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The banks did it : an anatomy of the financial crisis / / Neil Fligstein
| The banks did it : an anatomy of the financial crisis / / Neil Fligstein |
| Autore | Fligstein Neil |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Cambridge, Massachusetts : , : Harvard University Press, , [2021] |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (336 p.) |
| Disciplina | 330.9730931 |
| Soggetto topico |
Mortgages - United States - History - 21st century
Financial crises - United States - History - 21st century Banks and banking - United States - History - 21st century Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 |
| ISBN |
0-674-25901-7
0-674-25902-5 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto | Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- Preface -- THE BANKS DID IT -- 1 A Long, Strange Trip -- 2 From Mortgages to Mortgage Securitization -- 3 The Rise of the Vertically Integrated Private Banks, 1993–2001 -- 4 Financial Innovation and the Alphabet Soup of Financial Products -- 5 The Subprime Moment, 2001–2008 -- 6 The Crisis and Its Spread Worldwide -- 7 Fraud and the Financial Crisis -- 8 Why Did the Federal Reserve Miss the Financial Crisis of 2008 -- 9 The Banks Did It (With the Help of the Government!) -- Notes -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910554224803321 |
Fligstein Neil
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| Cambridge, Massachusetts : , : Harvard University Press, , [2021] | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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The crisis of crowding : quant copycats, ugly models, and the new crash normal / / Ludwig B. Chincarini
| The crisis of crowding : quant copycats, ugly models, and the new crash normal / / Ludwig B. Chincarini |
| Autore | Chincarini Ludwig B |
| Edizione | [1] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Hoboken, NJ, : Bloomberg Press/Wiley, c2012 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (510 p.) |
| Disciplina |
330.973/0931
330.9730931 332 |
| Collana | Bloomberg |
| Soggetto topico |
Financial crises - United States - History - 21st century
Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 |
| ISBN |
1-119-20341-4
1-283-60420-5 9786613916655 1-118-28480-1 |
| Classificazione | BUS027000 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
THE CRISIS OF CROWDING; Contents; Foreword; Preface; Cast of Characters; CHAPTER 1 Introduction; PART I: THE 1998 LTCM CRISIS; CHAPTER 2 Meriwether's Magic Money Tree; The Birth of Bond Arbitrage; The Dream Team; Early Success; CHAPTER 3 Risk Management; The General Idea; Leverage; Measuring Risk; The ρ; Economics; Copycats, Puppies, and Counterparties; LTCM's Actual Risk Management Practices; Diversification; Operations; The Raw Evidence; CHAPTER 4 The Trades; The Short U.S. Swap Trade; The European Cross-Country Swap Trade (Short UK and Long Europe); Long U.S. Mortgage Securities Hedged
The Box Spread in Japan The Italian Swap Spread; Fixed-Income Volatility Trades; The On-the-Run and Off-the-Run Trade; Short Longer-Term Equity Index Volatility; Risk Arbitrage Trades; Equity Relative-Value Trades; Emerging Market Trades; Other Trades; The Portfolio of Trades; CHAPTER 5 The Collapse; Early Summer 1998; The Salomon Shutdown; The Russian Default; The Phone Calls; The Meriwether Letter; Buffett's Hostile Alaskan Offer; The Consortium Bailout; Too Big To Fail; Why Did It Happen?; Appendix 5.1 The John Meriwether Letter; Appendix 5.2 The Warren Buffett Letter CHAPTER 6 The Fate of LTCM Investors CHAPTER 7 General Lessons from the Collapse; Interconnected Crowds; VaR; Leverage; Clearinghouses; Compensation; What's Size Got to Do with It?; Contingency Capital; The Fed Is a Coordinator of Last Resort; Counterparty Due Diligence; Spread the Love; Quantitative Theory Did Not Cause the LTCM Collapse; Déjà Vu; PART II: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008; CHAPTER 8 The Quant Crisis; The Subprime Mortgage Market Collapse; What Was the Quant Crisis?; The Erratic Behavior of Quant Factors; Standard Factors; Quantitative Portfolio Factors; Causes of the Quant Crisis The Shed Show CHAPTER 9 The Bear Stearns Collapse; A Brief History of the Bear; Shadow Banking; Window Dressing; Repo Power; The Unexpected Hibernation; The Polar Spring; CHAPTER 10 Money for Nothing and Fannie and Freddie for Free; The Basic Business; Where's the Risk?; CDO and CDO2; The Gigantic Hedge Fund; Big-Time Profits; The U.S. Housing Bubble; The Circle of Greed; Real Estate Agents and Mortgage Lender Tricks; Home Owners; Profits and Politicians; The Media and Regulators; Grade Inflation; Commercial Banks; Freddie and Fannie's Foreclosure; Why Save Freddie and Fannie? Did Anyone Know? CHAPTER 11 The Lehman Bankruptcy; The Wall Street Club; Why Was Lehman Next?; Business Exposure; A Chronology of the Gorilla's Death; Double Down in Real Estate; Mildly Seeking Capital; The Final Days; A Classic Run on the Bank; Why Let Lehman Fail?; Who Was at Fault?; Lehman Brothers; The Counterparties; The Government and Market Structure; The Legal Opinion on the Lehman Bankruptcy; Who Would Have Been Next?; The Spoils of Having Friends in High Places; CHAPTER 12 The Absurdity of Imbalance; The Long-Dated Swap Imbalance; The Repo Imbalance The 228 Wasted Resources and the Global Run on Banks |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910141409803321 |
