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Auction theory : introductory exercises with answer keys / / Pak-Sing Choi, Felix Munoz-Garcia
| Auction theory : introductory exercises with answer keys / / Pak-Sing Choi, Felix Munoz-Garcia |
| Autore | Choi Pak-Sing |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2021] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (304 pages) |
| Disciplina | 381.17 |
| Collana | Springer Texts in Business and Economics |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions
Auction theory |
| ISBN | 3-030-69575-1 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Preface -- Organization of the Book -- How to Use This Book -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- 1 Second-Price Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #1.1: Second-Price Auction with Complete InformationA -- Exercise #1.2: Second-Price Auctions Under Incomplete InformationB -- Exercise #1.3: Second-Price Auctions Under Incomplete Information and Discrete ValuationsB -- Exercise #1.4: Robustness of Equilibrium Bidding in the Second-Price AuctionA -- Exercise #1.5: Efficiency in Second-Price AuctionsA -- Exercise #1.6: Bidding Behavior in the English AuctionA -- Exercise #1.7: Expected Revenue in the Second-Price AuctionC -- Exercise #1.8: Second-Price Auctions with Reservation PricesA -- Exercise #1.9: Second-Price Auctions with Entry FeesB -- Exercise #1.10: Asymmetric Bidding Equilibria in the Second-Price AuctionB -- Exercise #1.11: Collusion in Second-Price Auctions, Based on GrahamandMarshall1987A -- Exercise #1.12: Second-Price Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders, Based on CheandGale1998B -- 2 First-Price Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #2.1: First-Price Auction Under Complete InformationA -- Exercise #2.2: First-Price Auction with Only Two Bidders and Uniformly Distributed ValuationsA -- Exercise #2.3: First-Price Auction with N≥2 Bidders and Uniformly Distributed ValuationsA -- Exercise #2.4: First-Price Auction with Generic Distribution of Valuations-The Direct ApproachB -- Exercise #2.5: First-Price Auction with Uniformly or Exponentially Distributed ValuesB -- Exercise #2.6: First-Price Auction with Generic Distribution of Valuations-The Envelope Theorem ApproachC -- Exercise #2.7: Efficiency in First-Price AuctionsA -- Exercise #2.8: The First-Order StatisticB -- Exercise #2.9: The Second-Order StatisticB -- Exercise #2.10: The kth-Order StatisticC -- Exercise #2.11: Bidding Behavior in the Dutch AuctionA.
3 First-Price Auctions: Extensions -- Introduction -- Exercise #3.1: Expected Revenue in the First-Price Auction-Direct ProofB -- Exercise #3.2: Expected Revenue in the First-Price Auction-Proof Using the First-Order StatisticC -- Exercise #3.3: Expected Payment in the First-Price AuctionB -- Exercise #3.4: First-Price Auction with Risk-Averse Bidders-An IntroductionA -- Exercise #3.5: First-Price Auction with Risk-Averse Bidders-General SettingB -- Exercise #3.6: Efficiency with Risk AversionA -- Exercise #3.7: First-Price Auction with Asymmetrically Distributed ValuationsB -- Exercise #3.8: Sequential Version of the First-Price AuctionA -- Exercise #3.9: First-Price Auctions with Reservation Prices-One BidderA -- Exercise #3.10: First-Price Auctions with Reservation Prices-Several BiddersC -- Exercise #3.11: First-Price Auction with Entry FeesC -- Exercise #3.12: First-Price Auction with Discrete ValuationsB -- Exercise #3.13: Collusion in First-Price Auctions, Based on McAfeeandMcMillan1992B -- Exercise #3.14: First-Price Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders, Based on CheandGale1998B -- 4 All-Pay Auctions and Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders -- Introduction -- Exercise #4.1: All-Pay Auction Under Complete Information, Based on Bayeetal1996B -- Exercise #4.2: Testing a Bidding Function in a First-Price, All-Pay AuctionA -- Exercise #4.3: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in the First-Price All-Pay Auction Using the Envelope Theorem ApproachC -- Exercise #4.4: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in the First-Price All-Pay Auction Using the Direct ApproachB -- Exercise #4.5: Efficiency in All-Pay AuctionsA -- Exercise #4.6: Finding the Expected Revenue in the First-Price All-Pay AuctionB -- Exercise #4.7: Finding Equilibrium Bids in the Second-Price All-Pay AuctionB -- Exercise #4.8: War of AttritionA. Exercise #4.9: Asymmetrically Informed Risk-Neutral Bidders, Based on KimandChe2014B -- Exercise #4.10: Asymmetrically