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Collusion and optimal reserve prices in repeated procurement auctions [[electronic resource] /] / Charles J. Thomas
| Collusion and optimal reserve prices in repeated procurement auctions [[electronic resource] /] / Charles J. Thomas |
| Autore | Thomas Charles J (Charles Jonathan), <1969-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, D.C. : , : Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, , [2001] |
| Descrizione fisica | 26 pages : digital, PDF file |
| Collana | Working paper |
| Soggetto topico |
Price fixing
Auctions |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910695509003321 |
Thomas Charles J (Charles Jonathan), <1969->
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| Washington, D.C. : , : Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, , [2001] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
The economics of collusion [[electronic resource] ] : cartels and bidding rings / / Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx
| The economics of collusion [[electronic resource] ] : cartels and bidding rings / / Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx |
| Autore | Marshall Robert C. <1956-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, c2012 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (315 p.) |
| Disciplina | 338.8/2 |
| Altri autori (Persone) | MarxLeslie M. <1967-> |
| Soggetto topico |
Price fixing
Cartels Competition |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN |
0-262-30073-7
1-280-49893-5 9786613594167 0-262-30150-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
""Contents""; ""Preface""; ""Chapter 1. Introduction ""; ""1.1 Motivating Example""; ""1.2 Collusion within Porter�s Five Forces""; ""1.3 Difficulties of Collusion""; ""1.4 Environments Requiring Explicit Collusion""; ""1.5 Lingering Price Effects of Explicit Collusion""; ""1.6 Price Formation Process""; ""1.7 Economic Rationale for the Illegality of Explicit Collusion""; ""1.8 Cartel Detection""; ""1.9 Outline of the Book""; ""1.10 Appendix: Factors Affecting the Sustainability of Tacit Collusion""; ""Part I. Collusion in Practice""; ""Chapter 2. Narrative of a Cartel""
""2.1 The Story Begins""""2.2 Initiation of the Cartel""; ""2.3 Market Share Division""; ""2.4 Price Increases and Announcements""; ""2.5 Sales Force Issues""; ""2.6 Redistributions""; ""2.7 Questions and Answers""; ""Chapter 3. Narrative of a Bidding Ring""; ""3.1 Preamble""; ""3.2 The Instruction Begins""; ""3.3 Two Motivations for the Ring""; ""3.4 Ring Logistics""; ""3.5 Ring Membership""; ""3.6 Auctioneer�s Response""; ""3.7 Implementation of Sidepayments""; ""3.8 Questions and Answers""; ""Chapter 4. Narrative of Cartel Detection""; ""4.1 Preamble""; ""4.2 The Seminar Begins"" ""4.3 Taxonomy of Cartel Actions""""4.4 Economic Evidence of Collusion""; ""4.5 Questions and Answers""; ""Part II. Economics of Cartels""; ""Chapter 5. Suppression of Rivalry by Cartels""; ""5.1 Basics""; ""5.2 Buyer Resistance""; ""5.3 Model of Price Competition without Buyer Resistance""; ""5.4 Collusive Outcomes""; ""5.5 Incentives for Cheating""; ""5.6 Conclusion""; ""Chapter 6. Implementation of Collusion by Cartels""; ""6.1 The Central Cartel Problem and the Solution""; ""6.2 Pricing Structures""; ""6.3 Allocation Structures""; ""6.4 Enforcement Structures""; ""6.5 Conclusion"" ""6.6 Appendix: Third-Party Facilitation""""Chapter 7. Beyond the Suppression of Within-cartel Rivalry""; ""7.1 Sharing Mutually Beneficial Investments""; ""7.2 A Dominant Firm versus a Cartel Acting as a Dominant Firm""; ""7.3 Direct Actions against Noncartel Firms""; ""7.4 Perimeter Forces""; ""7.5 Sixth Force of Government""; ""7.6 Conclusion""; ""7.7 Appendix: Antitrust Exemptions""; ""Part III. Economics of Bidding Rings""; ""Chapter 8. Suppression of Interbidder Rivalry by Rings""; ""8.1 Role of Auctions and Procurements in Price Discovery""; ""8.2 Suppression of Rivalry at an Auction"" ""8.3 Ring Composition""""8.4 Effects of Auction Format and Ring Size""; ""8.5 Conclusion""; ""8.6 Appendix A: Numerical Example of Leakage at a Sealed-Bid Auction""; ""8.7 Appendix B: Numerical Example of Membership and Participation at a Sealed-Bid Auction""; ""Chapter 9. Implementation of Collusion by Rings""; ""9.1 Rings versus Cartels""; ""9.2 Ring Secret Deviations""; ""9.3 Ring Pricing Structures and Seller Resistance""; ""9.4 Ring Allocation Structures""; ""9.5 Ring Enforcement Structures""; ""9.6 Ring Mechanisms for Standard Auction Types""; ""9.7 Efficiency of Allocations"" ""9.8 Conclusion"" |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910451971503321 |
