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Auction theory : introductory exercises with answer keys / / Pak-Sing Choi, Felix Munoz-Garcia
| Auction theory : introductory exercises with answer keys / / Pak-Sing Choi, Felix Munoz-Garcia |
| Autore | Choi Pak-Sing |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2021] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (304 pages) |
| Disciplina | 381.17 |
| Collana | Springer Texts in Business and Economics |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions
Auction theory |
| ISBN | 3-030-69575-1 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Preface -- Organization of the Book -- How to Use This Book -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- 1 Second-Price Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #1.1: Second-Price Auction with Complete InformationA -- Exercise #1.2: Second-Price Auctions Under Incomplete InformationB -- Exercise #1.3: Second-Price Auctions Under Incomplete Information and Discrete ValuationsB -- Exercise #1.4: Robustness of Equilibrium Bidding in the Second-Price AuctionA -- Exercise #1.5: Efficiency in Second-Price AuctionsA -- Exercise #1.6: Bidding Behavior in the English AuctionA -- Exercise #1.7: Expected Revenue in the Second-Price AuctionC -- Exercise #1.8: Second-Price Auctions with Reservation PricesA -- Exercise #1.9: Second-Price Auctions with Entry FeesB -- Exercise #1.10: Asymmetric Bidding Equilibria in the Second-Price AuctionB -- Exercise #1.11: Collusion in Second-Price Auctions, Based on GrahamandMarshall1987A -- Exercise #1.12: Second-Price Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders, Based on CheandGale1998B -- 2 First-Price Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #2.1: First-Price Auction Under Complete InformationA -- Exercise #2.2: First-Price Auction with Only Two Bidders and Uniformly Distributed ValuationsA -- Exercise #2.3: First-Price Auction with N≥2 Bidders and Uniformly Distributed ValuationsA -- Exercise #2.4: First-Price Auction with Generic Distribution of Valuations-The Direct ApproachB -- Exercise #2.5: First-Price Auction with Uniformly or Exponentially Distributed ValuesB -- Exercise #2.6: First-Price Auction with Generic Distribution of Valuations-The Envelope Theorem ApproachC -- Exercise #2.7: Efficiency in First-Price AuctionsA -- Exercise #2.8: The First-Order StatisticB -- Exercise #2.9: The Second-Order StatisticB -- Exercise #2.10: The kth-Order StatisticC -- Exercise #2.11: Bidding Behavior in the Dutch AuctionA.
3 First-Price Auctions: Extensions -- Introduction -- Exercise #3.1: Expected Revenue in the First-Price Auction-Direct ProofB -- Exercise #3.2: Expected Revenue in the First-Price Auction-Proof Using the First-Order StatisticC -- Exercise #3.3: Expected Payment in the First-Price AuctionB -- Exercise #3.4: First-Price Auction with Risk-Averse Bidders-An IntroductionA -- Exercise #3.5: First-Price Auction with Risk-Averse Bidders-General SettingB -- Exercise #3.6: Efficiency with Risk AversionA -- Exercise #3.7: First-Price Auction with Asymmetrically Distributed ValuationsB -- Exercise #3.8: Sequential Version of the First-Price AuctionA -- Exercise #3.9: First-Price Auctions with Reservation Prices-One BidderA -- Exercise #3.10: First-Price Auctions with Reservation Prices-Several BiddersC -- Exercise #3.11: First-Price Auction with Entry FeesC -- Exercise #3.12: First-Price Auction with Discrete ValuationsB -- Exercise #3.13: Collusion in First-Price Auctions, Based on McAfeeandMcMillan1992B -- Exercise #3.14: First-Price Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders, Based on CheandGale1998B -- 4 All-Pay Auctions and Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders -- Introduction -- Exercise #4.1: All-Pay Auction Under Complete Information, Based on Bayeetal1996B -- Exercise #4.2: Testing a Bidding Function in a First-Price, All-Pay AuctionA -- Exercise #4.3: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in the First-Price All-Pay Auction Using the Envelope Theorem ApproachC -- Exercise #4.4: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in the First-Price All-Pay Auction Using the Direct ApproachB -- Exercise #4.5: Efficiency in All-Pay AuctionsA -- Exercise #4.6: Finding the Expected Revenue in the First-Price All-Pay AuctionB -- Exercise #4.7: Finding Equilibrium Bids in the Second-Price All-Pay AuctionB -- Exercise #4.8: War of AttritionA. Exercise #4.9: Asymmetrically Informed Risk-Neutral Bidders, Based on KimandChe2014B -- Exercise #4.10: Asymmetrically Informed Risk-Averse Bidders, Based on OrozcoAlemanandMunozGarcia2011B -- 5 Third-Price Auctions, kth-Price Auctions, and Lotteries -- Introduction -- Exercise #5.1: Third-Price Auction, A Numerical ExampleA -- Exercise #5.2: Finding the Equilibrium Bidding Function in a Third-Price AuctionC -- Exercise #5.3: Equilibrium Bidding Function in a Third-Price Auction with Uniformly or Exponentially Distributed ValuesB -- Exercise #5.4: kth-Price AuctionC -- Exercise #5.5: Efficiency in kth-Price AuctionsA -- Exercise #5.6: Lottery Auction, An IntroductionA -- Exercise #5.7: Lottery Auction, A More General ApproachB -- Exercise #5.8: Efficiency in Lottery AuctionsA -- 6 The Revenue Equivalence Principle -- Introduction -- Exercise #6.1: Revenue Comparison in Four Auction FormatsA -- Exercise #6.2: Revenue Comparison Between First- and Second-Price AuctionsB -- Exercise #6.3: The Revenue Equivalence Principle with Risk Averse BiddersA -- Exercise #6.4: The Revenue Equivalence Principle with Risk Averse SellersB -- Exercise #6.5: Revenue