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Chincarini Ludwig B
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| Hoboken, NJ, : Bloomberg Press/Wiley, c2012 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Mercado financiero desintermediado y ciclo regulatorio / / Emilio Eiranova Encinas ; prólogo de Jesús Huerta de Soto
| Mercado financiero desintermediado y ciclo regulatorio / / Emilio Eiranova Encinas ; prólogo de Jesús Huerta de Soto |
| Autore | Eiranova Encinas Emilio |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Barcelona : , : JM Bosch Editor, , 2019 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 recurso en línea (428 páginas) : gráficos (blanco y negro y color) |
| Disciplina | 330.9730931 |
| Soggetto topico |
Mercado financiero - España
Crisis económicas - 2008- Liberalismo económico Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 Finance - Law and legislation |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Libros electronicos. |
| ISBN | 84-120243-7-0 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | spa |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910398052303321 |
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Eiranova Encinas Emilio
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| Barcelona : , : JM Bosch Editor, , 2019 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Mercado financiero desintermediado y ciclo regulatorio / / Emilio Eiranova Encinas ; prólogo de Jesús Huerta de Soto
| Mercado financiero desintermediado y ciclo regulatorio / / Emilio Eiranova Encinas ; prólogo de Jesús Huerta de Soto |
| Autore | Eiranova Encinas Emilio |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | Barcelona : , : JM Bosch Editor, , 2019 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 recurso en línea (428 páginas) : gráficos (blanco y negro y color) |
| Disciplina | 330.9730931 |
| Soggetto topico |
Mercado financiero - España
Crisis económicas - 2008- Liberalismo económico Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 Finance - Law and legislation |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Libros electronicos. |
| ISBN | 84-120243-7-0 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | spa |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910671895103321 |
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Eiranova Encinas Emilio
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| Barcelona : , : JM Bosch Editor, , 2019 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
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Who really drove the economy into the ditch? [[electronic resource] /] / Joseph Fried
| Who really drove the economy into the ditch? [[electronic resource] /] / Joseph Fried |
| Autore | Fried Joseph |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York, : Algora Pub., c2012 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (342 p.) |
| Disciplina |
330.973/0931
330.9730931 |
| Soggetto topico |
Financial crises - United States - History - 21st century
Recessions - United States - History - 21st century Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 |
| Soggetto genere / forma | Electronic books. |
| ISBN | 0-87586-944-0 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Preface: Who Really Drove the Economy Into the Ditch?; Part One: Two governmental policies caused the crisis; Chapter 1: The Rosetta stone of the subprime lending crisis; The origin of no-down payment loans; Lender, Thou Shalt be flexible; "The government was screaming" for subprime; The deadly role of Fannie and Freddie; Alarms were ringing years before the crisis; Chapter 2: Garbage in, garbage out; Say "goodbye" to sensible underwriting standards; F&F pushed the new automated systems with gusto; Automation and subprime don't mix; Push enough subprime and some will slip through
Risky, risk-based pricing Fannie and Freddie misconstrued the warning signs; Conclusion; Chapter 3: Appraise a house without leaving your seat; Lending on the basis of Zillow estimates; The many problems of the Automated Valuation Models; Needed for appraisals: A Full Monty; Epilogue; Chapter 4: A liberal pincer creates a thousand points of blight; The sound of silence; It gets worse: Down payments are "gifted"; What did F&F think of down payment corruption assistance?; The real reason we lack affordable homes; Summary; Chapter 5: Fannie and Freddie fudge their delinquency stats Once a crook, always a crook Like Sinatra, they did it their way; What were the real delinquency rates?; More creative accounting; Smoke and mirrors; Epilogue; Chapter 6: Fannie and Freddie's junk loan orgy; Paul's Principle, explained; What are subprime loans?; The junk loan orgy; F&F paid top dollar for subprime; Purchases of subprime were leveraged; The Fannie and Freddie apologists and their logic errors; Ed Pinto: A man completely vindicated; Chapter 7: More subprime promotion by Fannie and Freddie; Fannie and Freddie promoted brokers over banks; They got cozy with subprime aggregators They were cheerleaders for subprime F&F designed the subprime loans of private lenders; Fannie and Freddie misled the market about subprime; F&F redefined "conforming" to include subprime; The GSEs fought predatory lending laws; A brief history of F&F, subprime, and politics; Chapter 8: The Community Reinvestment Act (or Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde); What is the Community Reinvestment Act and how did it change?; The government refuses to produce reliable CRA data; What is the best estimate of CRA's impact on the crisis?; What torture teaches us about the CRA Chapter 9: Fed policy is a secondary cause of the crisis The deflation argument; Exactly when did the housing bubble start?; Can the U.S. Federal reserve cause a world-wide bubble?; Fed policy doesn't affect long-term rates?; The two bubble factors: monetary policy and subprime; Epilogue: Transcripts show a clueless Federal Reserve; Part Two: Resistance to subprime broke down; Chapter 10: Securitization - Who needs it?; A brief history of securitization; Was our 40-year securitization experiment a success?; Mechanics of mortgage loan securitization Securitization is not needed, but it is here to stay |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910462768203321 |
|
Fried Joseph
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||
| New York, : Algora Pub., c2012 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
Who really drove the economy into the ditch? [[electronic resource] /] / Joseph Fried
| Who really drove the economy into the ditch? [[electronic resource] /] / Joseph Fried |
| Autore | Fried Joseph |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | New York, : Algora Pub., c2012 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (342 p.) |
| Disciplina |
330.973/0931
330.9730931 |
| Soggetto topico |
Financial crises - United States - History - 21st century
Recessions - United States - History - 21st century Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 |
| ISBN | 0-87586-944-0 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Preface: Who Really Drove the Economy Into the Ditch?; Part One: Two governmental policies caused the crisis; Chapter 1: The Rosetta stone of the subprime lending crisis; The origin of no-down payment loans; Lender, Thou Shalt be flexible; "The government was screaming" for subprime; The deadly role of Fannie and Freddie; Alarms were ringing years before the crisis; Chapter 2: Garbage in, garbage out; Say "goodbye" to sensible underwriting standards; F&F pushed the new automated systems with gusto; Automation and subprime don't mix; Push enough subprime and some will slip through
Risky, risk-based pricing Fannie and Freddie misconstrued the warning signs; Conclusion; Chapter 3: Appraise a house without leaving your seat; Lending on the basis of Zillow estimates; The many problems of the Automated Valuation Models; Needed for appraisals: A Full Monty; Epilogue; Chapter 4: A liberal pincer creates a thousand points of blight; The sound of silence; It gets worse: Down payments are "gifted"; What did F&F think of down payment corruption assistance?; The real reason we lack affordable homes; Summary; Chapter 5: Fannie and Freddie fudge their delinquency stats Once a crook, always a crook Like Sinatra, they did it their way; What were the real delinquency rates?; More creative accounting; Smoke and mirrors; Epilogue; Chapter 6: Fannie and Freddie's junk loan orgy; Paul's Principle, explained; What are subprime loans?; The junk loan orgy; F&F paid top dollar for subprime; Purchases of subprime were leveraged; The Fannie and Freddie apologists and their logic errors; Ed Pinto: A man completely vindicated; Chapter 7: More subprime promotion by Fannie and Freddie; Fannie and Freddie promoted brokers over banks; They got cozy with subprime aggregators They were cheerleaders for subprime F&F designed the subprime loans of private lenders; Fannie and Freddie misled the market about subprime; F&F redefined "conforming" to include subprime; The GSEs fought predatory lending laws; A brief history of F&F, subprime, and politics; Chapter 8: The Community Reinvestment Act (or Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde); What is the Community Reinvestment Act and how did it change?; The government refuses to produce reliable CRA data; What is the best estimate of CRA's impact on the crisis?; What torture teaches us about the CRA Chapter 9: Fed policy is a secondary cause of the crisis The deflation argument; Exactly when did the housing bubble start?; Can the U.S. Federal reserve cause a world-wide bubble?; Fed policy doesn't affect long-term rates?; The two bubble factors: monetary policy and subprime; Epilogue: Transcripts show a clueless Federal Reserve; Part Two: Resistance to subprime broke down; Chapter 10: Securitization - Who needs it?; A brief history of securitization; Was our 40-year securitization experiment a success?; Mechanics of mortgage loan securitization Securitization is not needed, but it is here to stay |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910786447703321 |
|
Fried Joseph
|
||
| New York, : Algora Pub., c2012 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||