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Marshall Robert C. <1956->
|
||
| Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, c2012 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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The economics of collusion : cartels and bidding rings / / Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx
| The economics of collusion : cartels and bidding rings / / Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx |
| Autore | Marshall Robert C. <1956-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, ©2012 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (315 p.) |
| Disciplina | 338.8/2 |
| Soggetto topico |
Price fixing
Cartels Competition |
| Soggetto non controllato |
ECONOMICS/Microeconomics
SOCIAL SCIENCES/Political Science/Public Policy & Law |
| ISBN |
0-262-30073-7
1-280-49893-5 9786613594167 0-262-30150-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
""Contents""; ""Preface""; ""Chapter 1. Introduction ""; ""1.1 Motivating Example""; ""1.2 Collusion within Porter�s Five Forces""; ""1.3 Difficulties of Collusion""; ""1.4 Environments Requiring Explicit Collusion""; ""1.5 Lingering Price Effects of Explicit Collusion""; ""1.6 Price Formation Process""; ""1.7 Economic Rationale for the Illegality of Explicit Collusion""; ""1.8 Cartel Detection""; ""1.9 Outline of the Book""; ""1.10 Appendix: Factors Affecting the Sustainability of Tacit Collusion""; ""Part I. Collusion in Practice""; ""Chapter 2. Narrative of a Cartel""
""2.1 The Story Begins""""2.2 Initiation of the Cartel""; ""2.3 Market Share Division""; ""2.4 Price Increases and Announcements""; ""2.5 Sales Force Issues""; ""2.6 Redistributions""; ""2.7 Questions and Answers""; ""Chapter 3. Narrative of a Bidding Ring""; ""3.1 Preamble""; ""3.2 The Instruction Begins""; ""3.3 Two Motivations for the Ring""; ""3.4 Ring Logistics""; ""3.5 Ring Membership""; ""3.6 Auctioneer�s Response""; ""3.7 Implementation of Sidepayments""; ""3.8 Questions and Answers""; ""Chapter 4. Narrative of Cartel Detection""; ""4.1 Preamble""; ""4.2 The Seminar Begins"" ""4.3 Taxonomy of Cartel Actions""""4.4 Economic Evidence of Collusion""; ""4.5 Questions and Answers""; ""Part II. Economics of Cartels""; ""Chapter 5. Suppression of Rivalry by Cartels""; ""5.1 Basics""; ""5.2 Buyer Resistance""; ""5.3 Model of Price Competition without Buyer Resistance""; ""5.4 Collusive Outcomes""; ""5.5 Incentives for Cheating""; ""5.6 Conclusion""; ""Chapter 6. Implementation of Collusion by Cartels""; ""6.1 The Central Cartel Problem and the Solution""; ""6.2 Pricing Structures""; ""6.3 Allocation Structures""; ""6.4 Enforcement Structures""; ""6.5 Conclusion"" ""6.6 Appendix: Third-Party Facilitation""""Chapter 7. Beyond the Suppression of Within-cartel Rivalry""; ""7.1 Sharing Mutually Beneficial Investments""; ""7.2 A Dominant Firm versus a Cartel Acting as a Dominant Firm""; ""7.3 Direct Actions against Noncartel Firms""; ""7.4 Perimeter Forces""; ""7.5 Sixth Force of Government""; ""7.6 Conclusion""; ""7.7 Appendix: Antitrust Exemptions""; ""Part III. Economics of Bidding Rings""; ""Chapter 8. Suppression of Interbidder Rivalry by Rings""; ""8.1 Role of Auctions and Procurements in Price Discovery""; ""8.2 Suppression of Rivalry at an Auction"" ""8.3 Ring Composition""""8.4 Effects of Auction Format and Ring Size""; ""8.5 Conclusion""; ""8.6 Appendix A: Numerical Example of Leakage at a Sealed-Bid Auction""; ""8.7 Appendix B: Numerical Example of Membership and Participation at a Sealed-Bid Auction""; ""Chapter 9. Implementation of Collusion by Rings""; ""9.1 Rings versus Cartels""; ""9.2 Ring Secret Deviations""; ""9.3 Ring Pricing Structures and Seller Resistance""; ""9.4 Ring Allocation Structures""; ""9.5 Ring Enforcement Structures""; ""9.6 Ring Mechanisms for Standard Auction Types""; ""9.7 Efficiency of Allocations"" ""9.8 Conclusion"" |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910779176703321 |
