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Are the French Happy with the 35-Hour Workweek? / / Marcello Estevão, Filipa Sa
Are the French Happy with the 35-Hour Workweek? / / Marcello Estevão, Filipa Sa
Autore Estevão Marcello
Pubbl/distr/stampa Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (26 p.)
Altri autori (Persone) SaFilipa
Collana IMF Working Papers
Soggetto topico Hours of labor - France - Econometric models
Workweek - France - Econometric models
Labor
Macroeconomics
Employment
Unemployment
Wages
Intergenerational Income Distribution
Aggregate Human Capital
Aggregate Labor Productivity
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Single Equation Models
Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models
Spatial Models
Treatment Effect Models
Labor Economics: General
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Aggregate Factor Income Distribution
Labour
income economics
Income
National accounts
Labor economics
Economic theory
ISBN 1-4623-3869-0
1-4527-5618-X
1-283-51592-X
1-4519-0964-0
9786613828378
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH""; ""III. CONSEQUENCES OF HOURS RESTRICTIONS: THEORY""; ""IV. DATA AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY""; ""V. RESULTS""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
Record Nr. UNINA-9910788407403321
Estevão Marcello  
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Are the French Happy with the 35-Hour Workweek? / / Marcello Estevão, Filipa Sa
Are the French Happy with the 35-Hour Workweek? / / Marcello Estevão, Filipa Sa
Autore Estevão Marcello
Edizione [1st ed.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (26 p.)
Altri autori (Persone) SaFilipa
Collana IMF Working Papers
Soggetto topico Hours of labor - France - Econometric models
Workweek - France - Econometric models
Labor
Macroeconomics
Employment
Unemployment
Wages
Intergenerational Income Distribution
Aggregate Human Capital
Aggregate Labor Productivity
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Single Equation Models
Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models
Spatial Models
Treatment Effect Models
Labor Economics: General
Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Aggregate Factor Income Distribution
Labour
income economics
Income
National accounts
Labor economics
Economic theory
ISBN 1-4623-3869-0
1-4527-5618-X
1-283-51592-X
1-4519-0964-0
9786613828378
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH""; ""III. CONSEQUENCES OF HOURS RESTRICTIONS: THEORY""; ""IV. DATA AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY""; ""V. RESULTS""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""
Record Nr. UNINA-9910817303603321
Estevão Marcello  
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle : : Evidence from Italian Municipalities / / Lorenzo Forni, Andrea Bonfatti
Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle : : Evidence from Italian Municipalities / / Lorenzo Forni, Andrea Bonfatti
Autore Forni Lorenzo
Pubbl/distr/stampa Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2017
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (21 pages) : illustrations, tables
Disciplina 320
Altri autori (Persone) BonfattiAndrea
Collana IMF Working Papers
Soggetto topico Political science
Budgeting
Macroeconomics
Public Finance
Demography
Single Equation Models
Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models
Spatial Models
Treatment Effect Models
'Panel Data Models
Spatio-temporal Models'
National Deficit Surplus
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Intergovernmental Relations
Federalism
Secession
Fiscal Policy
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures
Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
National Budget
Budget Systems
Demographic Economics: General
Economics of the Elderly
Economics of the Handicapped
Non-labor Market Discrimination
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
Public finance & taxation
Budgeting & financial management
Population & demography
Fiscal rules
Capital spending
Budget planning and preparation
Population and demographics
Aging
Fiscal policy
Expenditure
Public financial management (PFM)
Current spending
Capital investments
Budget
Population
Population aging
Expenditures, Public
ISBN 1-4755-7015-5
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Record Nr. UNINA-9910162925803321
Forni Lorenzo  
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2017
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Goal-Independent Central Banks : : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate / / Christopher Crowe
Goal-Independent Central Banks : : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate / / Christopher Crowe
Autore Crowe Christopher
Pubbl/distr/stampa Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (43 p.)
Collana IMF Working Papers
Soggetto topico Banks and banking, Central
Monetary policy
Banks and Banking
Inflation
Macroeconomics
Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Cross-Sectional Models
Spatial Models
Treatment Effect Models
Noncooperative Games
Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Price Level
Deflation
Central Banks and Their Policies
Banks
Depository Institutions
Micro Finance Institutions
Mortgages
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Banking
Central bank autonomy
Personal income
Prices
Central banks
National accounts
Banks and banking
Income
ISBN 1-4623-6291-5
1-4527-8242-3
1-282-64909-4
9786613822901
1-4519-0969-1
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto ""Contents""; ""I. Introduction""; ""II. The Model""; ""III. Predictions""; ""IV. Empirical Tests""; ""V. Case Studies""; ""VI. Conclusions""
Record Nr. UNINA-9910788410903321
Crowe Christopher  
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Goal-Independent Central Banks : : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate / / Christopher Crowe
Goal-Independent Central Banks : : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate / / Christopher Crowe
Autore Crowe Christopher
Pubbl/distr/stampa Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (43 p.)
Collana IMF Working Papers
Soggetto topico Banks and banking, Central
Monetary policy
Banks and Banking
Inflation
Macroeconomics
Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Cross-Sectional Models
Spatial Models
Treatment Effect Models
Noncooperative Games
Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Price Level
Deflation
Central Banks and Their Policies
Banks
Depository Institutions
Micro Finance Institutions
Mortgages
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Banking
Central bank autonomy
Personal income
Prices
Central banks
National accounts
Banks and banking
Income
ISBN 1-4623-6291-5
1-4527-8242-3
1-282-64909-4
9786613822901
1-4519-0969-1
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto ""Contents""; ""I. Introduction""; ""II. The Model""; ""III. Predictions""; ""IV. Empirical Tests""; ""V. Case Studies""; ""VI. Conclusions""
Record Nr. UNINA-9910808808403321
Crowe Christopher  
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui