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Analysis of auctions for service allocation / / Gunhwan Kim
| Analysis of auctions for service allocation / / Gunhwan Kim |
| Autore | Kim Gunhwan |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Minneapolis, Minnesota : , : Publish Green, , [2015] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (81 p.) |
| Disciplina | 381.457 |
| Soggetto topico |
Public contracts
Auctions - Econometric models Auctions - Mathematical models |
| ISBN | 1-63413-382-X |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover Page; 1 Preface-Introduction; 2 Literature Review; 2.1 From Buyers' Perspective; 2.2 From Sellers' Perspective; 2.3 Auctions and Optimal Auctions; 2.4 Mechanism Design Perspective; 2.5 Random Sampling Optimal Price Auction; 2.6 Applications-I; 2.7 Dynamic Models; 2.8 Applications-II; 2.9 Applications-III; 3 Description for Our New Model; 4 Service Request Distribution in the Auction System; 4.1 Steady State Probability Distribution; 4.2 Probability of Departure After Service Completion; 5 Numerous Resource Allocation Systems; 5.1 Closed Bidder Group; 5.2 Open Bidder Group
5.3 Concurrent Bids across the Auction Systems6 Expected Income of Multiple Service Slot Auction; 6.1 PDF of the i-th Highest Bid; 6.1.1 Expected Bid Level; 6.2 Multiple Identical Service Slots; 6.2.1 Bidding with the Prior Knowledge; 6.2.2 Bidding without the Prior Belief; 6.2.3 Expected Income Rate; 6.3 Multiple Non-identical Service Slots; 7 Application Use; 8 Numerical Examples; 9 Conclusion; Bibliography |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910797030103321 |
Kim Gunhwan
|
||
| Minneapolis, Minnesota : , : Publish Green, , [2015] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Analysis of auctions for service allocation / / Gunhwan Kim
| Analysis of auctions for service allocation / / Gunhwan Kim |
| Autore | Kim Gunhwan |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Minneapolis, Minnesota : , : Publish Green, , [2015] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (81 p.) |
| Disciplina | 381.457 |
| Soggetto topico |
Public contracts
Auctions - Econometric models Auctions - Mathematical models |
| ISBN | 1-63413-382-X |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover Page; 1 Preface-Introduction; 2 Literature Review; 2.1 From Buyers' Perspective; 2.2 From Sellers' Perspective; 2.3 Auctions and Optimal Auctions; 2.4 Mechanism Design Perspective; 2.5 Random Sampling Optimal Price Auction; 2.6 Applications-I; 2.7 Dynamic Models; 2.8 Applications-II; 2.9 Applications-III; 3 Description for Our New Model; 4 Service Request Distribution in the Auction System; 4.1 Steady State Probability Distribution; 4.2 Probability of Departure After Service Completion; 5 Numerous Resource Allocation Systems; 5.1 Closed Bidder Group; 5.2 Open Bidder Group
5.3 Concurrent Bids across the Auction Systems6 Expected Income of Multiple Service Slot Auction; 6.1 PDF of the i-th Highest Bid; 6.1.1 Expected Bid Level; 6.2 Multiple Identical Service Slots; 6.2.1 Bidding with the Prior Knowledge; 6.2.2 Bidding without the Prior Belief; 6.2.3 Expected Income Rate; 6.3 Multiple Non-identical Service Slots; 7 Application Use; 8 Numerical Examples; 9 Conclusion; Bibliography |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910817232003321 |
|
Kim Gunhwan
|
||
| Minneapolis, Minnesota : , : Publish Green, , [2015] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Auction theory [[electronic resource] /] / Vijay Krishna
| Auction theory [[electronic resource] /] / Vijay Krishna |
| Autore | Krishna Vijay |
| Edizione | [2nd ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Boston, : Elsevier Academic Press, 2009 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (337 p.) |
| Disciplina | 381/.1701 |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions - Mathematical models
Game theory |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN |
1-282-28561-0
9786612285615 0-08-092293-7 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Front Cover; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication Page; Table of Contents; Preface; Chapter 1. Introduction; 1.1 Some Common Auction Forms; 1.2 Valuations; 1.3 Equivalent Auctions; 1.4 Revenue versus Efficiency; 1.5 What Is an Auction?; 1.6 Outline of Part I; Part I: Single-Object Auctions; Chapter 2. Private Value Auctions: A First Look; 2.1 The Symmetric Model; 2.2 Second-Price Auctions; 2.3 First-Price Auctions; 2.4 Revenue Comparison; 2.5 Reserve Prices; Chapter 3. The Revenue Equivalence Principle; 3.1 Main Result; 3.2 Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle
3.2.1 Unusual Auctions3.2.2 Uncertain Number of Bidders; Chapter 4. Qualifications and Extensions; 4.1 Risk-Averse Bidders; 4.2 Budget Constraints; 4.2.1 Second-Price Auctions; 4.2.2 First-Price Auctions; 4.2.3 Revenue Comparison; 4.3 Asymmetries among Bidders; 4.3.1 Asymmetric First-Price Auctions with Two Bidders; 4.3.2 Revenue Comparison; 4.3.3 Efficiency Comparison; 4.4 Resale and Efficiency; Chapter 5. Mechanism Design; 5.1 Mechanisms; 5.1.1 The Revelation Principle; 5.1.2 Incentive Compatibility; 5.1.3 Individual Rationality; 5.2 Optimal Mechanisms; 5.2.1 Setup; 5.2.2 Solution 5.2.3 Discussion and Interpretation5.2.4 Auctions versus Mechanisms; 5.3 Efficient Mechanisms; 5.3.1 The VCG Mechanism; 5.3.2 Budget Balance; 5.3.3 An Application to Bilateral Trade; Chapter 6. Auctions with Interdependent Values; 6.1 The Symmetric Model; 6.2 Second-Price Auctions; 6.3 English Auctions; 6.4 First-Price Auctions; 6.5 Revenue Comparisons; 6.5.1 English versus Second-Price Auctions; 6.5.2 Second-Price versus First-Price Auctions; 6.6 Efficiency; Chapter 7. The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle; 7.1 The Main Result; 7.2 Public Information; 7.3 An Alternative Linkage Principle Chapter 8. Asymmetries and Other Complications8.1 Failures of the Linkage Principle; 8.2 Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Second-Price Auctions; 8.3 Asymmetrically Informed Bidders; 8.4 Reserve Prices and Entry Fees; Chapter 9. Efficiency and the English Auction; 9.1 The Single Crossing Condition; 9.2 Two-Bidder Auctions; 9.3 The Average Crossing Condition; 9.4 Three or More Bidders; 9.5 Proof of Proposition 9.2; 9.6 Miscellany; Chapter 10. Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; 10.1 Efficient Mechanisms; 10.2 Optimal Mechanisms; Chapter 11. Bidding Rings 11.1 Collusion in Second-Price Auctions11.1.1 Efficient Collusion; 11.1.2 Reserve Prices in the Face of Collusion; 11.2 Collusion in First-Price Auctions; Part II: Multiple-Object Auctions; Chapter 12. An Introduction to Multiple-Object Auctions; 12.1 Sealed-Bid Auctions for Selling Identical Units; 12.1.1 Discriminatory Auctions; 12.1.2 Uniform-Price Auctions; 12.1.3 Vickrey Auctions; 12.2 Some Open Auctions; 12.2.1 Dutch Auctions; 12.2.2 English Auctions; 12.2.3 Ausubel Auctions; Chapter 13. Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; 13.1 The Basic Model; 13.2 Vickrey Auctions 13.3 Efficiency in Multiunit Auctions |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910455058803321 |
|
Krishna Vijay
|
||
| Boston, : Elsevier Academic Press, 2009 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Auction theory [[electronic resource] /] / Vijay Krishna
| Auction theory [[electronic resource] /] / Vijay Krishna |
| Autore | Krishna Vijay |
| Edizione | [2nd ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Boston, : Elsevier Academic Press, 2009 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (337 p.) |
| Disciplina | 381/.1701 |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions - Mathematical models
Game theory |
| ISBN |
1-282-28561-0
9786612285615 0-08-092293-7 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Front Cover; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication Page; Table of Contents; Preface; Chapter 1. Introduction; 1.1 Some Common Auction Forms; 1.2 Valuations; 1.3 Equivalent Auctions; 1.4 Revenue versus Efficiency; 1.5 What Is an Auction?; 1.6 Outline of Part I; Part I: Single-Object Auctions; Chapter 2. Private Value Auctions: A First Look; 2.1 The Symmetric Model; 2.2 Second-Price Auctions; 2.3 First-Price Auctions; 2.4 Revenue Comparison; 2.5 Reserve Prices; Chapter 3. The Revenue Equivalence Principle; 3.1 Main Result; 3.2 Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle
3.2.1 Unusual Auctions3.2.2 Uncertain Number of Bidders; Chapter 4. Qualifications and Extensions; 4.1 Risk-Averse Bidders; 4.2 Budget Constraints; 4.2.1 Second-Price Auctions; 4.2.2 First-Price Auctions; 4.2.3 Revenue Comparison; 4.3 Asymmetries among Bidders; 4.3.1 Asymmetric First-Price Auctions with Two Bidders; 4.3.2 Revenue Comparison; 4.3.3 Efficiency Comparison; 4.4 Resale and Efficiency; Chapter 5. Mechanism Design; 5.1 Mechanisms; 5.1.1 The Revelation Principle; 5.1.2 Incentive Compatibility; 5.1.3 Individual Rationality; 5.2 Optimal Mechanisms; 5.2.1 Setup; 5.2.2 Solution 5.2.3 Discussion and Interpretation5.2.4 Auctions versus Mechanisms; 5.3 Efficient Mechanisms; 5.3.1 The VCG Mechanism; 5.3.2 Budget Balance; 5.3.3 An Application to Bilateral Trade; Chapter 6. Auctions with Interdependent Values; 6.1 The Symmetric Model; 6.2 Second-Price Auctions; 6.3 English Auctions; 6.4 First-Price Auctions; 6.5 Revenue Comparisons; 6.5.1 English versus Second-Price Auctions; 6.5.2 Second-Price versus First-Price Auctions; 6.6 Efficiency; Chapter 7. The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle; 7.1 The Main Result; 7.2 Public Information; 7.3 An Alternative Linkage Principle Chapter 8. Asymmetries and Other Complications8.1 Failures of the Linkage Principle; 8.2 Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Second-Price Auctions; 8.3 Asymmetrically Informed Bidders; 8.4 Reserve Prices and Entry Fees; Chapter 9. Efficiency and the English Auction; 9.1 The Single Crossing Condition; 9.2 Two-Bidder Auctions; 9.3 The Average Crossing Condition; 9.4 Three or More Bidders; 9.5 Proof of Proposition 9.2; 9.6 Miscellany; Chapter 10. Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; 10.1 Efficient Mechanisms; 10.2 Optimal Mechanisms; Chapter 11. Bidding Rings 11.1 Collusion in Second-Price Auctions11.1.1 Efficient Collusion; 11.1.2 Reserve Prices in the Face of Collusion; 11.2 Collusion in First-Price Auctions; Part II: Multiple-Object Auctions; Chapter 12. An Introduction to Multiple-Object Auctions; 12.1 Sealed-Bid Auctions for Selling Identical Units; 12.1.1 Discriminatory Auctions; 12.1.2 Uniform-Price Auctions; 12.1.3 Vickrey Auctions; 12.2 Some Open Auctions; 12.2.1 Dutch Auctions; 12.2.2 English Auctions; 12.2.3 Ausubel Auctions; Chapter 13. Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; 13.1 The Basic Model; 13.2 Vickrey Auctions 13.3 Efficiency in Multiunit Auctions |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910778496703321 |
|
Krishna Vijay
|
||
| Boston, : Elsevier Academic Press, 2009 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Auction theory / / Vijay Krishna
| Auction theory / / Vijay Krishna |
| Autore | Krishna Vijay |
| Edizione | [2nd ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Boston, : Elsevier Academic Press, 2009 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (337 p.) |
| Disciplina | 381/.1701 |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions - Mathematical models
Game theory |
| ISBN |
9786612285615
9781282285613 1282285610 9780080922935 0080922937 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Front Cover; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication Page; Table of Contents; Preface; Chapter 1. Introduction; 1.1 Some Common Auction Forms; 1.2 Valuations; 1.3 Equivalent Auctions; 1.4 Revenue versus Efficiency; 1.5 What Is an Auction?; 1.6 Outline of Part I; Part I: Single-Object Auctions; Chapter 2. Private Value Auctions: A First Look; 2.1 The Symmetric Model; 2.2 Second-Price Auctions; 2.3 First-Price Auctions; 2.4 Revenue Comparison; 2.5 Reserve Prices; Chapter 3. The Revenue Equivalence Principle; 3.1 Main Result; 3.2 Some Applications of the Revenue Equivalence Principle
3.2.1 Unusual Auctions3.2.2 Uncertain Number of Bidders; Chapter 4. Qualifications and Extensions; 4.1 Risk-Averse Bidders; 4.2 Budget Constraints; 4.2.1 Second-Price Auctions; 4.2.2 First-Price Auctions; 4.2.3 Revenue Comparison; 4.3 Asymmetries among Bidders; 4.3.1 Asymmetric First-Price Auctions with Two Bidders; 4.3.2 Revenue Comparison; 4.3.3 Efficiency Comparison; 4.4 Resale and Efficiency; Chapter 5. Mechanism Design; 5.1 Mechanisms; 5.1.1 The Revelation Principle; 5.1.2 Incentive Compatibility; 5.1.3 Individual Rationality; 5.2 Optimal Mechanisms; 5.2.1 Setup; 5.2.2 Solution 5.2.3 Discussion and Interpretation5.2.4 Auctions versus Mechanisms; 5.3 Efficient Mechanisms; 5.3.1 The VCG Mechanism; 5.3.2 Budget Balance; 5.3.3 An Application to Bilateral Trade; Chapter 6. Auctions with Interdependent Values; 6.1 The Symmetric Model; 6.2 Second-Price Auctions; 6.3 English Auctions; 6.4 First-Price Auctions; 6.5 Revenue Comparisons; 6.5.1 English versus Second-Price Auctions; 6.5.2 Second-Price versus First-Price Auctions; 6.6 Efficiency; Chapter 7. The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle; 7.1 The Main Result; 7.2 Public Information; 7.3 An Alternative Linkage Principle Chapter 8. Asymmetries and Other Complications8.1 Failures of the Linkage Principle; 8.2 Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Second-Price Auctions; 8.3 Asymmetrically Informed Bidders; 8.4 Reserve Prices and Entry Fees; Chapter 9. Efficiency and the English Auction; 9.1 The Single Crossing Condition; 9.2 Two-Bidder Auctions; 9.3 The Average Crossing Condition; 9.4 Three or More Bidders; 9.5 Proof of Proposition 9.2; 9.6 Miscellany; Chapter 10. Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; 10.1 Efficient Mechanisms; 10.2 Optimal Mechanisms; Chapter 11. Bidding Rings 11.1 Collusion in Second-Price Auctions11.1.1 Efficient Collusion; 11.1.2 Reserve Prices in the Face of Collusion; 11.2 Collusion in First-Price Auctions; Part II: Multiple-Object Auctions; Chapter 12. An Introduction to Multiple-Object Auctions; 12.1 Sealed-Bid Auctions for Selling Identical Units; 12.1.1 Discriminatory Auctions; 12.1.2 Uniform-Price Auctions; 12.1.3 Vickrey Auctions; 12.2 Some Open Auctions; 12.2.1 Dutch Auctions; 12.2.2 English Auctions; 12.2.3 Ausubel Auctions; Chapter 13. Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; 13.1 The Basic Model; 13.2 Vickrey Auctions 13.3 Efficiency in Multiunit Auctions |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910970771303321 |
|
Krishna Vijay
|
||
| Boston, : Elsevier Academic Press, 2009 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Auction theory [[electronic resource] /] / Vijay Krishna
| Auction theory [[electronic resource] /] / Vijay Krishna |
| Autore | Krishna Vijay |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | San Diego, : Academic Press, c2002 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (318 p.) |
| Disciplina | 381.1701 |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions - Mathematical models
Game theory |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN |
1-281-05230-2
9786611052300 0-08-047596-5 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Auction Theory; Contents; Preface; Chapter 1: Introduction; Part I: Single Object Auctions; Chapter 2: Private Value Auctions: A First Look; Chapter 3: The Revenue Equivalence Principle; Chapter 4: Qualifications and Extensions; Chapter 5: Mechanism Design; Chapter 6: Auctions with Interdependent Values; Chapter 7: The Revenue Ranking (""Linkage"") Principle; Chapter 8: Asymmetries and Other Complications; Chapter 9: Efficiency and the English Auction; Chapter 10: Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; Chapter 11: Bidding Rings; Part II: Multiple Object Auctions
Chapter 12: An Introduction to Multiple Object AuctionsChapter 13: Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; Chapter 14: Some Revenue Considerations; Chapter 15: Sequential Sales; Chapter 16: Nonidentical Objects; Chapter 17: Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values; Part III: Appendices; Appendix A: Continuous Distributions; Appendix B: Stochastic Orders; Appendix C: Order Statistics; Appendix D: Affiliated Random Variables; Appendix E: Some Linear Algebra; Appendix F: Games of Incomplete Information; Appendix G: Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions; References; Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910458067803321 |
|
Krishna Vijay
|
||
| San Diego, : Academic Press, c2002 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Auction theory [[electronic resource] /] / Vijay Krishna
| Auction theory [[electronic resource] /] / Vijay Krishna |
| Autore | Krishna Vijay |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | San Diego, : Academic Press, c2002 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (318 p.) |
| Disciplina | 381.1701 |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions - Mathematical models
Game theory |
| ISBN |
1-281-05230-2
9786611052300 0-08-047596-5 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Auction Theory; Contents; Preface; Chapter 1: Introduction; Part I: Single Object Auctions; Chapter 2: Private Value Auctions: A First Look; Chapter 3: The Revenue Equivalence Principle; Chapter 4: Qualifications and Extensions; Chapter 5: Mechanism Design; Chapter 6: Auctions with Interdependent Values; Chapter 7: The Revenue Ranking (""Linkage"") Principle; Chapter 8: Asymmetries and Other Complications; Chapter 9: Efficiency and the English Auction; Chapter 10: Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; Chapter 11: Bidding Rings; Part II: Multiple Object Auctions
