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Principled agents? [[electronic resource] ] : the political economy of good government / / Timothy Besley
| Principled agents? [[electronic resource] ] : the political economy of good government / / Timothy Besley |
| Autore | Besley Timothy |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2006 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (279 p.) |
| Disciplina |
330
352.3 |
| Collana | The Lindahl lectures |
| Soggetto topico |
Public administration
Government productivity Agent (Philosophy) - Political aspects Motivation (Psychology) - Political aspects Policy sciences |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN |
1-280-90468-2
0-19-153392-0 1-4294-9179-5 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Contents; Preface; Acknowledgements; 1 Competing views of government; 2 The anatomy of government failure; 3 Political agency and accountability; 4 Political agency and public finance (with Michael Smart); 5 Final Comments; References; Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910452137503321 |
Besley Timothy
|
||
| Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2006 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Principled agents? [[electronic resource] ] : the political economy of good government / / Timothy Besley
| Principled agents? [[electronic resource] ] : the political economy of good government / / Timothy Besley |
| Autore | Besley Timothy |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2006 |
| Descrizione fisica | xi, 266 p. : ill |
| Collana | The Lindahl lectures |
| Soggetto topico |
Public administration
Government productivity Agent (Philosophy) - Political aspects Motivation (Psychology) - Political aspects Policy sciences |
| ISBN |
0191533920
9780191533921 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910795754803321 |
|
Besley Timothy
|
||
| Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2006 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Principled agents? : the political economy of good government / / Timothy Besley
| Principled agents? : the political economy of good government / / Timothy Besley |
| Autore | Besley Timothy |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2006 |
| Descrizione fisica | xi, 266 p. : ill |
| Disciplina | 352.3 |
| Collana | The Lindahl lectures |
| Soggetto topico |
Public administration
Government productivity Agent (Philosophy) - Political aspects Motivation (Psychology) - Political aspects Policy sciences |
| ISBN |
0191533920
9780191533921 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Competing views of government -- 1.1 The issues -- 1.2 This book -- 1.3 Background -- 1.3.1 The size of government -- 1.3.2 Corruption -- 1.3.3 Property rights -- 1.3.4 Trust and turnout -- 1.4 Economic policy making -- 1.4.1 Foundations -- 1.4.2 Good policies -- 1.4.3 The public choice critique of welfare economics -- 1.5 Political economy -- 1.6 Incentives and selection in politics -- 1.7 Concluding comments -- 2 The anatomy of government failure -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Three notions of government failure -- 2.2.1 Pareto inefficiency -- 2.2.2 Distributional failures -- 2.2.3 Wicksellian failures -- 2.2.4 Comparisons -- 2.3 An example: financing a public project -- 2.3.1 Private provision -- 2.3.2 Government provision -- 2.4 Sources of government failure -- 2.4.1 Ignorance -- 2.4.2 Influence -- 2.4.3 The quality of leadership -- 2.5 Sources of political failure -- 2.5.1 Voting -- 2.5.2 Log-rolling and legislative behavior -- 2.6 Dynamics -- 2.6.1 Investment linkages -- 2.6.2 Political and policy linkages -- 2.6.3 Investment and politics -- 2.7 Implications -- 2.8 Concluding comments -- 3 Political agency and accountability -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Elements of political agency models -- 3.2.1 The nature of the uncertainty -- 3.2.2 The motives for holding office -- 3.2.3 The nature of accountability -- 3.2.4 Retrospective voting -- 3.2.5 Model types -- 3.3 The baseline model -- 3.3.1 The environment -- 3.3.2 Equilibrium -- 3.3.3 Implications -- 3.4 Extensions -- 3.4.1 Polarization and competition -- 3.4.2 Information and accountability -- 3.4.3 The nature of the distortion -- 3.4.4 Within-term cycles -- 3.4.5 Multiple issues -- 3.4.6 Multiple two-period terms -- 3.4.7 Indefinite terms -- 3.4.8 Multiple agents -- 3.5 Discussion -- 3.5.1 Civic virtue and the quality of government.
3.5.2 Decentralization versus centralization -- 3.5.3 Autocracy versus democracy -- 3.5.4 Accountability to whom? -- 3.5.5 Wage policies for politicians -- 3.5.6 Behavioral versus rational choice models -- 3.6 Concluding comments -- 4 Political agency and public finance (with Michael Smart) -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The model -- 4.3 Three scenarios -- 4.3.1 Pure adverse selection -- 4.3.2 Pure moral hazard -- 4.3.3 Combining moral hazard and adverse selection -- 4.4 Implications -- 4.4.1 Equilibrium voter welfare -- 4.4.2 Are good politicians necessarily good for voters? -- 4.4.3 Turnover of politicians -- 4.4.4 The spending cycle -- 4.5 Restraining government -- 4.5.1 A direct restraint on the size of government -- 4.5.2 Indirect restraints -- 4.5.3 Summary -- 4.6 Debt and deficits -- 4.7 Governments versus NGOs -- 4.7.1 Framework -- 4.7.2 Aid to the government -- 4.7.3 Comparisons -- 4.7.4 Further issues -- 4.8 Competence -- 4.9 Conclusions -- Appendix -- 5 Final Comments -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z. |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910821871003321 |
|
Besley Timothy
|
||
| Oxford ; ; New York, : Oxford University Press, 2006 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
