One Seek a Correspondence Theory of Propositional Truth?
III. Does Weak Deflationism Stumble on the Explanation of General Facts Involving TruthIV. Does Weak Deflationism Have the Resources to Explain the Obviousness of Propositions Expressed by Instances of the Schema 'p' is true iff p?; V. Can the Weak Deflationist Answer the Standard Objection to Correspondence Theories that if Truth Consisted in Correspondence with the Facts, Knowing Something is True would Require an Absurd Comparison between Sentences (Utterances, Beliefs) and Facts? VI. Is Weak Deflationism Incompatible with Non-Factual ist Theories of Certain Areas of Declarative Discourse, e.g., Moral Discourse?VII. Why Can't We Use Higher-Order Quantification to Formulate Deflationism about Propositional Truth as a Universalized Biconditional?; 4. A Challenge from David Lewis; I. First Part of the Challenge; II. Second Part of the Challenge; 5. Truthmaking; I. Question 1: Does Pursuit of the Truthmaker Project Require Acceptance of a Correspondence Theory of Truth Rather than a Deflationist Theory? II. Question 2: Is There Good Reason to Think the Truthmaker Project will be Fruitful?III. Truthmaking without the Truthmaker Project; 6. The Liar Paradox; I. Illustrations of Supervenience; II. Categorial Preliminaries; III. An (Almost) General Account of Truth; IV. A Dilemma?; V. Comparison with Kripke's Account; Bibliography; Index |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910453608103321 |
McGrath Matthew | ||
London : , : Routledge, , 2013 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Between deflationism & correspondence theory / / Matthew McGrath |
Autore | McGrath Matthew |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | London : , : Routledge, , 2013 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (282 p.) |
Disciplina | 121 |
Collana | Studies in Philosophy |
Soggetto topico |
Truth - Deflationary theory
Truth - Correspondence theory |
ISBN |
1-138-86555-9
1-315-05456-6 1-135-71953-5 1-135-71946-2 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; Preface; 1. Realism about Propositions and Properties; I. Introduction; II. Ontological Commitment; III. Are Properties and Contents on a Par with Sakes and Average Persons?; IV. Ackerman's Triviality Charge; V. Properties and Concepts? Propositions and States of Affairs?; 2. Deflationism Rejected, Weak Deflationism Presented; 3. Questions for Weak Deflationism; I. Is Weak Deflationism Circular?; II. Why Shouldn't One Seek a Correspondence Theory of Propositional Truth?
III. Does Weak Deflationism Stumble on the Explanation of General Facts Involving TruthIV. Does Weak Deflationism Have the Resources to Explain the Obviousness of Propositions Expressed by Instances of the Schema 'p' is true iff p?; V. Can the Weak Deflationist Answer the Standard Objection to Correspondence Theories that if Truth Consisted in Correspondence with the Facts, Knowing Something is True would Require an Absurd Comparison between Sentences (Utterances, Beliefs) and Facts? VI. Is Weak Deflationism Incompatible with Non-Factual ist Theories of Certain Areas of Declarative Discourse, e.g., Moral Discourse?VII. Why Can't We Use Higher-Order Quantification to Formulate Deflationism about Propositional Truth as a Universalized Biconditional?; 4. A Challenge from David Lewis; I. First Part of the Challenge; II. Second Part of the Challenge; 5. Truthmaking; I. Question 1: Does Pursuit of the Truthmaker Project Require Acceptance of a Correspondence Theory of Truth Rather than a Deflationist Theory? II. Question 2: Is There Good Reason to Think the Truthmaker Project will be Fruitful?III. Truthmaking without the Truthmaker Project; 6. The Liar Paradox; I. Illustrations of Supervenience; II. Categorial Preliminaries; III. An (Almost) General Account of Truth; IV. A Dilemma?; V. Comparison with Kripke's Account; Bibliography; Index |
Altri titoli varianti | Between deflationism and correspondence theory |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910791097203321 |
McGrath Matthew | ||
London : , : Routledge, , 2013 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Between deflationism & correspondence theory / / Matthew McGrath |
Autore | McGrath Matthew |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | London : , : Routledge, , 2013 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (282 p.) |
Disciplina | 121 |
Collana | Studies in Philosophy |
Soggetto topico |
Truth - Deflationary theory
Truth - Correspondence theory |
ISBN |
1-138-86555-9
1-315-05456-6 1-135-71953-5 1-135-71946-2 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; Preface; 1. Realism about Propositions and Properties; I. Introduction; II. Ontological Commitment; III. Are Properties and Contents on a Par with Sakes and Average Persons?; IV. Ackerman's Triviality Charge; V. Properties and Concepts? Propositions and States of Affairs?; 2. Deflationism Rejected, Weak Deflationism Presented; 3. Questions for Weak Deflationism; I. Is Weak Deflationism Circular?; II. Why Shouldn't One Seek a Correspondence Theory of Propositional Truth?
