| Edizione | [1st ed. 2023.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa |
Cham : , : Springer International Publishing : , : Imprint : Springer, , 2023
|
| Descrizione fisica |
1 online resource (453 pages)
|
| Disciplina |
387.71
|
| Collana |
Advances in Spatial Science, The Regional Science Series
|
| Soggetto topico |
Regional economics
Space in economics
Transportation
Industrial organization
Transportation engineering
Traffic engineering
Regional and Spatial Economics
Transportation Economics
Industrial Organization
Transportation Technology and Traffic Engineering
|
| ISBN |
9783031203411
9783031203398
|
| Formato |
Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico |
Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione |
eng
|
| Nota di contenuto |
Intro -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 Background -- 1.2 Part I: The Need for Economic Regulation -- 1.3 Part I: Systems of Regulation -- 1.4 Part II: Benchmarking -- 1.5 Part III: Regulation in Practice: Facts and Systems of Regulation -- References -- Part I: Theoretical Background: Market Power and Regulation -- Chapter 2: How Strong Is Airport Competition: Is There a Case for Regulation? -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Competition and the Case for Regulation -- 2.2.1 Market Power and the Classic Case for Regulation -- 2.2.2 The Allocative Efficiency Argument -- 2.2.3 Regulation, Competition and Public Airports -- 2.2.4 Alternative Arguments for Regulation: Transaction Costs and Opportunistic Behaviour -- 2.2.5 Distribution, Regulation and Competition -- 2.3 Airport Competition: A Brief Overview -- 2.3.1 Privatization and Incentives for Profit -- 2.3.2 Types of Airports and Sources of Competition -- 2.4 Substitutability of Airports -- 2.4.1 Demand Side and Supply Side Substitution -- 2.4.2 Provision of Infrastructure for O& -- D and Transfer Passengers and for Cargo: The Definition of Catchment Areas -- 2.4.3 High-Speed Rail Competition -- 2.4.4 Bundling: Aviation-Related Services and Market Power -- 2.5 Countervailing Power -- 2.5.1 Are There Alternative Airports Available? -- 2.5.2 Are Airline Markets Competitive, Contestable or Concentrated? -- 2.5.3 Countervailing Power and Subsidies -- 2.5.4 Countervailing Power and Passenger Interests -- 2.5.5 Competition and Countervailing Power: A Summary -- 2.6 Some Evidence of the Use of Market Power -- 2.6.1 Airport Charging Behaviour -- 2.6.2 The Presence of Price Discrimination -- 2.7 Studies of Competition and Market Power: A Brief Review -- 2.7.1 Airport Competition in the UK Market -- 2.7.2 The Productivity Commission Inquiries -- 2.7.3 Assessing Market Power at Amsterdam Airport.
2.7.4 The Two ACI Studies by Copenhagen Economics Studies and OXERA -- 2.8 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 3: European Hub Airport Competition: An Assessment of Market Concentration in the Local Catchment and in the Transfer ... -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 European Hub Airport Market Development -- 3.3 Review of Hub Airport Competition -- 3.4 Competition in the Local Catchment -- 3.5 Competition in the Transfer Market -- 3.6 Discussion and Implications for Economic Regulation -- Appendix -- References -- Chapter 4: The Transactions Costs Foundation for Public Utility Regulation and Its Application to the Regulation of Airports -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Transaction Cost Economics and Competition Policy -- 4.2.1 Relationship-Specific Investment and Hold-Up -- 4.2.2 Transaction Cost Economics and Competition Policy -- 4.2.2.1 Ownership Solutions to the Monopoly Problem -- 4.2.2.2 Contractual Solutions to the Monopoly Problem -- 4.2.3 Public Policies Towards Natural Monopoly -- 4.3 Transaction Cost Economics and Airport Regulation -- 4.3.1 Protecting Sunk-Specific Investment in the Air Transport Sector -- 4.3.1.1 Ownership Solutions to the Airport Monopoly Problem -- 4.3.1.2 Contractual Solutions to the Airport Monopoly Problem -- 4.3.2 Implications of the Transaction Cost Approach to Airport Regulation -- 4.4 Comments and Discussion -- 4.4.1 The Public Interest Is Broader than the Interests of Airports and Airlines -- 4.4.2 Airports and Airlines May Exercise Market Power in Other Ways -- 4.4.3 Why Do We Observe Arms-Length Regulation of a Government-Owned Facility? -- 4.4.4 Why Do We Not See Independent Dispute Resolution in Practice? -- 4.4.5 Potential Reform of Airport Regulation -- 4.5 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 5: Cost-Based Versus Incentive Regulation for Airports -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 ROR-Regulation.