Equivalence Theorem-Short ProofB -- Exercise #6.6: Revenue Equivalence Theorem-Longer ProofC -- 7 Common-Value Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #7.1: The Winner's Curse in Common-Value Auctions-IntroductionA -- Exercise #7.2: Equilibrium Bidding in Common-Value Auctions with Two BiddersB -- Exercise #7.3: Equilibrium Bidding in Common-Value Auctions with N≥2 BiddersC -- Exercise #7.4: First-Price Auction When Bidders Have Interdependent ValuesB -- Exercise #7.5: Second-Price Auction When Bidders have Interdependent ValuesB -- Exercise #7.6: Revenue Comparison in Auctions When Bidders Have Interdependent ValuesB -- 8 Multi-Unit Auctions -- Introduction. Exercise #8.1: First-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units (Discriminatory Auction)A -- Exercise #8.2: Second-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units (Uniform-Price Auction)A -- Exercise #8.3: Second-Price Auction Selling Multiple Units, Allowing for Different PricesB -- Exercise #8.4: Divide Bidders and Conquer in a First-Price AuctionB -- Exercise #8.5: Divide Bidders and Conquer in a Second-Price AuctionA -- 9 Mechanism Design -- Introduction -- Exercise #9.1: Incentives to Truthfully Reveal ValuationsA -- Exercise #9.2: First-Price Auction as a Direct Revelation MechanismB -- Exercise #9.3: Second-Price Auction as a Direct Revelation Mechanism A -- Exercise #9.4: VCG Mechanism Selling a Single UnitB -- Exercise #9.5: VCG Mechanism Selling Several UnitsB -- Exercise #9.6: VCG Mechanism and the Generalized Second-Price AuctionB -- 10 Procurement Auctions -- Introduction -- Exercise #10.1: Procurement Auctions Under Complete InformationA -- Exercise #10.2: Procurement Auctions Under Incomplete InformationB -- Exercise #10.3: Procurement Auctions with External Effects, Based on Choietal2018 C -- Exercise #10.4: Procurement Auctions with Perfect MonitoringB -- Exercise #10.5: Procurement Auctions with Imperfect MonitoringC -- A Game Theory Appendix -- Background -- Dominated Strategies -- Nash Equilibrium -- Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium -- Subgame Perfect Equilibrium -- Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- References -- Index. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910483346303321 |
Choi Pak-Sing
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| Cham, Switzerland : , : Springer, , [2021] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Discovering prices : auction design in markets with complex constraints / / Paul Milgrom
| Discovering prices : auction design in markets with complex constraints / / Paul Milgrom |
| Autore | Milgrom Paul R (Paul Robert), <1948-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York : , : Columbia University Press, , 2017 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (247 pages) |
| Disciplina | 381/.1701 |
| Collana | Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series |
| Soggetto topico |
Auction theory
Auctions - Mathematical models Prices - Mathematical models |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. (Near-)Substitutes, Prices, and Stability -- 3. Vickrey Auctions and Substitution -- 4. Deferred-Acceptance Auctions and Near-Substitutes -- 5. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910466146703321 |
|
Milgrom Paul R (Paul Robert), <1948->
|
||
| New York : , : Columbia University Press, , 2017 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Discovering prices : auction design in markets with complex constraints / / Paul Milgrom
| Discovering prices : auction design in markets with complex constraints / / Paul Milgrom |
| Autore | Milgrom Paul R (Paul Robert), <1948-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York : , : Columbia University Press, , 2017 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (247 pages) |
| Disciplina | 381/.1701 |
| Collana | Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series |
| Soggetto topico |
Auction theory
Auctions - Mathematical models Prices - Mathematical models |
| Classificazione | QH 430 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. (Near-)Substitutes, Prices, and Stability -- 3. Vickrey Auctions and Substitution -- 4. Deferred-Acceptance Auctions and Near-Substitutes -- 5. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910792964503321 |
|
Milgrom Paul R (Paul Robert), <1948->
|
||
| New York : , : Columbia University Press, , 2017 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Discovering prices : auction design in markets with complex constraints / / Paul Milgrom
| Discovering prices : auction design in markets with complex constraints / / Paul Milgrom |
| Autore | Milgrom Paul R (Paul Robert), <1948-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York : , : Columbia University Press, , 2017 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (247 pages) |
| Disciplina | 381/.1701 |
| Collana | Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series |
| Soggetto topico |
Auction theory
Auctions - Mathematical models Prices - Mathematical models |
| Classificazione | QH 430 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- 2. (Near-)Substitutes, Prices, and Stability -- 3. Vickrey Auctions and Substitution -- 4. Deferred-Acceptance Auctions and Near-Substitutes -- 5. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910814072103321 |
|
Milgrom Paul R (Paul Robert), <1948->
|
||
| New York : , : Columbia University Press, , 2017 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
An Introduction to Auction Theory [[electronic resource] /] / Flavio M. Menezes, University of Queensland, Paulo K. Monteiro, PGE/FGV
