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Currency boards in retrospect and prospect [[electronic resource] /] / Holger C. Wolf ... [et al.]
| Currency boards in retrospect and prospect [[electronic resource] /] / Holger C. Wolf ... [et al.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, c2008 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (279 p.) |
| Disciplina | 332.4/56 |
| Altri autori (Persone) | WolfHolger C |
| Collana | CESifo book series |
| Soggetto topico |
Currency boards - History
Currency boards - Europe, Eastern Currency boards - Argentina Monetary policy - Europe, Eastern Monetary policy - Argentina |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN |
0-262-30993-9
1-282-09959-0 9786612099595 0-262-28641-6 1-4356-4330-5 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Introduction -- Currency boards : history, theory, and institutions -- Currency boards in historical perspective -- Why do countries choose currency boards? -- Modern currency boards : structural and institutional aspects -- Macroeconomic performance -- Stylized facts -- Inflation and disinflation under alternative exchange rate regimes -- Output growth and trade performance -- Argentina -- Case studies in modern currency boards : the European experience -- Euro-based currency boards : introduction -- Estonia -- Lithuania -- Bulgaria -- Bosnia and Herzegovina -- Euro-based currency boards : an assessment -- Conclusions. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910451572303321 |
| Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, c2008 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Currency boards in retrospect and prospect / / Holger C. Wolf [and others]
| Currency boards in retrospect and prospect / / Holger C. Wolf [and others] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, ©2008 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (279 p.) |
| Disciplina | 332.4/56 |
| Altri autori (Persone) | WolfHolger C |
| Collana | CESifo book series |
| Soggetto topico |
Currency boards - History
Currency boards - Europe, Eastern Currency boards - Argentina Monetary policy - Europe, Eastern Monetary policy - Argentina |
| Soggetto non controllato |
ECONOMICS/Macroeconomics
ECONOMICS/Finance |
| ISBN |
0-262-30993-9
1-282-09959-0 9786612099595 0-262-28641-6 1-4356-4330-5 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Introduction -- Currency boards : history, theory, and institutions -- Currency boards in historical perspective -- Why do countries choose currency boards? -- Modern currency boards : structural and institutional aspects -- Macroeconomic performance -- Stylized facts -- Inflation and disinflation under alternative exchange rate regimes -- Output growth and trade performance -- Argentina -- Case studies in modern currency boards : the European experience -- Euro-based currency boards : introduction -- Estonia -- Lithuania -- Bulgaria -- Bosnia and Herzegovina -- Euro-based currency boards : an assessment -- Conclusions. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910781926303321 |
| Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, ©2008 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Currency boards in retrospect and prospect / / Holger C. Wolf [and others]
| Currency boards in retrospect and prospect / / Holger C. Wolf [and others] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, ©2008 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (279 p.) |
| Disciplina | 332.4/56 |
| Altri autori (Persone) | WolfHolger C |
| Collana | CESifo book series |
| Soggetto topico |
Currency boards - History
Currency boards - Europe, Eastern Currency boards - Argentina Monetary policy - Europe, Eastern Monetary policy - Argentina |
| Soggetto non controllato |
ECONOMICS/Macroeconomics
ECONOMICS/Finance |
| ISBN |
0-262-30993-9
1-282-09959-0 9786612099595 0-262-28641-6 1-4356-4330-5 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Introduction -- Currency boards : history, theory, and institutions -- Currency boards in historical perspective -- Why do countries choose currency boards? -- Modern currency boards : structural and institutional aspects -- Macroeconomic performance -- Stylized facts -- Inflation and disinflation under alternative exchange rate regimes -- Output growth and trade performance -- Argentina -- Case studies in modern currency boards : the European experience -- Euro-based currency boards : introduction -- Estonia -- Lithuania -- Bulgaria -- Bosnia and Herzegovina -- Euro-based currency boards : an assessment -- Conclusions. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910822481803321 |
| Cambridge, Mass., : MIT Press, ©2008 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Hyperinflation, currency board, and bust : the case of Argentina / / Jutta Maute
| Hyperinflation, currency board, and bust : the case of Argentina / / Jutta Maute |
| Autore | Maute Jutta |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Bern, : Peter Lang International Academic Publishing Group, 2018 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (289 pages) : illustrations, charts; digital, PDF file(s) |
| Disciplina | 658.40809892 |
| Collana | Hohenheimer volkswirtschaftliche Schriften |
| Soggetto topico |
Currency boards - Argentina
Monetary policy - Argentina Currency question - Argentina |
| Soggetto non controllato |
Argentina
Argentinien Board Bust Case Currency Currency Board Fixed Exchange Rates Geschichte 1980-2002 Hyperinflation IMF Inflation IWF Konvertierbarkeit Maute Währung Washington Consensus Wechselkurs |
| ISBN | 3-631-75447-7 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover -- FIGURES -- ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS -- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS -- 1 INTRODUCTION -- 2 ARGENTINA'S STABILISATION CHALLENGE -- 2.1 PRECEDING STABILISATION ATTEMPTS SINCE THE DAYS OF PERÓN -- 2.2 HIGH AND HYPERINFLATION IN ARGENTINA IN THE 1980s -- 2.2.1 Rising Money Stock -- 2.2.2 Government Finance -- 2.2.2.1 Inflationary Bias of Governments -- 2.2.2.2 Debt Structure -- 2.2.2.3 Are Budget Deficits a Cause or a Consequence of Inflation? -- 2.2.2.4 Erosion of Tax System -- 2.2.2.5 Lack of Structured Budgeting Process -- 2.2.2.6 Inflation Tax -- 2.2.3 Monetary Regime -- 2.2.3.1 Monetary Constitution -- 2.2.3.2 Monetary Policy -- 2.2.4 Inflation Expectations -- 2.2.5 Symptoms of High Inflation -- 2.2.5.1 Decreasing Demand for Real Money Stock -- 2.2.5.2 Currency Substitution -- 2.2.5.3 Undervaluation as a Consequence of Currency Substitution -- 2.2.5.4 Acceleration and Variability of Inflation -- 2.2.5.5 Real Price and Wage Variability -- 2.2.5.6 Distortion and Excess Variability of Relative Prices -- 2.2.5.7 Contracting Strategies -- 2.2.5.8 Disappearance of Markets -- 2.2.5.9 Economic Performance -- 2.2.5.10 External Trade -- 2.2.5.11 Distributional Effects of High Inflation -- 2.2.6 From High to Hyperinflation -- 2.3 OPTIONS FOR STABILISATION IN THE BEGINNING 1990s -- 2.3.1 Political Feasibility of Reforms -- 2.3.2 Shape of Reforms Ending Hyperinflation -- 2.3.2.1 Monetary and Fiscal Reform -- 2.3.2.2 External Anchor: Fixing the Exchange Rate -- 2.3.3 Argentina's Choice -- 3 STABILISATION VIA CURRENCY BOARD -- 3.1 THE CURRENCY BOARD IDEA -- 3.1.1 The Term -- 3.1.2 The Concept -- 3.1.3 Currency Board vs. Other Fixed Exchange Rate Arrangements -- 3.1.4 Currency Board vs. Central Bank -- 3.1.5 Excursus: Doctrinal History and the Currency Board Idea -- 3.1.5.1 Doctrinal Positions: Mercantilist vs. Classical Views.
3.1.5.2 The Bullionist and Banking-Currency Controversies -- The Early 19th Century Bullionist Controversy -- The 1840s Banking-Currency Controversy -- Findings with Hindsight -- 3.1.5.3 The Currency Board and Classical Monetary Theory -- 3.1.5.4 From Colonial to Present-Day Currency Boards -- Rationale of Colonial Currency Boards -- Currency Boards Since 1849 -- 3.2 THE SPECIFICS AND FUNCTIONING OF A CURRENCY BOARD -- 3.2.1 Constitutional Elements of a Currency Board -- 3.2.1.1 Anchor Currency -- 3.2.1.2 Fixed Exchange Rate -- 3.2.1.3 Full Convertibility -- 3.2.1.4 Conduct of Monetary Policy -- Control of Private Money Creation -- Clearing and Day-to-Day Monetary Operations -- Lender of Last Resort Function -- 3.2.1.5 Conduct of Fiscal Policy -- 3.2.1.6 Institutional Preconditions -- 3.2.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of a Currency Board -- 3.2.2.1 Strengths of a Currency Board -- Simplicity and Transparency -- Credibility -- Currency Stability -- Interest Rate Convergence -- Financial Intermediation -- 3.2.2.2 Weaknesses of a Currency Board -- Nominal Exchange Rate Rigidity and Exchange Rate Misalignments -- Financial Fragility in the Absence of a Lender of Last Resort -- Loss of Other Central Bank Functions -- Constraints on Fiscal Policy -- 3.2.3 Considerations for Adopting a Currency Board -- 3.2.3.1 When is a Currency Board an Appropriate Choice? -- 3.2.3.2 Implementation of a Currency Board -- 3.2.4 Duration and Termination of a Currency Board -- 3.2.4.1 Currency Board: Permanent or Transitional Arrangement? -- 3.2.4.2 Exit Options -- Built-in Escape Clauses -- Depreciation -- Appreciation -- Switch to a Floating Exchange Rate -- Switch in the Peg -- 3.2.5 Dual Currency Boards: An Extended Proposal for Currency Stability -- 4 THE ARGENTINE CURRENCY BOARD ARRANGEMENT -- 4.1 FEATURES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARGENTINE CBA -- 4.1.1 The Legal Fixing. 4.1.1.1 The Convertibility Law -- 4.1.1.2 The New Central Bank Law -- 4.1.2 Assessment of the Argentine CBA's Configuration -- 4.1.2.1 Orthodox and Non-Orthodox Elements -- 4.1.2.2 The Choice of the Anchor and the Rate -- 4.1.2.3 Suboptimal Currency Area -- 4.2 THE STABILISATION TRACK DURING THE 1990s -- 4.2.1 The Early 1990s' Economic Reforms -- 4.2.1.1 Further Reforms Shaping the Monetary Frame -- 4.2.1.2 Brady Restructuring -- 4.2.1.3 Tax Reforms -- 4.2.1.4 Federal Fiscal Relations -- 4.2.1.5 Privatisation and Deregulation -- 4.2.1.6 Financial Sector Reform -- 4.2.1.7 Social Security Reform -- 4.2.1.8 Labour Market Reforms -- 4.2.1.9 Trade Liberalisation -- 4.2.2 The Early 1990s' Economic Performance: 1991-1994 -- 4.2.2.1 Monetary and Financial Development -- 4.2.2.2 Economic Activity -- 4.2.2.3 Fiscal Development -- 4.2.2.4 Unemployment and Income Distribution -- 4.2.3 Coping with the Tequila Crisis: 1995 -- 4.2.3.1 The Tequila Effect -- 4.2.3.2 Currency and Bank Run -- 4.2.3.3 Managing the Crisis -- 4.2.3.4 Financial Sector Reforms in the Wake of Tequila -- 4.2.3.5 Fiscal Adjustment Following Tequila -- 4.2.4 The Second Expansionary Phase after Tequila: 1996-1998 -- 4.2.5 The Late 1990s' Recession: 1999-2001 -- 4.2.5.1 The Asian, Russian, and Brazilian Crises -- 4.2.5.2 More Adverse External Shocks -- 4.2.5.3 Recession cum Deflation -- 4.2.5.4 Real Appreciation of the Peso -- 4.2.5.5 Fiscal Atrophy -- 4.2.5.6 Limited Financial Sector Robustness -- 4.2.5.7 Further Labour Market Reforms -- 4.2.6 The Run Up to the Collapse: 2001 -- 4.2.6.1 Meddling with the CBA -- 4.2.6.2 Emission of Quasi-Monies -- 4.2.6.3 Social and Political Overflow, and the End of the CBA -- 4.2.7 A Sketch of the Post-Collapse -- 5 WHAT WENT WRONG? -- 5.1 THE MAIN SUSPECTS -- 5.1.1 Fiscal Imbalance -- 5.1.1.1 Persistent Budget Deficits -- 5.1.1.2 Total Indebtedness. 5.1.2 Overvalued Exchange Rate -- 5.1.2.1 Real Appreciation before 1998 -- 5.1.2.2 The Real Exchange Rate after 1998 -- 5.1.3 Sudden Stop -- 5.1.3.1 Leveraged Argentina -- 5.1.3.2 Debt Sustainability -- 5.1.3.3 The Sudden Stop in the Region -- 5.1.4 Shock Exacerbation within MERCOSUR -- 5.1.4.1 1994-1998: Fixed Here, Fixed plus Sterilisation There -- 5.1.4.2 1999-2001: Fixed Here, Floating plus Sterilisation There -- 5.1.4.3 Exposed within MERCOSUR -- 5.1.5 Institutional Defects -- 5.1.5.1 Insufficient Labour Market Reforms -- 5.1.5.2 Insufficient Diversification of Production -- 5.1.5.3 Banking Sector Reforms Impaired -- 5.1.5.4 Other Deficient Reforms -- 5.1.6 Politics -- 5.1.7 The IMF -- 5.1.7.1 The IMF and the CBA -- 5.1.7.2 Outline of the IMF's Engagement 1991-2001 -- 5.1.7.3 The Role of the IMF during 1991 to 2000 -- 5.1.7.4 The Role of the IMF in the Crisis -- 5.1.7.5 The Fund's Responsibilities -- 5.1.8 The Washington Consensus -- 5.1.9 The Currency Board Itself -- 5.2 TAKING STOCK -- 5.2.1 Vulnerability -- 5.2.2 Triggers -- 5.3 MISSED OPPORTUNITIES? -- 5.3.1 Soft Exit during 1993/1994 -- 5.3.2 Soft Exit during the Second Expansionary Phase -- 5.3.3 Hard Exit after the External Shocks of the Late Nineties -- 5.3.4 Exit towards Full Dollarisation until 1999 -- 5.3.5 Dollarisation in the Midst of Crisis -- 6 CONCLUSION -- Some Lessons -- Argentina's New Challenge -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- STATISTICAL APPENDIX -- Macro Indicators -- Financial and Banking Indicators -- Fiscal Indicators -- Distribution and Poverty Indicators -- Selected Data. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910297043003321 |
Maute Jutta
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| Bern, : Peter Lang International Academic Publishing Group, 2018 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