5.2.1 Technical Illustration of the Averch-Johnson Effect -- 5.2.2 Rate-of-Return Regulation Gives Improper Incentive -- 5.3 Incentive Regulation -- 5.3.1 Price Cap Regulation -- 5.3.1.1 Cost-Minimizing Behavior and Rents -- 5.3.2 Other Forms of Regulation -- 5.4 Airport Regulation -- 5.4.1 Double Marginalization -- 5.4.2 Policy Competition -- 5.4.3 Slot-Controlled Airports -- 5.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 6: Airport Privatization and Regulation: Effects on Airport Charge, Capacity, and Social Welfare -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Basic Model -- 6.2.1 Consumers -- 6.2.2 Airlines -- 6.2.3 Non-Aeronautical Service Market -- 6.2.4 Airport´s Profit and Social Welfare -- 6.3 Welfare Maximization vs. Public Airport -- 6.4 Privatization of Aeronautical and Non-Aeronautical Services -- 6.4.1 No Regulation on Aeronautical Service -- 6.4.2 Price-Cap Regulation on Aeronautical Service -- 6.4.3 Cost-Based Regulation on Aeronautical Service -- 6.5 Numerical Results -- 6.5.1 Welfare Maximization vs. Public Airport -- 6.5.2 Privatization -- 6.5.3 Price-Cap vs. Cost-Based Regulation -- 6.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis with Respect to the Base Case -- 6.5.4.1 Smaller Cost Differences Between Public and Private Operations -- 6.5.4.2 Higher Time Cost -- 6.5.4.3 Higher Regulatory Waste -- 6.5.4.4 Higher Degrees of Airline Competition and Competition Among Non-Aeronautical Shops -- 6.5.4.5 Higher Internalization Rate of Profit from Non-Aeronautical Service -- 6.6 Concluding Remarks -- Appendix 1 -- Appendix 2 -- Appendix 3 -- Appendix 4 -- Appendix 5 -- Appendix 6 -- Appendix 7 -- Appendix 8 -- Appendix 9 -- References -- Chapter 7: Light-Handed Regulation of Airports: The Way to Go? -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The History of and Rationale for Light-Handed Regulation -- 7.3 What Is Light-Handed Regulation? -- 7.3.1 The Ex Post Nature -- 7.3.2 Upward Price Flexibility.
7.3.3 The Ability of Parties to Negotiate -- 7.3.4 The Probability of Sanction -- 7.3.5 Other Characteristics -- 7.3.5.1 Formal or Informal -- 7.3.5.2 Independent and Dependent Regulators -- 7.3.5.3 Monitoring/Benchmarking -- 7.3.5.4 Review Criteria -- 7.3.6 LHR: Content or Process? -- 7.4 Models of Light-Handed Regulation -- 7.4.1 The Review/Sanction Model -- 7.4.2 The Negotiate/Arbitrate Model -- 7.5 The Working of Light-Handed Regulation -- 7.6 LHR and Performance -- 7.6.1 Expectations -- 7.6.1.1 Use of Market Power -- 7.6.1.2 Productive Efficiency -- 7.6.1.3 Service Quality -- 7.6.1.4 Non-Aeronautical Revenue -- 7.6.1.5 Investment -- 7.6.2 LHR in Practice -- 7.6.2.1 Use of Market Power -- 7.6.2.2 Productive Efficiency -- 7.6.2.3 Non-Aeronautical Revenues -- 7.6.2.4 Investment -- 7.7 Light-Handed Regulation: A Model to Follow? -- 7.8 Summary and Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 8: Optimising Investment in Regulated Airports -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Regulating Airport Investment -- 8.2.1 Privatisation and Investments -- 8.2.2 Investment Dynamics -- 8.2.3 Conflicting Goals and Complexities -- 8.3 Efficiency and Distributional Objectives in Regulating Airports -- 8.3.1 Short-Run Optimisation: Use of Fixed Capacity -- 8.3.2 Regulating Quality -- 8.3.3 Achieving Productive Efficiency in the Short Run -- 8.3.4 Long-Run Optimisation: Achieving Efficient Investment in Capacity -- 8.3.5 Productive Efficiency in the Long Run -- 8.3.6 Distributional Objectives -- 8.4 Instruments of Regulation -- 8.4.1 Price Regulation -- 8.4.2 Cost-Based Regulation -- 8.4.3 Incentive Regulation -- 8.4.4 Light-Handed Regulation -- 8.4.5 Airport Slots -- 8.4.6 Conditional Triggers -- 8.5 Regulating Airport Investments: Assessing the Options -- 8.6 Improving Regulation Via More Sophisticated Approaches -- 8.6.1 Introducing Quality Incentives -- 8.6.2 Introducing Slots.
8.6.3 Introducing Conditional Triggers -- 8.6.4 Systems of Regulation: A Revised Comparison -- 8.6.5 Summary -- 8.7 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 9: European Airport Reform: Slots and the Implicit Contract Between Airlines and Airports -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Outline of the European Airport System -- 9.2.1 Some Facts about the System -- 9.2.2 Aspects of Performance -- 9.2.2.1 Allocative Efficiency in the Short Run -- 9.2.2.2 Cost Efficiency -- 9.2.2.3 Provision of Capacity -- 9.2.2.4 Options for Commercial Activities -- 9.2.2.5 Connectivity and Regional Aspects -- 9.2.2.6 Quality -- 9.2.2.7 Environmental Externalities -- 9.2.3 Institutions -- 9.2.3.1 Ownership -- 9.2.3.2 Competition -- 9.2.3.3 Regulation -- 9.2.3.4 The Slot System -- 9.2.3.5 The Planning Environment -- 9.2.4 Interest Groups -- 9.2.4.1 Passengers and Shippers -- 9.2.4.2 Airlines -- 9.2.4.3 Airports -- 9.2.4.4 Governments and Regulators -- 9.2.4.5 Local Communities -- 9.3 How Well Are European Airports Performing? -- 9.3.1 Allocative Efficiency -- 9.3.2 Cost Efficiency -- 9.3.3 Provision of Capacity -- 9.3.4 Other Aspects -- 9.4 Implicit Airline-Airport Contracts -- 9.4.1 Airports with Adequate Capacity -- 9.4.2 Busy Airports -- 9.4.3 Options for Reform -- 9.5 Conclusions -- References -- Part II: Benchmarking -- Chapter 10: Efficiency Assessment of Airports and the Impact of Regulation on Performance -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Airport Efficiency Estimation -- 10.2.1 Total Factor Productivity -- 10.2.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis -- 10.2.3 Data Envelopment Analysis -- 10.2.4 Comparing Index Number TFP, SFA and DEA -- 10.3 Impact of Regulation on Airport Performance -- 10.4 Conclusions and Future Directions -- References -- Chapter 11: Methodology Choices for Benchmarking Airports -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 The Link Between the Use and Format of Benchmarking -- 11.2.1 Assess Managerial or Firm Performance.
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| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910720061703321 |
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Aircraft Valuation : Airplane Investments as an Asset Class / / by David Yu