| An Introduction to Auction Theory [[electronic resource] /] / Flavio M. Menezes, University of Queensland, Paulo K. Monteiro, PGE/FGV |
| Autore | Menezes Flavio M |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Oxford, : Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2008 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (199 p.) |
| Disciplina | 381/.17/0151 |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions - Mathematical models
Economics, Mathematical Auction theory BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Sales & Selling / General |
| ISBN |
0-19-153472-2
1-4356-9952-1 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910454315503321 |
|
Menezes Flavio M
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| Oxford, : Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2008 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
An Introduction to Auction Theory [[electronic resource] /] / Flavio M. Menezes, University of Queensland, Paulo K. Monteiro, PGE/FGV
| An Introduction to Auction Theory [[electronic resource] /] / Flavio M. Menezes, University of Queensland, Paulo K. Monteiro, PGE/FGV |
| Autore | Menezes Flavio M |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Oxford, : Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2008 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (199 p.) |
| Disciplina | 381/.17/0151 |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions - Mathematical models
Economics, Mathematical Auction theory BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Sales & Selling / General |
| ISBN |
0-19-153472-2
1-4356-9952-1 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910782865303321 |
|
Menezes Flavio M
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| Oxford, : Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2008 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Options for improving conservation programs : insights from auction theory and economic experients / / Daniel Hellerstein, Nathaniel Higgins, and Michael Roberts
| Options for improving conservation programs : insights from auction theory and economic experients / / Daniel Hellerstein, Nathaniel Higgins, and Michael Roberts |
| Autore | Hellerstein Daniel R. |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | [Washington, D.C.] : , : United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, , [2015] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (6 unnumbered pages, 47 pages) : color illustrations |
| Collana | Economic research report |
| Soggetto topico |
Agricultural conservation - Economic aspects - United States
Conservation projects (Natural resources) - United States - Finance Auction theory |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Altri titoli varianti | Options for improving conservation programs |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910703525403321 |
|
Hellerstein Daniel R.
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||
| [Washington, D.C.] : , : United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, , [2015] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Putting auction theory to work / / Paul Milgrom [[electronic resource]]
| Putting auction theory to work / / Paul Milgrom [[electronic resource]] |
| Autore | Milgrom Paul R (Paul Robert), <1948-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2004 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xxii, 368 pages) : digital, PDF file(s) |
| Disciplina | 381/.17/01 |
| Collana | Churchill lectures in economics |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions - Mathematical models
Auction theory |
| ISBN |
1-107-71323-4
1-283-32916-6 9786613329165 0-511-16543-9 0-511-81382-1 0-511-16612-5 0-511-16417-3 0-511-55570-9 0-511-16497-1 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Getting to work -- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms -- The envelope theorem and payoff equivalence -- Bidding equilibrium and revenue differences -- Interdependence of types and values -- Auctions in context -- Uniform price auctions -- Package auctions and combinatorial bidding. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910457605403321 |
|
Milgrom Paul R (Paul Robert), <1948->
|
||
| Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2004 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Putting auction theory to work / / Paul Milgrom [[electronic resource]]
| Putting auction theory to work / / Paul Milgrom [[electronic resource]] |
| Autore | Milgrom Paul R (Paul Robert), <1948-> |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2004 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xxii, 368 pages) : digital, PDF file(s) |
| Disciplina | 381/.17/01 |
| Collana | Churchill lectures in economics |
| Soggetto topico |
Auctions - Mathematical models
Auction theory |
| ISBN |
1-107-71323-4
1-283-32916-6 9786613329165 0-511-16543-9 0-511-81382-1 0-511-16612-5 0-511-16417-3 0-511-55570-9 0-511-16497-1 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Getting to work -- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms -- The envelope theorem and payoff equivalence -- Bidding equilibrium and revenue differences -- Interdependence of types and values -- Auctions in context -- Uniform price auctions -- Package auctions and combinatorial bidding. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910784423603321 |
|
Milgrom Paul R (Paul Robert), <1948->
|
||
| Cambridge : , : Cambridge University Press, , 2004 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
