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Sovereign insurance and program design [[electronic resource] ] : what is optimal for the sovereign? / / prepared by Miguel Messmacher
Sovereign insurance and program design [[electronic resource] ] : what is optimal for the sovereign? / / prepared by Miguel Messmacher
Autore Messmacher Miguel
Pubbl/distr/stampa [Washington, D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, 2006
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (30 p.)
Collana IMF working paper
Soggetto topico Insurance - Econometric models
Moral hazard - Econometric models
International finance - Econometric models
Soggetto genere / forma Electronic books.
ISBN 1-4623-1248-9
1-4527-8647-X
1-283-51558-X
1-4519-0860-1
9786613828033
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE""; ""III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE""; ""IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER""; ""V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS""; ""REFERENCES""
Record Nr. UNINA-9910464359103321
Messmacher Miguel  
[Washington, D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, 2006
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Sovereign Insurance and Program Design : : What is Optimal for the Sovereign? / / Miguel Messmacher
Sovereign Insurance and Program Design : : What is Optimal for the Sovereign? / / Miguel Messmacher
Autore Messmacher Miguel
Pubbl/distr/stampa Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (30 p.)
Collana IMF Working Papers
Soggetto topico Insurance - Econometric models
Moral hazard - Econometric models
International finance - Econometric models
Finance: General
Insurance
Macroeconomics
Taxation
Industries: Financial Services
International Economic Order and Integration
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
International Lending and Debt Problems
International Policy Coordination and Transmission
Insurance Companies
Actuarial Studies
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
Pension Funds
Non-bank Financial Institutions
Financial Instruments
Institutional Investors
Macroeconomics: Consumption
Saving
Wealth
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Finance
Insurance & actuarial studies
Public finance & taxation
Moral hazard
Insurance companies
Consumption
Tax incentives
Financial risk management
Economics
ISBN 1-4623-1248-9
1-4527-8647-X
1-283-51558-X
1-4519-0860-1
9786613828033
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE""; ""III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE""; ""IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER""; ""V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS""; ""REFERENCES""
Record Nr. UNINA-9910788406203321
Messmacher Miguel  
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2006
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
Sovereign insurance and program design : what is optimal for the sovereign? / / prepared by Miguel Messmacher
Sovereign insurance and program design : what is optimal for the sovereign? / / prepared by Miguel Messmacher
Autore Messmacher Miguel
Edizione [1st ed.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa [Washington, D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, 2006
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (30 p.)
Collana IMF working paper
Soggetto topico Insurance - Econometric models
Moral hazard - Econometric models
International finance - Econometric models
ISBN 1-4623-1248-9
1-4527-8647-X
1-283-51558-X
1-4519-0860-1
9786613828033
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto ""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE""; ""III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE""; ""IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER""; ""V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS""; ""REFERENCES""
Record Nr. UNINA-9910826876803321
Messmacher Miguel  
[Washington, D.C.], : International Monetary Fund, IMF Institute, 2006
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
A theory of international crisis lending and IMF conditionality / / Olivier Jeanne, Jonathan D. Ostry, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
A theory of international crisis lending and IMF conditionality / / Olivier Jeanne, Jonathan D. Ostry, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Autore Jeanne Olivier
Pubbl/distr/stampa [Washington, District of Columbia] : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (35 p.)
Disciplina 332.152
Altri autori (Persone) OstryJonathan David <1962->
ZettelmeyerJeromin
Collana IMF Working Papers
IMF working paper
Soggetto topico Financial crises - Prevention - Econometric models
Moral hazard - Econometric models
Loans, Foreign - Econometric models
Soggetto genere / forma Electronic books.
ISBN 1-4623-3359-1
1-4519-9938-0
1-282-84187-4
9786612841873
1-4518-7094-9
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Contents; I. Introduction; II. History; III. Literature; IV. A Theory of the IMF; A. Setup; B. Equilibrium Under Laissez-Faire; C. Equilibrium with IMF Crisis Lending; D. Moral Hazard in the Presence of IMF Crisis Lending; E. The Case for ex ante Conditionality; V. Discussion and Extensions; A. Incomplete Information and Imperfect Commitment by the IMF; B. Large versus Small Countries; C. Distortions Related to Domestic Political Economy; VI. Conclusion; References
Record Nr. UNINA-9910463612303321
Jeanne Olivier  
[Washington, District of Columbia] : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality / / Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan Ostry, Olivier Jeanne
A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality / / Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan Ostry, Olivier Jeanne
Autore Zettelmeyer Jeromin
Pubbl/distr/stampa Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (35 p.)
Disciplina 332.152
Altri autori (Persone) OstryJonathan
JeanneOlivier
Collana IMF Working Papers
IMF working paper
Soggetto topico Financial crises - Prevention - Econometric models
Moral hazard - Econometric models
Loans, Foreign - Econometric models
Finance: General
Financial Risk Management
Political Economy
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
Financial Crises
Economic & financial crises & disasters
Finance
Political economy
Crisis prevention
Moral hazard
Financial crises
Crisis resolution
Crisis management
Financial risk management
Economics
ISBN 1-4623-3359-1
1-4519-9938-0
1-282-84187-4
9786612841873
1-4518-7094-9
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Contents; I. Introduction; II. History; III. Literature; IV. A Theory of the IMF; A. Setup; B. Equilibrium Under Laissez-Faire; C. Equilibrium with IMF Crisis Lending; D. Moral Hazard in the Presence of IMF Crisis Lending; E. The Case for ex ante Conditionality; V. Discussion and Extensions; A. Incomplete Information and Imperfect Commitment by the IMF; B. Large versus Small Countries; C. Distortions Related to Domestic Political Economy; VI. Conclusion; References
Record Nr. UNINA-9910788344103321
Zettelmeyer Jeromin  
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui
A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality / / Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan Ostry, Olivier Jeanne
A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality / / Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan Ostry, Olivier Jeanne
Autore Zettelmeyer Jeromin
Edizione [1st ed.]
Pubbl/distr/stampa Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
Descrizione fisica 1 online resource (35 p.)
Disciplina 332.152
Altri autori (Persone) OstryJonathan D <1962-> (Jonathan David)
JeanneOlivier
Collana IMF Working Papers
IMF working paper
Soggetto topico Financial crises - Prevention - Econometric models
Moral hazard - Econometric models
Loans, Foreign - Econometric models
Finance: General
Financial Risk Management
Political Economy
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
Financial Crises
Economic & financial crises & disasters
Finance
Political economy
Crisis prevention
Moral hazard
Financial crises
Crisis resolution
Crisis management
Financial risk management
Economics
ISBN 1-4623-3359-1
1-4519-9938-0
1-282-84187-4
9786612841873
1-4518-7094-9
Formato Materiale a stampa
Livello bibliografico Monografia
Lingua di pubblicazione eng
Nota di contenuto Contents; I. Introduction; II. History; III. Literature; IV. A Theory of the IMF; A. Setup; B. Equilibrium Under Laissez-Faire; C. Equilibrium with IMF Crisis Lending; D. Moral Hazard in the Presence of IMF Crisis Lending; E. The Case for ex ante Conditionality; V. Discussion and Extensions; A. Incomplete Information and Imperfect Commitment by the IMF; B. Large versus Small Countries; C. Distortions Related to Domestic Political Economy; VI. Conclusion; References
Record Nr. UNINA-9910827363403321
Zettelmeyer Jeromin  
Washington, D.C. : , : International Monetary Fund, , 2008
Materiale a stampa
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II
Opac: Controlla la disponibilità qui