Chapter 12: An Introduction to Multiple Object AuctionsChapter 13: Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; Chapter 14: Some Revenue Considerations; Chapter 15: Sequential Sales; Chapter 16: Nonidentical Objects; Chapter 17: Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values; Part III: Appendices; Appendix A: Continuous Distributions; Appendix B: Stochastic Orders; Appendix C: Order Statistics; Appendix D: Affiliated Random Variables; Appendix E: Some Linear Algebra; Appendix F: Games of Incomplete Information; Appendix G: Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions; References; Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910784562603321 |
|
Krishna Vijay
|
||
| San Diego, : Academic Press, c2002 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Auction theory / / Vijay Krishna
| Auction theory / / Vijay Krishna |
| Autore | Krishna Vijay |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | San Diego, : Academic Press, c2002 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (318 p.) |
| Disciplina | 381.1701 |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions - Mathematical models
Game theory |
| ISBN |
9786611052300
9781281052308 1281052302 9780080475967 0080475965 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Auction Theory; Contents; Preface; Chapter 1: Introduction; Part I: Single Object Auctions; Chapter 2: Private Value Auctions: A First Look; Chapter 3: The Revenue Equivalence Principle; Chapter 4: Qualifications and Extensions; Chapter 5: Mechanism Design; Chapter 6: Auctions with Interdependent Values; Chapter 7: The Revenue Ranking (""Linkage"") Principle; Chapter 8: Asymmetries and Other Complications; Chapter 9: Efficiency and the English Auction; Chapter 10: Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; Chapter 11: Bidding Rings; Part II: Multiple Object Auctions
Chapter 12: An Introduction to Multiple Object AuctionsChapter 13: Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; Chapter 14: Some Revenue Considerations; Chapter 15: Sequential Sales; Chapter 16: Nonidentical Objects; Chapter 17: Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values; Part III: Appendices; Appendix A: Continuous Distributions; Appendix B: Stochastic Orders; Appendix C: Order Statistics; Appendix D: Affiliated Random Variables; Appendix E: Some Linear Algebra; Appendix F: Games of Incomplete Information; Appendix G: Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions; References; Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910959040503321 |
|
Krishna Vijay
|
||
| San Diego, : Academic Press, c2002 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Discovering prices : auction design in markets with complex constraints / / Paul Milgrom
| Discovering prices : auction design in markets with complex constraints / / Paul Milgrom |
| Autore | Milgrom Paul R (Paul Robert), <1948-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York : , : Columbia University Press, , 2017 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (247 pages) |
| Disciplina | 381/.1701 |
| Collana | Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series |
| Soggetto topico |
Auction theory
Auctions - Mathematical models Prices - Mathematical models |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. (Near-)Substitutes, Prices, and Stability -- 3. Vickrey Auctions and Substitution -- 4. Deferred-Acceptance Auctions and Near-Substitutes -- 5. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910466146703321 |
|
Milgrom Paul R (Paul Robert), <1948->
|
||
| New York : , : Columbia University Press, , 2017 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Discovering prices : auction design in markets with complex constraints / / Paul Milgrom
| Discovering prices : auction design in markets with complex constraints / / Paul Milgrom |
| Autore | Milgrom Paul R (Paul Robert), <1948-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York : , : Columbia University Press, , 2017 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (247 pages) |
| Disciplina | 381/.1701 |
| Collana | Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series |
| Soggetto topico |
Auction theory
Auctions - Mathematical models Prices - Mathematical models |
| Classificazione | QH 430 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. (Near-)Substitutes, Prices, and Stability -- 3. Vickrey Auctions and Substitution -- 4. Deferred-Acceptance Auctions and Near-Substitutes -- 5. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910792964503321 |
|
Milgrom Paul R (Paul Robert), <1948->
|
||
| New York : , : Columbia University Press, , 2017 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
