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Measuring judicial independence [[electronic resource] ] : the political economy of judging in Japan / / J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen
Measuring judicial independence [[electronic resource] ] : the political economy of judging in Japan / / J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen
Autore Ramseyer J. Mark <1954->
Pubbl/distr/stampa Chicago, IL, : University of Chicago Press, 2003
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (215 p.)
Disciplina 347.52/014
Altri autori (Persone) RasmusenEric
Collana Studies in law and economics
Soggetto topico Judges - Japan
Judicial process - Japan
Political questions and judicial power - Japan
Courts - Japan
Soggetto genere / forma Electronic books.
ISBN 1-282-53769-5
9786612537691
0-226-70387-8
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: 1968 -- 1. The Setting -- 2. Preliminary Empirics: Methodology and Communist Judges -- 3. The Effect of Judicial Decisions: Anti-Government Opinions and Electoral Law Disputes -- 4. Political Disputes: Military, Malapportionment, Injunctions, and Constitutional Law -- 5. Administrative Disputes: Taxpayers against the Government -- 6. Criminal Cases: Suspects against the Government -- 7. Toward a Party-Alternation Theory of Comparative Judicial Independence -- 8. Conclusions -- Appendix A. Excerpts from the Constitutional Texts -- Appendix B. Data Used for Time2Sok Estimates in Tables 2.5-2.7 -- Appendix C. Interpreting Ordered Probit Results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 -- Appendix D. A Formal Model of Prosecutorial Incentives -- References -- Index
Record Nr. UNINA-9910455602803321
Ramseyer J. Mark <1954->  
Chicago, IL, : University of Chicago Press, 2003
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Measuring judicial independence [[electronic resource] ] : the political economy of judging in Japan / / J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen
Measuring judicial independence [[electronic resource] ] : the political economy of judging in Japan / / J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen
Autore Ramseyer J. Mark <1954->
Pubbl/distr/stampa Chicago, IL, : University of Chicago Press, 2003
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (215 p.)
Disciplina 347.52/014
Altri autori (Persone) RasmusenEric
Collana Studies in law and economics
Soggetto topico Judges - Japan
Judicial process - Japan
Political questions and judicial power - Japan
Courts - Japan
Soggetto non controllato supreme court, legal system, judiciary, political influence, politics, selection, federal judges, merit, principle, japan, japanese constitution, communism, ideology, criminal, government, justice, taxpayers, constitutional law, injunctions, malapportionment, military, elections, protest, activism, free speech, nonfiction, judicial process, power, courts, decision making
ISBN 1-282-53769-5
9786612537691
0-226-70387-8
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: 1968 -- 1. The Setting -- 2. Preliminary Empirics: Methodology and Communist Judges -- 3. The Effect of Judicial Decisions: Anti-Government Opinions and Electoral Law Disputes -- 4. Political Disputes: Military, Malapportionment, Injunctions, and Constitutional Law -- 5. Administrative Disputes: Taxpayers against the Government -- 6. Criminal Cases: Suspects against the Government -- 7. Toward a Party-Alternation Theory of Comparative Judicial Independence -- 8. Conclusions -- Appendix A. Excerpts from the Constitutional Texts -- Appendix B. Data Used for Time2Sok Estimates in Tables 2.5-2.7 -- Appendix C. Interpreting Ordered Probit Results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 -- Appendix D. A Formal Model of Prosecutorial Incentives -- References -- Index
Record Nr. UNINA-9910780993903321
Ramseyer J. Mark <1954->  
Chicago, IL, : University of Chicago Press, 2003
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Measuring judicial independence : the political economy of judging in Japan / / J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen
Measuring judicial independence : the political economy of judging in Japan / / J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen
Autore Ramseyer J. Mark <1954->
Edizione [1st ed.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Chicago, IL, : University of Chicago Press, 2003
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (215 p.)
Disciplina 347.52/014
Altri autori (Persone) RasmusenEric
Collana Studies in law and economics
Soggetto topico Judges - Japan
Judicial process - Japan
Political questions and judicial power - Japan
Courts - Japan
ISBN 1-282-53769-5
9786612537691
0-226-70387-8
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: 1968 -- 1. The Setting -- 2. Preliminary Empirics: Methodology and Communist Judges -- 3. The Effect of Judicial Decisions: Anti-Government Opinions and Electoral Law Disputes -- 4. Political Disputes: Military, Malapportionment, Injunctions, and Constitutional Law -- 5. Administrative Disputes: Taxpayers against the Government -- 6. Criminal Cases: Suspects against the Government -- 7. Toward a Party-Alternation Theory of Comparative Judicial Independence -- 8. Conclusions -- Appendix A. Excerpts from the Constitutional Texts -- Appendix B. Data Used for Time2Sok Estimates in Tables 2.5-2.7 -- Appendix C. Interpreting Ordered Probit Results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 -- Appendix D. A Formal Model of Prosecutorial Incentives -- References -- Index
Record Nr. UNINA-9910827844003321
Ramseyer J. Mark <1954->  
Chicago, IL, : University of Chicago Press, 2003
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui