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This is philosophy of mind [[electronic resource] ] : an introduction / / Pete Mandik
| This is philosophy of mind [[electronic resource] ] : an introduction / / Pete Mandik |
| Autore | Mandik Pete |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Chichester, West Sussex ; ; Malden, MA., : Wiley-Blackwell, 2014 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (266 p.) |
| Disciplina | 128/.2 |
| Collana | This is philosophy |
| Soggetto topico |
Philosophy of mind
Philosophical behaviorism |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN |
1-118-60739-2
1-118-60748-1 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Title page; Copyright page; Contents; How to Use This Book; Acknowledgments; 1: Meet Your Mind; Aspects of Mind; Thought and experience; Conscious and unconscious; Qualia; Sensory perception; Emotion; Imagery; Will and action; Self; Propositional attitudes; Philosophical Problems; Mind-body problem; Other problems; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 2: Substance Dualism; Arguments for Substance Dualism; Leibniz's law arguments; Criticism of Leibniz's law arguments: Intensional fallacy; Explanatory gap arguments; Criticisms of explanatory gap arguments; Modal arguments
Criticism of the modal arguments: Does conceivability really entail possibility?Mind-Body Interaction as a Problem for Substance Dualism; Princess Elisabeth's objection; The dualistic alternatives to Cartesian interactionism; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 3: Property Dualism; Introducing Property Dualism: Qualia and the Brain; The Inverted Spectrum; Attack of the Zombies; The Knowledge Argument; The Explanatory Gap Argument; Does Property Dualism Lead to Epiphenomenalism?; How Do You Know You're Not a Zombie?; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 4: Idealism, Solipsism, and Panpsychism Solipsism: Is It Just Me?Idealism: It's All in the Mind; Berkeley's argument from pain; Berkeley's argument from perceptual relativity: Berkeley's bucket; Berkeley's "Nothing but an idea can resemble an idea"; Berkeley's master argument; Why Berkeley is not a solipsist; Arguing against idealism; Panpsychism: Mind Is Everywhere; The analogy argument; The nothing from nothing argument; The evolutionary argument; Arguing against panpsychism: The combination problem; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 5: Behaviorism and Other Minds; Behaviorism: Introduction and Overview The History of BehaviorismLudwig Wittgenstein and the private language argument; Gilbert Ryle versus the ghost in the machine; Objections to Behaviorism; The qualia objection; Sellars's objection; The Geach-Chisholm objection; The Philosophical Problem of Other Minds; The rise and fall of the argument from analogy; Denying the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 6: Mind as Brain; Introducing Mind-Brain Identity Theory; Advantages of Mind-Brain Identity Theory; A Very Brief Overview of Neuroscience Major parts and functions of the nervous systemMajor parts and functions of the brain; Neurons, neural activations, and brain states; Lesions, imaging, and electrophysiology; Localism and holism; Learning and synaptic plasticity; Computational neuroscience and connectionism; Neural correlates of consciousness; On pain and c-fibers; Some General Remarks about Identity; Arguments against Mind-Brain Identity Theory; The zombie argument; The multiple realizability argument; Max Black's "distinct property" argument; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 7: Thinking Machines; Can a Machine Think? Alan Turing, Turing Machines, and the Turing Test |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910463064103321 |
Mandik Pete
|
||
| Chichester, West Sussex ; ; Malden, MA., : Wiley-Blackwell, 2014 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
This is philosophy of mind [[electronic resource] ] : an introduction / / Pete Mandik
| This is philosophy of mind [[electronic resource] ] : an introduction / / Pete Mandik |
| Autore | Mandik Pete |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Chichester, West Sussex ; ; Malden, MA., : Wiley-Blackwell, 2014 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (266 p.) |
| Disciplina | 128/.2 |
| Collana | This is philosophy |
| Soggetto topico |
Philosophical behaviorism
Philosophy of mind |
| ISBN |
1-118-60739-2
1-118-60748-1 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Title page; Copyright page; Contents; How to Use This Book; Acknowledgments; 1: Meet Your Mind; Aspects of Mind; Thought and experience; Conscious and unconscious; Qualia; Sensory perception; Emotion; Imagery; Will and action; Self; Propositional attitudes; Philosophical Problems; Mind-body problem; Other problems; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 2: Substance Dualism; Arguments for Substance Dualism; Leibniz's law arguments; Criticism of Leibniz's law arguments: Intensional fallacy; Explanatory gap arguments; Criticisms of explanatory gap arguments; Modal arguments
Criticism of the modal arguments: Does conceivability really entail possibility?Mind-Body Interaction as a Problem for Substance Dualism; Princess Elisabeth's objection; The dualistic alternatives to Cartesian interactionism; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 3: Property Dualism; Introducing Property Dualism: Qualia and the Brain; The Inverted Spectrum; Attack of the Zombies; The Knowledge Argument; The Explanatory Gap Argument; Does Property Dualism Lead to Epiphenomenalism?; How Do You Know You're Not a Zombie?; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 4: Idealism, Solipsism, and Panpsychism Solipsism: Is It Just Me?Idealism: It's All in the Mind; Berkeley's argument from pain; Berkeley's argument from perceptual relativity: Berkeley's bucket; Berkeley's "Nothing but an idea can resemble an idea"; Berkeley's master argument; Why Berkeley is not a solipsist; Arguing against idealism; Panpsychism: Mind Is Everywhere; The analogy argument; The nothing from nothing argument; The evolutionary argument; Arguing against panpsychism: The combination problem; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 5: Behaviorism and Other Minds; Behaviorism: Introduction and Overview The History of BehaviorismLudwig Wittgenstein and the private language argument; Gilbert Ryle versus the ghost in the machine; Objections to Behaviorism; The qualia objection; Sellars's objection; The Geach-Chisholm objection; The Philosophical Problem of Other Minds; The rise and fall of the argument from analogy; Denying the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 6: Mind as Brain; Introducing Mind-Brain Identity Theory; Advantages of Mind-Brain Identity Theory; A Very Brief Overview of Neuroscience Major parts and functions of the nervous systemMajor parts and functions of the brain; Neurons, neural activations, and brain states; Lesions, imaging, and electrophysiology; Localism and holism; Learning and synaptic plasticity; Computational neuroscience and connectionism; Neural correlates of consciousness; On pain and c-fibers; Some General Remarks about Identity; Arguments against Mind-Brain Identity Theory; The zombie argument; The multiple realizability argument; Max Black's "distinct property" argument; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 7: Thinking Machines; Can a Machine Think? Alan Turing, Turing Machines, and the Turing Test |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910786984203321 |
|
Mandik Pete
|
||
| Chichester, West Sussex ; ; Malden, MA., : Wiley-Blackwell, 2014 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
This is philosophy of mind : an introduction / / Pete Mandik
| This is philosophy of mind : an introduction / / Pete Mandik |
| Autore | Mandik Pete |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Chichester, West Sussex ; ; Malden, MA., : Wiley-Blackwell, 2014 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (266 p.) |
| Disciplina | 128/.2 |
| Collana | This is philosophy |
| Soggetto topico |
Philosophical behaviorism
Philosophy of mind |
| ISBN |
9781118607398
1118607392 9781118607480 1118607481 |
| Classificazione |
114.2
128/.2 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Title page; Copyright page; Contents; How to Use This Book; Acknowledgments; 1: Meet Your Mind; Aspects of Mind; Thought and experience; Conscious and unconscious; Qualia; Sensory perception; Emotion; Imagery; Will and action; Self; Propositional attitudes; Philosophical Problems; Mind-body problem; Other problems; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 2: Substance Dualism; Arguments for Substance Dualism; Leibniz's law arguments; Criticism of Leibniz's law arguments: Intensional fallacy; Explanatory gap arguments; Criticisms of explanatory gap arguments; Modal arguments
Criticism of the modal arguments: Does conceivability really entail possibility?Mind-Body Interaction as a Problem for Substance Dualism; Princess Elisabeth's objection; The dualistic alternatives to Cartesian interactionism; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 3: Property Dualism; Introducing Property Dualism: Qualia and the Brain; The Inverted Spectrum; Attack of the Zombies; The Knowledge Argument; The Explanatory Gap Argument; Does Property Dualism Lead to Epiphenomenalism?; How Do You Know You're Not a Zombie?; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 4: Idealism, Solipsism, and Panpsychism Solipsism: Is It Just Me?Idealism: It's All in the Mind; Berkeley's argument from pain; Berkeley's argument from perceptual relativity: Berkeley's bucket; Berkeley's "Nothing but an idea can resemble an idea"; Berkeley's master argument; Why Berkeley is not a solipsist; Arguing against idealism; Panpsychism: Mind Is Everywhere; The analogy argument; The nothing from nothing argument; The evolutionary argument; Arguing against panpsychism: The combination problem; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 5: Behaviorism and Other Minds; Behaviorism: Introduction and Overview The History of BehaviorismLudwig Wittgenstein and the private language argument; Gilbert Ryle versus the ghost in the machine; Objections to Behaviorism; The qualia objection; Sellars's objection; The Geach-Chisholm objection; The Philosophical Problem of Other Minds; The rise and fall of the argument from analogy; Denying the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 6: Mind as Brain; Introducing Mind-Brain Identity Theory; Advantages of Mind-Brain Identity Theory; A Very Brief Overview of Neuroscience Major parts and functions of the nervous systemMajor parts and functions of the brain; Neurons, neural activations, and brain states; Lesions, imaging, and electrophysiology; Localism and holism; Learning and synaptic plasticity; Computational neuroscience and connectionism; Neural correlates of consciousness; On pain and c-fibers; Some General Remarks about Identity; Arguments against Mind-Brain Identity Theory; The zombie argument; The multiple realizability argument; Max Black's "distinct property" argument; Conclusion; Annotated Bibliography; 7: Thinking Machines; Can a Machine Think? Alan Turing, Turing Machines, and the Turing Test |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910970779203321 |
|
Mandik Pete
|
||
| Chichester, West Sussex ; ; Malden, MA., : Wiley-Blackwell, 2014 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