III. Does Weak Deflationism Stumble on the Explanation of General Facts Involving TruthIV. Does Weak Deflationism Have the Resources to Explain the Obviousness of Propositions Expressed by Instances of the Schema 'p' is true iff p?; V. Can the Weak Deflationist Answer the Standard Objection to Correspondence Theories that if Truth Consisted in Correspondence with the Facts, Knowing Something is True would Require an Absurd Comparison between Sentences (Utterances, Beliefs) and Facts? VI. Is Weak Deflationism Incompatible with Non-Factual ist Theories of Certain Areas of Declarative Discourse, e.g., Moral Discourse?VII. Why Can't We Use Higher-Order Quantification to Formulate Deflationism about Propositional Truth as a Universalized Biconditional?; 4. A Challenge from David Lewis; I. First Part of the Challenge; II. Second Part of the Challenge; 5. Truthmaking; I. Question 1: Does Pursuit of the Truthmaker Project Require Acceptance of a Correspondence Theory of Truth Rather than a Deflationist Theory? II. Question 2: Is There Good Reason to Think the Truthmaker Project will be Fruitful?III. Truthmaking without the Truthmaker Project; 6. The Liar Paradox; I. Illustrations of Supervenience; II. Categorial Preliminaries; III. An (Almost) General Account of Truth; IV. A Dilemma?; V. Comparison with Kripke's Account; Bibliography; Index |
Altri titoli varianti | Between deflationism and correspondence theory |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910807285803321 |
McGrath Matthew | ||
London : , : Routledge, , 2013 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
The correspondence theory of truth : an essay on the metaphysics of predication / / Andrew Newman [[electronic resource]] |
Autore | Newman Andrew <1948-> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2002 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xii, 251 pages) : digital, PDF file(s) |
Disciplina | 121 |
Collana | Cambridge studies in philosophy |
Soggetto topico |
Truth - Correspondence theory
Language and languages - Philosophy |
ISBN |
1-107-12530-8
1-280-41956-3 0-511-17665-1 0-511-04223-X 0-511-15754-1 0-511-30455-2 0-511-49797-0 0-511-04515-8 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | ; 1. Universals, Predication, and Truth. ; 1.1. The Problem of Universals. ; 1.2. Theories of Universals. ; 1.3. Predication, Participation, and Inherence. ; 1.4. Universals, Truth, and Devitt -- ; 2. The Univocity of Truth. ; 2.1. Horwich and Deflationary Theories of Truth. ; 2.2. Alston and Minimalist Realism about Truth. ; 2.3. The Problem of the Univocity of Truth. ; 2.4. Reality and the Eleatic Principle -- ; 3. The Correspondence Theory for Predicative Sentences. ; 3.1. Difficulties about States of Affairs in the Tractatus. ; 3.2. Truth as Isomorphism between Sentence and State of Affairs. ; 3.3. The Nominalist Account of Atomic Facts. ; 3.4. The Realist Account of Atomic Facts. ; 3.5. Correspondence for Sentences with and without Facts. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910449794203321 |
Newman Andrew <1948-> | ||
Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2002 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
The correspondence theory of truth : an essay on the metaphysics of predication / / Andrew Newman [[electronic resource]] |
Autore | Newman Andrew <1948-> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2002 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xii, 251 pages) : digital, PDF file(s) |
Disciplina | 121 |
Collana | Cambridge studies in philosophy |
Soggetto topico |
Truth - Correspondence theory
Language and languages - Philosophy |
ISBN |
1-107-12530-8
1-280-41956-3 0-511-17665-1 0-511-04223-X 0-511-15754-1 0-511-30455-2 0-511-49797-0 0-511-04515-8 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | ; 1. Universals, Predication, and Truth. ; 1.1. The Problem of Universals. ; 1.2. Theories of Universals. ; 1.3. Predication, Participation, and Inherence. ; 1.4. Universals, Truth, and Devitt -- ; 2. The Univocity of Truth. ; 2.1. Horwich and Deflationary Theories of Truth. ; 2.2. Alston and Minimalist Realism about Truth. ; 2.3. The Problem of the Univocity of Truth. ; 2.4. Reality and the Eleatic Principle -- ; 3. The Correspondence Theory for Predicative Sentences. ; 3.1. Difficulties about States of Affairs in the Tractatus. ; 3.2. Truth as Isomorphism between Sentence and State of Affairs. ; 3.3. The Nominalist Account of Atomic Facts. ; 3.4. The Realist Account of Atomic Facts. ; 3.5. Correspondence for Sentences with and without Facts. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910777070203321 |
Newman Andrew <1948-> | ||
Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2002 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
The correspondence theory of truth : an essay on the metaphysics of predication / / Andrew Newman [[electronic resource]] |
Autore | Newman Andrew <1948-> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2002 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xii, 251 pages) : digital, PDF file(s) |
Disciplina | 121 |
Collana | Cambridge studies in philosophy |
Soggetto topico |
Truth - Correspondence theory
Language and languages - Philosophy |
ISBN |
1-107-12530-8