|
Marshall Robert C. <1956->
|
||
| Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, ©2012 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
The economics of collusion : cartels and bidding rings / / Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx
| The economics of collusion : cartels and bidding rings / / Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx |
| Autore | Marshall Robert C. <1956-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, ©2012 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (315 p.) |
| Disciplina | 338.8/2 |
| Soggetto topico |
Price fixing
Cartels Competition |
| Soggetto non controllato |
ECONOMICS/Microeconomics
SOCIAL SCIENCES/Political Science/Public Policy & Law |
| ISBN |
0-262-30073-7
1-280-49893-5 9786613594167 0-262-30150-4 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
""Contents""; ""Preface""; ""Chapter 1. Introduction ""; ""1.1 Motivating Example""; ""1.2 Collusion within Porter�s Five Forces""; ""1.3 Difficulties of Collusion""; ""1.4 Environments Requiring Explicit Collusion""; ""1.5 Lingering Price Effects of Explicit Collusion""; ""1.6 Price Formation Process""; ""1.7 Economic Rationale for the Illegality of Explicit Collusion""; ""1.8 Cartel Detection""; ""1.9 Outline of the Book""; ""1.10 Appendix: Factors Affecting the Sustainability of Tacit Collusion""; ""Part I. Collusion in Practice""; ""Chapter 2. Narrative of a Cartel""
""2.1 The Story Begins""""2.2 Initiation of the Cartel""; ""2.3 Market Share Division""; ""2.4 Price Increases and Announcements""; ""2.5 Sales Force Issues""; ""2.6 Redistributions""; ""2.7 Questions and Answers""; ""Chapter 3. Narrative of a Bidding Ring""; ""3.1 Preamble""; ""3.2 The Instruction Begins""; ""3.3 Two Motivations for the Ring""; ""3.4 Ring Logistics""; ""3.5 Ring Membership""; ""3.6 Auctioneer�s Response""; ""3.7 Implementation of Sidepayments""; ""3.8 Questions and Answers""; ""Chapter 4. Narrative of Cartel Detection""; ""4.1 Preamble""; ""4.2 The Seminar Begins"" ""4.3 Taxonomy of Cartel Actions""""4.4 Economic Evidence of Collusion""; ""4.5 Questions and Answers""; ""Part II. Economics of Cartels""; ""Chapter 5. Suppression of Rivalry by Cartels""; ""5.1 Basics""; ""5.2 Buyer Resistance""; ""5.3 Model of Price Competition without Buyer Resistance""; ""5.4 Collusive Outcomes""; ""5.5 Incentives for Cheating""; ""5.6 Conclusion""; ""Chapter 6. Implementation of Collusion by Cartels""; ""6.1 The Central Cartel Problem and the Solution""; ""6.2 Pricing Structures""; ""6.3 Allocation Structures""; ""6.4 Enforcement Structures""; ""6.5 Conclusion"" ""6.6 Appendix: Third-Party Facilitation""""Chapter 7. Beyond the Suppression of Within-cartel Rivalry""; ""7.1 Sharing Mutually Beneficial Investments""; ""7.2 A Dominant Firm versus a Cartel Acting as a Dominant Firm""; ""7.3 Direct Actions against Noncartel Firms""; ""7.4 Perimeter Forces""; ""7.5 Sixth Force of Government""; ""7.6 Conclusion""; ""7.7 Appendix: Antitrust Exemptions""; ""Part III. Economics of Bidding Rings""; ""Chapter 8. Suppression of Interbidder Rivalry by Rings""; ""8.1 Role of Auctions and Procurements in Price Discovery""; ""8.2 Suppression of Rivalry at an Auction"" ""8.3 Ring Composition""""8.4 Effects of Auction Format and Ring Size""; ""8.5 Conclusion""; ""8.6 Appendix A: Numerical Example of Leakage at a Sealed-Bid Auction""; ""8.7 Appendix B: Numerical Example of Membership and Participation at a Sealed-Bid Auction""; ""Chapter 9. Implementation of Collusion by Rings""; ""9.1 Rings versus Cartels""; ""9.2 Ring Secret Deviations""; ""9.3 Ring Pricing Structures and Seller Resistance""; ""9.4 Ring Allocation Structures""; ""9.5 Ring Enforcement Structures""; ""9.6 Ring Mechanisms for Standard Auction Types""; ""9.7 Efficiency of Allocations"" ""9.8 Conclusion"" |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910807038003321 |
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Marshall Robert C. <1956->
|
||
| Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, ©2012 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Final report on price manipulation in Western markets : fact-finding investigation of potential manipulation of electric and natural gas prices / / prepared by the staff of the Federal Energy Regulation Commission
