Why intelligence fails [[electronic resource] ] : lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War / / Robert Jervis |
Autore | Jervis Robert <1940-> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Ithaca, : Cornell University Press, 2010 |
Descrizione fisica | ix, 238 p |
Disciplina | 955.05/3 |
Collana | Cornell studies in security affairs |
Soggetto topico |
Intelligence service - United States - Evaluation
Iraq War, 2003-2011 - Military intelligence - United States - Evaluation Weapons of mass destruction - Iraq |
Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
ISBN |
0-8014-7806-5
0-8014-5761-0 0-8014-5885-4 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | Adventures in intelligence -- Failing to see that the Shah was in danger : introduction, postmortem, and CIA comments -- Analysis of NFAC's performance on Iran's domestic crisis, mid-1977-7 November 1978 -- CIA comments on the report -- The Iraq WMD intelligence failure : what everyone knows is wrong -- The politics and psychology of intelligence and intelligence reform. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910459770003321 |
Jervis Robert <1940->
![]() |
||
Ithaca, : Cornell University Press, 2010 | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Why intelligence fails [[electronic resource] ] : lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War / / Robert Jervis |
Autore | Jervis Robert <1940-2021.> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Ithaca, : Cornell University Press, 2010 |
Descrizione fisica | ix, 238 p |
Disciplina | 955.05/3 |
Collana | Cornell studies in security affairs |
Soggetto topico |
Intelligence service - United States - Evaluation
Iraq War, 2003-2011 - Military intelligence - United States - Evaluation Weapons of mass destruction - Iraq |
ISBN |
0-8014-7806-5
0-8014-5761-0 0-8014-5885-4 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | Adventures in intelligence -- Failing to see that the Shah was in danger : introduction, postmortem, and CIA comments -- Analysis of NFAC's performance on Iran's domestic crisis, mid-1977-7 November 1978 -- CIA comments on the report -- The Iraq WMD intelligence failure : what everyone knows is wrong -- The politics and psychology of intelligence and intelligence reform. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910789840903321 |
Jervis Robert <1940-2021.>
![]() |
||
Ithaca, : Cornell University Press, 2010 | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|
Why intelligence fails : lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War / / Robert Jervis |
Autore | Jervis Robert <1940-> |
Pubbl/distr/stampa | Ithaca, : Cornell University Press, 2010 |
Descrizione fisica | ix, 238 p |
Disciplina | 955.05/3 |
Collana | Cornell studies in security affairs |
Soggetto topico |
Intelligence service - United States - Evaluation
Iraq War, 2003-2011 - Military intelligence - United States - Evaluation Weapons of mass destruction - Iraq |
ISBN |
0-8014-7806-5
0-8014-5761-0 0-8014-5885-4 |
Formato | Materiale a stampa ![]() |
Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
Nota di contenuto | Adventures in intelligence -- Failing to see that the Shah was in danger : introduction, postmortem, and CIA comments -- Analysis of NFAC's performance on Iran's domestic crisis, mid-1977-7 November 1978 -- CIA comments on the report -- The Iraq WMD intelligence failure : what everyone knows is wrong -- The politics and psychology of intelligence and intelligence reform. |
Record Nr. | UNINA-9910825249003321 |
Jervis Robert <1940->
![]() |
||
Ithaca, : Cornell University Press, 2010 | ||
![]() | ||
Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
|