1-280-41956-3 0-511-17665-1 0-511-04223-X 0-511-15754-1 0-511-30455-2 0-511-49797-0 0-511-04515-8 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | ; 1. Universals, Predication, and Truth. ; 1.1. The Problem of Universals. ; 1.2. Theories of Universals. ; 1.3. Predication, Participation, and Inherence. ; 1.4. Universals, Truth, and Devitt -- ; 2. The Univocity of Truth. ; 2.1. Horwich and Deflationary Theories of Truth. ; 2.2. Alston and Minimalist Realism about Truth. ; 2.3. The Problem of the Univocity of Truth. ; 2.4. Reality and the Eleatic Principle -- ; 3. The Correspondence Theory for Predicative Sentences. ; 3.1. Difficulties about States of Affairs in the Tractatus. ; 3.2. Truth as Isomorphism between Sentence and State of Affairs. ; 3.3. The Nominalist Account of Atomic Facts. ; 3.4. The Realist Account of Atomic Facts. ; 3.5. Correspondence for Sentences with and without Facts. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910809387403321 |
Newman Andrew <1948-> | ||
Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2002 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Focusing on truth / / Lawrence E. Johnson |
Autore | Johnson Lawrence E. |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | London ; ; New York : , : Routledge, , 1992 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (288 p.) |
Disciplina | 121 |
Soggetto topico |
Truth
Truth - Correspondence theory Truth - Coherence theory |
Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
ISBN |
1-134-90794-X
1-280-60356-9 9786610603565 0-203-00417-5 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | Preliminaries; Contents; Acknowledgements; 1 Introduction; 2 Coherence; 3 Correspondence; 4 Alternatives I; 5 The semantic conception of truth; 6 Intermezzo; 7 Austin and Strawson; 8 Truth; 9 Alternatives II; 10 Truth and truth; 11 Coda; Notes; Bibliography; Index |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910449890603321 |
Johnson Lawrence E. | ||
London ; ; New York : , : Routledge, , 1992 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Focusing on truth / / Lawrence E. Johnson |
Autore | Johnson Lawrence E. |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | London ; ; New York : , : Routledge, , 1992 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (288 p.) |
Disciplina | 121 |
Soggetto topico |
Truth
Truth - Correspondence theory Truth - Coherence theory |
ISBN |
1-134-90793-1
1-134-90794-X 1-280-60356-9 9786610603565 0-203-00417-5 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | Preliminaries; Contents; Acknowledgements; 1 Introduction; 2 Coherence; 3 Correspondence; 4 Alternatives I; 5 The semantic conception of truth; 6 Intermezzo; 7 Austin and Strawson; 8 Truth; 9 Alternatives II; 10 Truth and truth; 11 Coda; Notes; Bibliography; Index |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910777387503321 |
Johnson Lawrence E. | ||
London ; ; New York : , : Routledge, , 1992 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Focusing on truth / / Lawrence E. Johnson |
Autore | Johnson Lawrence E. |
Edizione | [1st ed.] |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | London ; ; New York : , : Routledge, , 1992 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (288 p.) |
Disciplina | 121 |
Soggetto topico |
Truth
Truth - Correspondence theory Truth - Coherence theory |
ISBN |
1-134-90793-1
1-134-90794-X 1-280-60356-9 9786610603565 0-203-00417-5 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | Preliminaries; Contents; Acknowledgements; 1 Introduction; 2 Coherence; 3 Correspondence; 4 Alternatives I; 5 The semantic conception of truth; 6 Intermezzo; 7 Austin and Strawson; 8 Truth; 9 Alternatives II; 10 Truth and truth; 11 Coda; Notes; Bibliography; Index |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910807118603321 |
Johnson Lawrence E. | ||
London ; ; New York : , : Routledge, , 1992 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Truth [[electronic resource] ] : its nature, criteria and conditions / / Haig Khatchadourian |
Autore | Khatchadourian Haig |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Frankfurt, : Ontos Verlag, 2011 |
Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (126 p.) |
Disciplina | 121 |
Collana | Philosophische Analyse =Philosophical analysis |
Soggetto topico |
Truth
Truth - Correspondence theory |
Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
ISBN | 3-11-032576-4 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1. The Traditional Correspondence Theory of Truth -- Chapter 2. A Modified Correspondence Theory of Truth -- Chapter 3. "Truth as Identity of Fact and Proposition" -- Chapter 4. "Truth as Appraisal" -- Chapter 5. Facts -- Chapter 6. "Emotive Theory of Truth" -- Chapter 7. Nicholas Rescher's Coherence Theory of Truth -- Chapter 8. Standard Conditions, Preconditions and Presuppositions, and Performative & Constative Uses, of 'True' and 'False' -- Chapter 9. Conditions of Cognitive & Conditions of Performative Uses of Truth Statements -- Chapter 10. Appraisive/ Evaluative Uses of 'True' and 'False' -- INDEX -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910452586303321 |
Khatchadourian Haig | ||
Frankfurt, : Ontos Verlag, 2011 | ||
Materiale a stampa | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|