| Final report on price manipulation in Western markets : fact-finding investigation of potential manipulation of electric and natural gas prices / / prepared by the staff of the Federal Energy Regulation Commission |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | [Washington, D.C.] : , : Federal Energy Regulation Commission, , 2003 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (404 unnumbered pages) : color illustrations |
| Soggetto topico |
Electric utilities - Prices - West (U.S.)
Natural gas - Prices - West (U.S.) Price fixing - West (U.S.) Electric utilities - Prices Natural gas - Prices Price fixing |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Online resources. |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Altri titoli varianti | Final report on price manipulation in Western markets |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910711857203321 |
| [Washington, D.C.] : , : Federal Energy Regulation Commission, , 2003 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Pricing policies and competition in the contact lens industry : is what you see what you get? : hearing before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, second session, July 30, 2014
| Pricing policies and competition in the contact lens industry : is what you see what you get? : hearing before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, second session, July 30, 2014 |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington : , : U.S. Government Publishing Office, , 2018 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (iii, 91 pages) : illustrations |
| Collana | S. hrg. |
| Soggetto topico |
Contact lens industry - Prices - United States
Contact lenses - Prices - United States Price fixing - United States Competition - United States Antitrust law - United States Antitrust law Competition Price fixing |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Legislative hearings. |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Altri titoli varianti | Pricing policies and competition in the contact lens industry |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910711627603321 |
| Washington : , : U.S. Government Publishing Office, , 2018 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Regulation of radio communications. March 5, 1926. -- Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
| Regulation of radio communications. March 5, 1926. -- Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | [Washington, D.C.] : , : [U.S. Government Printing Office], , 1926 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (31 pages) : tables |
| Altri autori (Persone) |
DavisEwin Lamar <1876-1949> (Democrat (TN))
ScottFrank Douglas <1878-1951> (Republican (MI)) |
| Collana |
House report / 69th Congress, 1st session. House
[United States congressional serial set] |
| Soggetto topico |
Administrative remedies
Censorship Independent regulatory commissions Interstate commerce Legislative amendments Monopolies Patents Price fixing Radio broadcasting Radio stations - Licenses Radio Telecommunication policy |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Legislative materials. |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910716104903321 |
| [Washington, D.C.] : , : [U.S. Government Printing Office], , 1926 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
A variance screen for collusion [[electronic resource] /] / Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz ... [and others]
| A variance screen for collusion [[electronic resource] /] / Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz ... [and others] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, DC : , : Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, , [2005] |
| Altri autori (Persone) | Abrantes-MetzRosa M |
| Collana | Working paper |
| Soggetto topico |
Price fixing
Price maintenance Restraint of trade |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910693398303321 |
| Washington, DC : , : Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, , [2005] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Soggetto topico
-
Price fixing
(8)
- Competition (4)
- Cartels (3)
- Administrative remedies (1)
- Antitrust law (1)