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Hard fighting : Israel in Lebanon and Gaza / / David E. Johnson
| Hard fighting : Israel in Lebanon and Gaza / / David E. Johnson |
| Autore | Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.> |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Santa Monica, CA, : RAND, 2011 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xxxv, 227 pages) |
| Disciplina | 956.9204/524095694 |
| Soggetto topico |
Asymmetric warfare
Lebanon War, 2006 Gaza War, 2008-2009 |
| ISBN | 0-8330-5853-3 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; S.1. Levels of Adversaries and Their Associated Military Capabilities, with Examples; S.1. Air and Ground Power Across the Levels of Adversary Capabilities; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; Purpose; Methodology; Monograph Organization; CHAPTER TWO: The Second Lebanon War; 2.1. Map of Southern Lebanon; Conflict Backdrop; The State of the Israeli Military in 2006; What's in It for Us? The Problems with "Lessons Learned" from Lebanon; The IDF in Transition
Confronting Protracted Low-Intensity Conflict and Terrorism Complex Concepts for Complex Problems: Systemic Operational Design; The IDF and Standoff Fires; Systemic Operational Design and Standoff Fires in Action: Defeating the Intifada; The Israeli Elite's Misperceptions About the Security Environment; IDF Deficiencies on the Eve of the Second Lebanon War; The Challenges Posed by the Terrain and by Hezbollah; Terrain; Hezbollah's Preparation of the Battlefield; Hezbollah: A Hybrid Adversary; 2.1. Hezbollah Rockets, 2006; 2.2. A Concealed Hezbollah Rocket System; 2.2. Other Hezbollah Weapons How the Second Lebanon War Unfolded Israel's Strategy in Lebanon; The Air War; 2.3. Map of Lebanese Targets Attacked by Israel; The Initial Ground War; Losing Support for the War; One Final Offensive; 2.4. Ground Scheme of Maneuver: Operation Changing Direction; 2.5. Final IDF Positions and Hezbollah Rocket-Launching Sites; The End of the War; Shortfalls Identified in the Second Lebanon War; Standoff Fires Are Critical, but Not Sufficient, to Achieving Objectives; The Short-Range Rocket Challenge; 2.6. The Changing Nature of Israeli Targets Civil-Military Issues, Unclear Objectives, and a Lack of Jointness Hezbollah Presented the IDF with a New Type of Adversary; CHAPTER THREE: Operation Cast Lead; Conflict Backdrop; The State of the Israeli Military in 2008; The Challenges Posed by the Terrain and by Hamas; Terrain; Hamas' Preparation of the Battlefield; 3.1. The Gaza Strip; Hamas: A Hybrid Opponent, but Not Hezbollah; The Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades; Internal Security Forces; Hamas' Weapons; 3.1. Hamas Rockets; How Operation Cast Lead Unfolded; The Air Campaign; The Ground Campaign 3.2. The IDF Ground Campaign in Operation Cast Lead Hamas' Military Strategy During Operation Cast Lead; The End of Operation Cast Lead; Insights from Operation Cast Lead; Unresolved Problems in Determining Strategic "Ends"; Significant Improvement in the Military "Means"; Military Lessons Learned from Operation Cast Lead; Military Operations "Amongst the People"; Joint Fire and Maneuver Against Hybrid Opponents; Air-Ground Integration; 3.3. IDF Air Control Organizations; Operation Cast Lead Was Not a Robust Hybrid Case CHAPTER FOUR: The Relevance of the Israeli Experience for the U.S. Joint Force |
| Record Nr. | UNISA-996320210503316 |
Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.>
|
||
| Santa Monica, CA, : RAND, 2011 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. di Salerno | ||
| ||
Hard fighting : Israel in Lebanon and Gaza / / David E. Johnson
| Hard fighting : Israel in Lebanon and Gaza / / David E. Johnson |
| Autore | Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.> |
| Edizione | [1st ed.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Santa Monica, CA, : RAND, 2011 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (xxxv, 227 pages) |
| Disciplina | 956.9204/524095694 |
| Soggetto topico |
Asymmetric warfare
Lebanon War, 2006 Gaza War, 2008-2009 |
| ISBN | 0-8330-5853-3 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; S.1. Levels of Adversaries and Their Associated Military Capabilities, with Examples; S.1. Air and Ground Power Across the Levels of Adversary Capabilities; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; Purpose; Methodology; Monograph Organization; CHAPTER TWO: The Second Lebanon War; 2.1. Map of Southern Lebanon; Conflict Backdrop; The State of the Israeli Military in 2006; What's in It for Us? The Problems with "Lessons Learned" from Lebanon; The IDF in Transition
Confronting Protracted Low-Intensity Conflict and Terrorism Complex Concepts for Complex Problems: Systemic Operational Design; The IDF and Standoff Fires; Systemic Operational Design and Standoff Fires in Action: Defeating the Intifada; The Israeli Elite's Misperceptions About the Security Environment; IDF Deficiencies on the Eve of the Second Lebanon War; The Challenges Posed by the Terrain and by Hezbollah; Terrain; Hezbollah's Preparation of the Battlefield; Hezbollah: A Hybrid Adversary; 2.1. Hezbollah Rockets, 2006; 2.2. A Concealed Hezbollah Rocket System; 2.2. Other Hezbollah Weapons How the Second Lebanon War Unfolded Israel's Strategy in Lebanon; The Air War; 2.3. Map of Lebanese Targets Attacked by Israel; The Initial Ground War; Losing Support for the War; One Final Offensive; 2.4. Ground Scheme of Maneuver: Operation Changing Direction; 2.5. Final IDF Positions and Hezbollah Rocket-Launching Sites; The End of the War; Shortfalls Identified in the Second Lebanon War; Standoff Fires Are Critical, but Not Sufficient, to Achieving Objectives; The Short-Range Rocket Challenge; 2.6. The Changing Nature of Israeli Targets Civil-Military Issues, Unclear Objectives, and a Lack of Jointness Hezbollah Presented the IDF with a New Type of Adversary; CHAPTER THREE: Operation Cast Lead; Conflict Backdrop; The State of the Israeli Military in 2008; The Challenges Posed by the Terrain and by Hamas; Terrain; Hamas' Preparation of the Battlefield; 3.1. The Gaza Strip; Hamas: A Hybrid Opponent, but Not Hezbollah; The Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades; Internal Security Forces; Hamas' Weapons; 3.1. Hamas Rockets; How Operation Cast Lead Unfolded; The Air Campaign; The Ground Campaign 3.2. The IDF Ground Campaign in Operation Cast Lead Hamas' Military Strategy During Operation Cast Lead; The End of Operation Cast Lead; Insights from Operation Cast Lead; Unresolved Problems in Determining Strategic "Ends"; Significant Improvement in the Military "Means"; Military Lessons Learned from Operation Cast Lead; Military Operations "Amongst the People"; Joint Fire and Maneuver Against Hybrid Opponents; Air-Ground Integration; 3.3. IDF Air Control Organizations; Operation Cast Lead Was Not a Robust Hybrid Case CHAPTER FOUR: The Relevance of the Israeli Experience for the U.S. Joint Force |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910141284703321 |
|
Johnson David E (David Eugene), <1950-2022.>
|
||
| Santa Monica, CA, : RAND, 2011 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||