Informed Risk-Averse Bidders, Based on OrozcoAlemanandMunozGarcia2011B -- 5 Third-Price Auctions, kth-Price Auctions, and Lotteries -- Introduction -- Exercise #5.1: Third-Price Auction, A Numerical ExampleA -- Exercise #5.2: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in a Third-Price AuctionC -- Exercise #5.3: Equilibrium Bidding Function in a Third-Price Auction with Uniformly or Exponentially Distributed ValuesB -- Exercise #5.4: kth-Price AuctionC -- Exercise #5.5: Efficiency in kth-Price AuctionsA -- Exercise #5.6: Lottery Auction, An IntroductionA -- Exercise #5.7: Lottery Auction, A More General ApproachB -- Exercise #5.8: Efficiency in Lottery AuctionsA -- 6 The Revenue Equivalence Principle -- Introduction -- Exercise #6.1: Revenue Comparison in Four Auction FormatsA -- Exercise #6.2: Revenue Comparison Between First- and Second-Price AuctionsB -- Exercise #6.3: The Revenue Equivalence Principle with Risk Averse BiddersA -- Exercise #6.4: The Revenue Equivalence Principle with Risk Averse SellersB -- Exercise #6.5: Revenue Equivalence Theorem-Short ProofB -- Exercise #6.6: Revenue Equivalence Theorem-Longer ProofC -- 7 Common-Value Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #7.1: The Winner's Curse in Common-Value Auctions-IntroductionA -- Exercise #7.2: Equilibrium Bidding in Common-Value Auctions with Two BiddersB -- Exercise #7.3: Equilibrium Bidding in Common-Value Auctions with N≥2 BiddersC -- Exercise #7.4: First-Price Auction When Bidders Have Interdependent ValuesB -- Exercise #7.5: Second-Price Auction When Bidders have Interdependent ValuesB -- Exercise #7.6: Revenue Comparison in Auctions When Bidders Have Interdependent ValuesB -- 8 Multi-Unit Auctions -- Introduction. Exercise #8.1: First-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units (Discriminatory Auction)A -- Exercise #8.2: Second-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units (Uniform-Price Auction)A -- Exercise #8.3: Second-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units, Allowing for Different PricesB -- Exercise #8.4: Divide Bidders and Conquer in a First-Price AuctionB -- Exercise #8.5: Divide Bidders and Conquer in a Second-Price AuctionA -- 9 Mechanism Design -- Introduction -- Exercise #9.1: Incentives to Truthfully Reveal ValuationsA -- Exercise #9.2: First-Price Auction as a Direct Revelation MechanismB -- Exercise #9.3: Second-Price Auction as a Direct Revelation Mechanism A -- Exercise #9.4: VCG Mechanism Selling a Single UnitB -- Exercise #9.5: VCG Mechanism Selling Several UnitsB -- Exercise #9.6: VCG Mechanism and the Generalized Second-Price AuctionB -- 10 Procurement Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #10.1: Procurement Auctions Under Complete InformationA -- Exercise #10.2: Procurement Auctions Under Incomplete InformationB -- Exercise #10.3: Procurement Auctions with External Effects, Based on Choietal2018 C -- Exercise #10.4: Procurement Auctions with Perfect MonitoringB -- Exercise #10.5: Procurement Auctions with Imperfect MonitoringC -- A Game Theory Appendix -- Background -- Dominated Strategies -- Nash Equilibrium -- Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium -- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium -- Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- References -- Index. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910483346303321 |
Choi Pak-Sing
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| Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2021] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Auctions / / Timothy P. Hubbard and Harry J. Paarsch
| Auctions / / Timothy P. Hubbard and Harry J. Paarsch |
| Autore | Hubbard Timothy P. |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge, Massachusetts : , : MIT Press, , [2015] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (266 pages) |
| Disciplina | 381/.17 |
| Collana | The MIT Press essential knowledge series |
| Soggetto topico | Auctions |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN | 0-262-33472-0 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Contents; Series Foreword; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 - Auction Formats and Pricing Rules; 2 - Modeling Auctions; 3 - Bidder Behavior; 4 - Other Assumptions and Rules; 5 - Procurement; 6 - Internet Auctions; 7 - Multi-Unit and Multi-Object Auctions; 8 - Online Ad Auctions; 9 - Reflections; Glossary; Further Reading; Bibliography; Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910460513203321 |
|
Hubbard Timothy P.
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| Cambridge, Massachusetts : , : MIT Press, , [2015] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Auctions / / Timothy P. Hubbard and Harry J. Paarsch
| Auctions / / Timothy P. Hubbard and Harry J. Paarsch |
| Autore | Hubbard Timothy P. |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge, Massachusetts : , : MIT Press, , [2015] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (266 pages) |
| Disciplina | 381/.17 |
| Collana | The MIT Press essential knowledge series |
| Soggetto topico | Auctions |
| ISBN |
0-262-33473-9
0-262-33472-0 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Contents; Series Foreword; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 - Auction Formats and Pricing Rules; 2 - Modeling Auctions; 3 - Bidder Behavior; 4 - Other Assumptions and Rules; 5 - Procurement; 6 - Internet Auctions; 7 - Multi-Unit and Multi-Object Auctions; 8 - Online Ad Auctions; 9 - Reflections; Glossary; Further Reading; Bibliography; Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910798042303321 |
|
Hubbard Timothy P.
|
||
| Cambridge, Massachusetts : , : MIT Press, , [2015] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Auctions / / Timothy P. Hubbard and Harry J. Paarsch
| Auctions / / Timothy P. Hubbard and Harry J. Paarsch |
| Autore | Hubbard Timothy P. |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge, Massachusetts : , : MIT Press, , [2015] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (266 pages) |
| Disciplina | 381/.17 |
| Collana | The MIT Press essential knowledge series |
| Soggetto topico | Auctions |
| ISBN |
0-262-33473-9
0-262-33472-0 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Contents; Series Foreword; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 - Auction Formats and Pricing Rules; 2 - Modeling Auctions; 3 - Bidder Behavior; 4 - Other Assumptions and Rules; 5 - Procurement; 6 - Internet Auctions; 7 - Multi-Unit and Multi-Object Auctions; 8 - Online Ad Auctions; 9 - Reflections; Glossary; Further Reading; Bibliography; Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910816060303321 |
|
Hubbard Timothy P.
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||
| Cambridge, Massachusetts : , : MIT Press, , [2015] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Collusion and optimal reserve prices in repeated procurement auctions [[electronic resource] /] / Charles J. Thomas
| Collusion and optimal reserve prices in repeated procurement auctions [[electronic resource] /] / Charles J. Thomas |
| Autore | Thomas Charles J (Charles Jonathan), <1969-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, D.C. : , : Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, , [2001] |
| Descrizione fisica | 26 pages : digital, PDF file |
| Collana | Working paper |
| Soggetto topico |
Price fixing
Auctions |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910695509003321 |
|
Thomas Charles J (Charles Jonathan), <1969->
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| Washington, D.C. : , : Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, , [2001] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Common value auctions and the winner's curse [[electronic resource] /] / John H. Kagel and Dan Levin
| Common value auctions and the winner's curse [[electronic resource] /] / John H. Kagel and Dan Levin |
| Autore | Kagel John H (John Henry), <1942-> |
| Edizione | [Course Book] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Princeton, N.J., : Princeton University Press, c2002 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (420 p.) |
| Disciplina | 381/.17 |
| Altri autori (Persone) | LevinDan <1947-> |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions
Paradoxes Value |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN |
1-282-15875-9
9786612158759 1-4008-3013-3 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Credits -- 1 Bidding in Common-Value Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- 2 First-Price Common-Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior and the "Winner's Curse" / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan / Battalio, Raymond C. / Meyer, Donald J. -- 3 The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- 4 Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price Common Value Auctions / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan / Harstad, Ronald M. -- 5 Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study / Kagel, John H. / Harstad, Ronald M. / Levin, Dan -- 6 Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions / Levin, Dan / Kagel, John H. / Richard, Jean-Francois -- 7 Common Value Auctions with Insider Information / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- 8 Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions? / Campbell, Colin M. / Levin, Dan -- 9 Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation / Avery, Christopher / Kagel, John H. -- 10 Learning in Common Value Auctions: Some Initial Observations / Garvin, Susan / Kagel, John H. -- 11 Cross-Game Learning: Experimental Evidence from First-Price and English Common Value Auctions / Kagel, John H. -- 12 A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis / Dyer, Douglas / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- 13 Bidding in Common Value Auctions: How the Commercial Construction Industry Corrects for the Winner's Curse / Dyer, Douglas / Kagel, John H. -- Instructions -- Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910454984103321 |
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Kagel John H (John Henry), <1942->
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||
| Princeton, N.J., : Princeton University Press, c2002 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Common value auctions and the winner's curse [[electronic resource] /] / John H. Kagel and Dan Levin
| Common value auctions and the winner's curse [[electronic resource] /] / John H. Kagel and Dan Levin |
| Autore | Kagel John H (John Henry), <1942-> |
| Edizione | [Course Book] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Princeton, N.J., : Princeton University Press, c2002 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (420 p.) |
| Disciplina | 381/.17 |
| Altri autori (Persone) | LevinDan <1947-> |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions
Paradoxes Value |
| ISBN |
1-282-15875-9
9786612158759 1-4008-3013-3 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Credits -- 1 Bidding in Common-Value Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- 2 First-Price Common-Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior and the "Winner's Curse" / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan / Battalio, Raymond C. / Meyer, Donald J. -- 3 The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- 4 Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price Common Value Auctions / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan / Harstad, Ronald M. -- 5 Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study / Kagel, John H. / Harstad, Ronald M. / Levin, Dan -- 6 Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions / Levin, Dan / Kagel, John H. / Richard, Jean-Francois -- 7 Common Value Auctions with Insider Information / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- 8 Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions? / Campbell, Colin M. / Levin, Dan -- 9 Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation / Avery, Christopher / Kagel, John H. -- 10 Learning in Common Value Auctions: Some Initial Observations / Garvin, Susan / Kagel, John H. -- 11 Cross-Game Learning: Experimental Evidence from First-Price and English Common Value Auctions / Kagel, John H. -- 12 A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis / Dyer, Douglas / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- 13 Bidding in Common Value Auctions: How the Commercial Construction Industry Corrects for the Winner's Curse / Dyer, Douglas / Kagel, John H. -- Instructions -- Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910778218703321 |
|
Kagel John H (John Henry), <1942->
|
||
| Princeton, N.J., : Princeton University Press, c2002 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Common value auctions and the winner's curse / / John H. Kagel and Dan Levin
| Common value auctions and the winner's curse / / John H. Kagel and Dan Levin |
| Autore | Kagel John H (John Henry), <1942-> |
| Edizione | [Course Book] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Princeton, N.J., : Princeton University Press, c2002 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (420 p.) |
| Disciplina | 381/.17 |
| Altri autori (Persone) | LevinDan <1947-> |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions
Paradoxes Value |
| ISBN |
1-282-15875-9
9786612158759 1-4008-3013-3 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Credits -- 1 Bidding in Common-Value Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- 2 First-Price Common-Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior and the "Winner's Curse" / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan / Battalio, Raymond C. / Meyer, Donald J. -- 3 The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- 4 Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price Common Value Auctions / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan / Harstad, Ronald M. -- 5 Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study / Kagel, John H. / Harstad, Ronald M. / Levin, Dan -- 6 Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions / Levin, Dan / Kagel, John H. / Richard, Jean-Francois -- 7 Common Value Auctions with Insider Information / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- 8 Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions? / Campbell, Colin M. / Levin, Dan -- 9 Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation / Avery, Christopher / Kagel, John H. -- 10 Learning in Common Value Auctions: Some Initial Observations / Garvin, Susan / Kagel, John H. -- 11 Cross-Game Learning: Experimental Evidence from First-Price and English Common Value Auctions / Kagel, John H. -- 12 A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis / Dyer, Douglas / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- 13 Bidding in Common Value Auctions: How the Commercial Construction Industry Corrects for the Winner's Curse / Dyer, Douglas / Kagel, John H. -- Instructions -- Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910813420503321 |
|
Kagel John H (John Henry), <1942->
|
||
| Princeton, N.J., : Princeton University Press, c2002 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
A comparison of auctions and multilateral negotiations [[electronic resource] /] / Charles J. Thomas and Bart J. Wilson
| A comparison of auctions and multilateral negotiations [[electronic resource] /] / Charles J. Thomas and Bart J. Wilson |
| Autore | Thomas Charles J (Charles Jonathan), <1969-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, DC : , : Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, , [2000] |
| Descrizione fisica | 34 pages, 6 unnumbered pages : digital, PDF file |
| Altri autori (Persone) | WilsonBart J |
| Collana | Working paper |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions
Negotiation in business |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910695138403321 |
|
Thomas Charles J (Charles Jonathan), <1969->
|
||
| Washington, DC : , : Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, , [2000] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
The effect of offer verifiability on the relationship between auctions and multilateral negotiations [[electronic resource] /] / Charles J. Thomas, Bart J. Wilson
| The effect of offer verifiability on the relationship between auctions and multilateral negotiations [[electronic resource] /] / Charles J. Thomas, Bart J. Wilson |
| Autore | Thomas Charles J (Charles Jonathan), <1969-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Washington, D.C. : , : Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, , [2001] |
| Descrizione fisica | 29 pages : digital, PDF file |
| Altri autori (Persone) | WilsonBart J |
| Collana | Working paper |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions
Negotiation in business |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910695508803321 |
|
Thomas Charles J (Charles Jonathan), <1969->
|
||
| Washington, D.C. : , : Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, , [2001] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
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