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The political economy of Chinese finance [[electronic resource] /] / edited by J. Jay Choi, Michael R. Powers, Xiaotian Tina Zhang
| The political economy of Chinese finance [[electronic resource] /] / edited by J. Jay Choi, Michael R. Powers, Xiaotian Tina Zhang |
| Edizione | [First edition.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | United Kingdom : , : Emerald, , 2016 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (424 p.) |
| Disciplina | 332 |
| Altri autori (Persone) |
ChoiJongmoo Jay <1945->
PowersMichael R ZhangXiaotian Tina |
| Collana | International finance review |
| Soggetto topico |
Business & Economics - Finance
Finance - China |
| ISBN | 1-78560-957-2 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa  |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Front Cover; The Political Economy of Chinese Finance; Copyright Page; Contents; List of Contributors; Part I: An Overview and Conceptual Foundations; Market Socialism with "Chinese Characteristics"; Introduction; Timeline of China's Economic Reform; Confucianism, Socialism, and SOEs; Forthcoming Papers; Notes; The Metaphysical Foundations of Political Economy in China and the West; Introduction; Political Economy; The Phenomenology of Political Economy; The Concept of Political Economy; Metaphysics; An Historical Perspective on the Concept of 'Metaphysics'; Heidegger's Concept of Metaphysics
Heidegger's Metaphysical ErasWestern Metaphysics; Confucian Metaphysics; Conclusion; References; Part II: State and Corporate Governance; A State-Stewardship View on Executive Compensation; Introduction; Institutional Background; Privatization and the Split-Share Structure Reform; Corporate Governance Structure and Executive Compensation Structure; A State-Stewardship View; Hypothesis; State Control and Gray Income; Value Maximization: Agents versus State's Stewards; Political Connections and Managerial Backgrounds; Internal Governance and Symbolic Management Local and National Political GoalsData and Methodology; Data; Methodology; Results and Discussion; Benchmark Results; SOEs versus Private Firms; The Regional Analysis; Robustness Checks; Results from Alternative Panel Data Models; Pay and Performance Revisited: Instrumental Variable Strategy; Generalizability and Alternative Explanations; Conclusion; Notes; Acknowledgments; References; Netizens and Private Monitoring in Chinese Banking; Information and Private Monitoring in Chinese Banking; Relationship and Transactional Banking Models in Chinese Banking Pathologies in Chinese Relationship and Transactional BankingPersonal Relationships between Senior Bankers and SOE Senior Managers; A Simple Argument for Better Chinese Banking Governance; Final Thoughts; Notes; References; Appendix; CEO Promotion, Relative Performance Measures, and Institutions in an Emerging Market: Evidence from China's Listed State-Owned Enterprise; Introduction; Background and Hypothesis; Incentive Schemes in China's SOEs; The Relative Performance Measure as Explicit Incentive in China's SOEs; Variables and Models; Incentive Schemes in China's SOEs; Promotion Entering GovernmentRotation; Demotion; Imprisonment; Other Honorary Positions; Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE); Other Factors; Data and Sample; Data; Sample Description; Results; Association between Incentive Schemes and Prior Firm Performance; Incentive Schemes and Subsequent Firm Performance; Univariate Tests; Regression Results; Conclusion; Notes; Acknowledgments; References; Appendix: The Characteristics of Chinese Bureaucratic Layers (Source: Chinese Government Yearbooks); County Level; Municipal Level; Provincial Level; Central Level Part III: Control and Ownership in the Corporate Sector |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910798650403321 |
| United Kingdom : , : Emerald, , 2016 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||
The political economy of Chinese finance / / edited by J. Jay Choi, Michael R. Powers, Xiaotian Tina Zhang
| The political economy of Chinese finance / / edited by J. Jay Choi, Michael R. Powers, Xiaotian Tina Zhang |
| Edizione | [First edition.] |
| Pubbl/distr/stampa | United Kingdom : , : Emerald, , 2016 |
| Descrizione fisica | 1 online resource (424 p.) |
| Disciplina | 332 |
| Altri autori (Persone) |
ChoiJongmoo Jay <1945->
PowersMichael R ZhangXiaotian Tina |
| Collana | International finance review |
| Soggetto topico |
Business & Economics - Finance
Finance - China |
| ISBN | 1-78560-957-2 |
| Formato | Materiale a stampa |
| Livello bibliografico | Monografia |
| Lingua di pubblicazione | eng |
| Nota di contenuto |
Front Cover; The Political Economy of Chinese Finance; Copyright Page; Contents; List of Contributors; Part I: An Overview and Conceptual Foundations; Market Socialism with "Chinese Characteristics"; Introduction; Timeline of China's Economic Reform; Confucianism, Socialism, and SOEs; Forthcoming Papers; Notes; The Metaphysical Foundations of Political Economy in China and the West; Introduction; Political Economy; The Phenomenology of Political Economy; The Concept of Political Economy; Metaphysics; An Historical Perspective on the Concept of 'Metaphysics'; Heidegger's Concept of Metaphysics
Heidegger's Metaphysical ErasWestern Metaphysics; Confucian Metaphysics; Conclusion; References; Part II: State and Corporate Governance; A State-Stewardship View on Executive Compensation; Introduction; Institutional Background; Privatization and the Split-Share Structure Reform; Corporate Governance Structure and Executive Compensation Structure; A State-Stewardship View; Hypothesis; State Control and Gray Income; Value Maximization: Agents versus State's Stewards; Political Connections and Managerial Backgrounds; Internal Governance and Symbolic Management Local and National Political GoalsData and Methodology; Data; Methodology; Results and Discussion; Benchmark Results; SOEs versus Private Firms; The Regional Analysis; Robustness Checks; Results from Alternative Panel Data Models; Pay and Performance Revisited: Instrumental Variable Strategy; Generalizability and Alternative Explanations; Conclusion; Notes; Acknowledgments; References; Netizens and Private Monitoring in Chinese Banking; Information and Private Monitoring in Chinese Banking; Relationship and Transactional Banking Models in Chinese Banking Pathologies in Chinese Relationship and Transactional BankingPersonal Relationships between Senior Bankers and SOE Senior Managers; A Simple Argument for Better Chinese Banking Governance; Final Thoughts; Notes; References; Appendix; CEO Promotion, Relative Performance Measures, and Institutions in an Emerging Market: Evidence from China's Listed State-Owned Enterprise; Introduction; Background and Hypothesis; Incentive Schemes in China's SOEs; The Relative Performance Measure as Explicit Incentive in China's SOEs; Variables and Models; Incentive Schemes in China's SOEs; Promotion Entering GovernmentRotation; Demotion; Imprisonment; Other Honorary Positions; Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE); Other Factors; Data and Sample; Data; Sample Description; Results; Association between Incentive Schemes and Prior Firm Performance; Incentive Schemes and Subsequent Firm Performance; Univariate Tests; Regression Results; Conclusion; Notes; Acknowledgments; References; Appendix: The Characteristics of Chinese Bureaucratic Layers (Source: Chinese Government Yearbooks); County Level; Municipal Level; Provincial Level; Central Level Part III: Control and Ownership in the Corporate Sector |
| Record Nr. | UNINA-9910816076603321 |
| United Kingdom : , : Emerald, , 2016 | ||
| Materiale a stampa | ||
| Lo trovi qui: Univ. Federico II | ||
| ||